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Governance is the greatest challenge facing the international commu­
nity. In fact, only if the nations of the world cooperate in establishing 
institutions and rules in support of the global common good will the 
phrase “international community” have practical meaning. Otherwise, 
sovereign nations will live, and very likely die, not in a community at 
all but in a Hobbesian jungle. 
The overarching common goal can best be defined in the negative: 
avoiding catastrophe for the planet. Because of humankind’s mastery 
of technology, we now have the capacity to destroy ourselves. We can 
do so today and quickly, in a thermonuclear war; or we can do so 
tomorrow, more slowly but no less completely, through the ruination 
of our environment. This book addresses that danger and what it will 
take to avert it. 
In their thoughtful, rigorous, comprehensive, and readable chap­
ters, the scholars and practitioners assembled here discuss options and 
opportunities for better management of our ecological interdepend­
ence. The authors, all in the forefront of their fields, draw on several 
areas of scientific expertise, including international law, economics, 
biological sciences, and environmental policy; they also represent a 
variety of national perspectives spanning five continents. Yet they 
share a conviction that traditional national policy and international 
diplomacy are no longer sufficient, either in pace, scope or substance. 
Retarding and reversing the damage that we are already inflicting on 
our environment requires an unprecedented, coordinated, long-term 
effort involving ambitious, innovative, and flexible coalitions of state 
and non-state actors, especially non-governmental organizations that 
tap into the resources, knowledge, and activism of citizens. 
Making the case for environmental governance is an intellectual 
challenge as well as a political one. Hence the opportunity — and the 
obligation — of leading institutions like the Yale School of Forestry & 
Environmental Studies to contribute to the debate. 
The Yale Center for the Study of Globalization is proud to have sup­
ported this venture. Those of us involved in the founding of the 
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option. It’s not good or bad. It’s not something to be for or against. It’s 
a fact of life — something to be understood and managed. Yet global­
ization is, for better or worse, subject to human behavior. We can max­
imize the positive aspects of globalization, diminish the risks, and 
counter the threats. In that sense, we’ve often said, globalization is like 
the weather, which not only manifests the forces of nature but shows 
the effects of human profligacy and short-sightedness. 
This book tackles head on that aspect of globalization — including 
what it has to say about the weather, how it’s changing, and how we, 
the international community, can change the way it’s changing. 
Readers will have a chance to join the authors in better under­
standing the problem of global environmental degradation and there­
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A Note from the Editors 
Daniel C. Esty and Maria H. Ivanova 
This book grew out of the Global Environmental Governance Project 
sponsored by the Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy. The 
project began in 1998 as a dialogue among environmental profession­
als, government officials, business people, non-governmental organi­
zation leaders, and scholars from around the world keenly aware of 
the magnitude of modern environmental challenges, the inability of 
existing institutions to respond effectively, and the need for funda­
mental reforms in the way we manage our global ecological interde­
pendence. A diverse group has continued to gather over the years to 
push the boundaries of the current debate and to delineate options 
and opportunities for strengthened global environmental governance. 
The World Summit on Sustainable Development to be held in 
Johannesburg in August 2002 provided the impetus for assembling the 
accumulated collective knowledge into a concise volume aiming to 
contribute to the policy dialogue with a thoughtful yet rigorous 
reform agenda. What seemed like an impossible timeframe for a pub­
lication became a feasible project with editorial and publicity support 
from the Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies (F&ES). 
Dean James Gustave Speth contributed visionary leadership, policy 
guidance, and financial support. Jane Coppock, Assistant Dean and 
Editor of the Yale F&ES Book Series, ingeniously pulled all the pieces 
together and made this volume a vibrant part of the School’s book 
series on environmental subjects of current interest. 
We owe a great debt of gratitude to the extraordinary group of 
authors that gave life to this book. The fifteen contributors brought to 
the project a depth and breadth of expertise, invaluable experience 
from all social sectors, and a range of national perspectives from 
Africa, Asia, Latin America, Western and Eastern Europe, and North 
America. Above all, they offered energy, enthusiasm, and commit­
ment. The authors submitted drafts and revisions under pressing 
deadlines, quickly and thoughtfully responded to comments, and 
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The truly collaborative nature of this project was manifested in a 
two-day workshop in New Haven in April 2002 that allowed us to dis­
cuss the draft chapters, elaborate the overall analytical framework of 
the volume, and test preliminary findings. A grant from the Yale 
Center for the Study of Globalization made this event possible. The 
broad support, active engagement, and insightful advice of its Director 
Strobe Talbott helped immeasurably. We are also grateful for the 
encouragement and assistance of Associate Director Haynie Wheeler. 
The commentaries and critiques of two reviewers, Peter Haas of the 
University of Massachusetts and David Driesen of University of 
Syracuse Law School, strengthened the book considerably. The valu­
able comments of Mehjabeen Habidi-Abib of UNDP in Pakistan also 
helped to bolster several of the chapters. 
The analytical framework for this book has greatly benefited from 
our extensive discussions over a number of years with the participants 
in the Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy’s Global 
Environmental Governance Project (and the recently constituted 
Global Environmental Mechanism Policy Action Group that grew out 
of that project). We wish to thank all those who have been part of this 
process: Mehjabeen Abidi-Habib (Pakistan), Adnan Amin (Kenya), Ali 
Azimi (Afghanistan), Abimbola Bamidele-Izu (Nigeria), Alicia 
Bàrcena (Mexico), Johannah Bernstein (Canada), Frank Biermann 
(Germany), Al Binger (Jamaica), Zbigniew Bochniarz (Poland), 
Laurence Boisson de Chazournes (Switzerland), Delphine Borione 
(France), Tom Burke (United Kingdom), James Cameron (United 
Kingdom), Paulo Henrique Cardoso (Brazil), Daniele Cesano (Italy), 
Anilla Cherian (India), Nazli Choucri (Egypt), Angela Cropper 
(Trinidad and Tobago), Carolyn Deere (Australia), Bharat H. Desai 
(India), Neno Dimov (Bulgaria), Rudolf Dolzer (Germany), Elizabeth 
Dowdeswell (Canada), Saliem Fakir (South Africa), Janine Ferretti 
(Canada), Christiana Figueres (Costa Rica), Dan Fleshler (United 
States), Claude Fussler (Switzerland), Arnoldo Jose Gabaldon 
(Venezuela), Luis Gomez-Echeverri (Colombia), Pat Gruber (United 
States), Michael Gucovsky (Israel), Peter Haas (United States), Scott 
Hajost (United States), Parvez Hassan (Pakistan), Gudrun Henne 
(Germany), Jim Hickman (United States), T. Christine Hogan 
(Canada), Joy Hyvarinen (Finland), Jesse Johnson (United States), 
Ilona Kickbusch (Germany), Maritta Koch-Weser (Germany), Koh 
Kheng Lian (Singapore), Milwako Kurosaka (Japan), Alexander 
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Loy (United States), Wangari Maathai (Kenya), Andrew Mack 
(Australia), Dan Martin (United States), Claudia Martinez 
(Colombia), Julia Marton-Lefèvre (France), Bill McCalpin (United 
States), Kristin Morico (United States), Sascha Müller-Kraenner 
(Germany), Daudi Mwakawago (Tanzania), Dhesigan Naidoo (South 
Africa), Sunita Narain (India), Derek Osborn (United Kingdom), 
Boyce Papu (South Africa), Franz Xaver Perrez (Switzerland), Kenneth 
Prewitt (United States), Karl Rábago (United States), Tom Rautenberg 
(United States), Julie Richardson (United Kingdom), Mark Ritchie 
(United States), Michael Roux (Australia), Kim Samuel-Johnson 
(Canada), Mark Schapiro (United States), P.J. Simmons (United 
States), Udo Simonis (Germany), Sandra Smithey (United States), 
Tom Spencer (United Kingdom), Matthew Stilwell (Australia), 
Charlotte Streck (Germany), Simon Tay (Singapore), Beth Tener 
(United States), Alvaro Umaña (Costa Rica), Simon Upton (New 
Zealand), Annabell Waititu (Kenya), Joke Waller-Hunter (the 
Netherlands), Wang Canfa (China), Patricia Waruhiu-Wangai (Kenya), 
John Waugh (United States), Makarim Wibisono (Indonesia), 
Xiangmin Liu (China), and Kees Zoeteman (the Netherlands). 
An outstanding team of Yale students provided invaluable support 
in research, editing, and organizing the book. We wish to acknowledge 
the assistance of Elizabeth Allison, Andres Luque, Shafqat Hussain, 
and Tyler Welti. Pierre-Luc Arsenault stepped in as an editorial assis­
tant and has worked wonders. We wish to pay special tribute to Emily 
Noah whose extraordinary skills in research, writing, editing, and 
graphic design advanced not only the book effort but also the Global 
Environmental Governance Project more generally. 
Jane Coppock, the series editor, and Melissa Goodall, editorial 
assistant, at the Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies 
deserve special recognition and thanks. Simply said, without them this 
book would not have been possible. Their contribution to every stage 
of the process and every page of the volume is invaluable. We are also 
grateful to Barbara Ruth, Carolyn Deere, and Irina Faion for their 
assistance at critical moments. 
A book is not just about writing. Its ultimate purpose is to convey 
an idea. In this regard, we are grateful for the use of David Walker’s 
quilt art on the book cover, which communicates the myriad ways in 
which humanity is interwoven and interrelated. Dottie Scott’s 
resourceful assistance with the page layout was indispensable to the 
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of the efforts of the team at Yale’s Reprographics and Imaging Services 
(RIS) where the book was produced. The Yale F&ES book series has 
used these digital publishing services for many years, and the existence 
of a facility where books can be designed, printed, bound, and mailed, 
utilizing the latest in digital technology, has enabled many an author 
to get ideas into print at a speed that was once considered inconceiv­
able. On this particular project, our thanks go to Maura Gianakos and 
Peter Johnson for the overall graphic design of the book, and to Joseph 
Cinquino who, as always, managed the printing and production 
process with efficiency and grace. 
This project could not have gone forward without substantial sup­
port from several funders. The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur 
Foundation helped launch the Global Environmental Governance 
Project in 1998 and has continued to support its activities. 
Contributions from the Heinrich Böll Foundation, the Rockefeller 
Foundation, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, and the Global 
Environment and Trade Study (and its funders including the Ford 
Foundation and the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership) 
have allowed the project to continue and expand. 
Publishing a book is not the end of this sweeping project. While 
this volume marks a major landmark in the Global Environmental 
Governance Project, it also denotes the beginning of an expanded pol­
icy and outreach effort. Building on its four-year initiative, the Yale 
Center for Environmental Law and Policy, in cooperation with the 
Globus Institute for Globalization and Sustainability in the 
Netherlands, and the Commission on Globalization, has established a 
Global Environmental Mechanism (GEM) Policy Action Group. The 
goals of this Policy Action Group are to: (1) define a thoughtful, yet 
rigorous agenda for global environmental governance reform; (2) 
open a “back channel” dialogue among government officials, NGO 
leaders, academics, and business community representatives on ways 
to strengthen global environmental institutions; (3) create a con­
stituency for sustained involvement in a reform initiative; and (4) 
work toward the implementation of the reform agenda. 
We hope that, with the publication of this collection of reform 
visions and options, the group of authors and collaborators can assist 
decisionmakers around the world in beginning to define ambitious 
yet feasible ways of converting global environmental governance chal­
lenges into opportunities. 








The Global Environmental Agenda: 
Origins and Prospects 
James Gustave Speth 
summary 
We have been moving rapidly to a swift and pervasive deterioration of 
our environmental assets. In response, there has been an upsurge of 
international environmental law and diplomacy, a vast outpouring of 
impressive scientific research, and thoughtful policy analysis. What has 
emerged over the past two decades is the international community’s 
first attempt at global environmental governance. 
Two developments were needed before the international 
environmental movement could be born: (1) environmental policy had to 
be legitimized at the national level, and (2) the life-sustaining processes 
of the biosphere had to be perceived as a common concern of all peoples. 
The first phase of global environmental governance has been instru­
mental in raising domestic and international awareness for 
environmental issues, but overall it has been marked more by failure 
than success. The threatening trends that spurred international 
attention twenty years ago persist essentially unabated, ozone depletion 
being the principal exception. It is clearly time to launch a second phase, 
moving us from talk to action. 
Three broad paths to environmental governance can be discerned. 
First, new institutions and norm-setting procedures are needed at the 
international level. Second, bottom-up initiatives from non-government 
organizations (NGOs), businesses, local governments, and other actors 
should be encouraged. Third, we need to address more directly the 
underlying causes of environmental degradation, such as population 
growth, poverty and underdevelopment, inadequate technologies, and 
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the new ethical imperative 
We have entered a new period in our relationship with the natural 
world. Human influence is pervasive and deep. We impact hugely on 
the great life support systems of the planet. We are now at the plane­
tary controls, whether we like it or not. Scientist Peter Vitousek and his 
co-authors stated the matter forcefully in a 1997 article in Science: 
All of these seemingly disparate phenomena trace to a single 
cause – the growing scale of the human enterprise. The rates, 
scales, kinds, and combinations of changes occurring now are 
fundamentally different from those at any other time in history; 
we are changing earth more rapidly than we are understanding 
it. We live on a human-dominated planet – and the momentum 
of human population growth, together with the imperative for 
further economic development in most of the world, ensures 
that our dominance will increase…. Humanity’s dominance of 
Earth means that we cannot escape responsibility for managing 
the planet. (Vitousek et al., 1997) 
Scientists are generally a cautious lot, so when our most respected 
scientists issue a plea for “active management of the planet,” we must 
take notice. Aldo Leopold, perhaps the most famous graduate of the 
school that I now serve as dean, noted that “one of the penalties of an 
ecological education is that one lives alone in a world of wounds.” 
There is a lot of bad news in the world of environmental affairs, but 
there is good news as well. One piece of good news is that the plea of 
Vitousek is but the latest in a long line of appeals from the scientific 
community, urging governments and others to take the task of pro­
tecting the global environment more seriously. 
Starting in the 1980s, governments and others did indeed take 
notice and began the process of assuming responsibility for planetary 
management. What has emerged over the past two decades is the 
international community’s first attempt at global environmental gov­
ernance. All is not well yet in this new arena, but it is important to 
acknowledge what has been accomplished. 
Before examining these accomplishments in global governance of 
the environment, however, a quick observation about vocabulary is in 
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does it include only the actions of governments. Many non-govern­
mental organizations (NGOs), businesses, and communities are 
already playing large roles in the emergence of global environmental 
governance as we know it today. 
It is also interesting to contrast the use of language in the environ­
mental field and the field of economics. 
The phrase “managing the global economy” comes rather 
easily. It is frequently heard because it is a priority enterprise 
of governments, multilateral financial institutions, and many 
others. But “managing the global environment”? It still sounds 
futuristic, but it shouldn’t. The global environment is more 
of an integrated system than the global economy. It is 
even more fundamental to human wellbeing. It is impacted 
powerfully by human activities, and it requires collective 
management. 
origins of the global environmental agenda 
An agenda of the principal large-scale environmental concerns of the 
international community has been defined. In response to this agenda, 
there has been an upsurge of international conferences, negotiations, 
action plans, treaties, and other initiatives. New fields of international 
environmental law and diplomacy have been born. There has been a 
vast outpouring of impressive and relevant scientific research and 
policy analysis. Increasingly sophisticated actions by an ever-stronger 
international community of environmental and other NGOs have 
flourished, ranging from the global to the local, from civil 
disobedience to analytical think-tank publications. 
Both national governments and multilateral institutions, from the 
United Nations to the international development banks, have recog­
nized these concerns, creating major units to address global-scale 
issues. While many multinational corporations are still in denial, oth­
ers have become highly innovative and have moved ahead with 
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impressive steps, often before their governments. In academia, inter­
national environmental affairs has become a major subject of intellec­
tual inquiry and teaching. A large body of scholarly analysis now 
exists. And we are fast-approaching another of those milestone events: 
the 2002 World Summit for Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, 
which follows the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human 
Environment and the 1992 Rio Earth Summit. 
Large-scale environmental concerns have attracted increasing 
attention from governments, NGOs, multilateral agencies, and even 
the business community. How did this agenda emerge? How were the 
issues identified and framed? What has been accomplished to date in 
the area of global environmental governance? By whom? How did 
these actors gain recognition and political traction? 
The Rise of Domestic Concern: The U.S. Environmental Movement 
To put these issues in perspective, it is useful to start in the 1960s with 
the emergence of the modern era of environmental concern. It was 
driven by domestic, mostly local, issues: local air and water pollution, 
strip-mining, highway construction, noise pollution, dams and stream 
channelization, clear-cutting of forests, hazardous waste dumps, 
nuclear power plants, exposures to toxic chemicals, oil spills, suburban 
sprawl. Concern about these issues gathered strength throughout the 
1960s. 
In the United States, this concern led to the National 
Environmental Policy Act in December 1969, and to the first Earth Day 
a few months later. Within the short span of a few years in the early 
1970s, the Environmental Protection Agency and the Presidential 
Council on Environmental Quality were established, the Clean Air 
and Water Acts and other major federal legislation were passed, and 
the federal courts were deluged with lawsuits brought by a new gener­
ation of environmental advocacy organizations, often funded by 
major U.S. foundations. It was during this period that groups like the 
Natural Resources Defense Council and the Environmental Defense 


















The new environmental movement handed the business 
community a long string of defeats, and it often left scientists 
anxious in their efforts to keep up. Economists were aghast, 
and ecologists, even lawyers, were lionized. Large majorities 
of the public were strongly pro-environment. The news media 
were full of stories, and the government responded with far-
reaching, expensive requirements and tough deadlines for 
industry. A tipping point — a phase change — was reached. 
What was once impossible became inevitable. The fire was lit. 
How did this happen? A number of factors came together (Speth, 
1985, 1988). First, there was the rising demand for environmental qual­
ity in an increasingly affluent post-war population. Between 1950 and 
1970, U.S. per capita income rose by fifty-two percent. People sought 
the amenities of the suburbs, and by 1970 there were more Americans 
in the suburbs than in cities or rural areas. National Park visitation 
doubled between 1954 and 1962 and doubled again by 1971 (U.S. 
Council on Environmental Quality, 1979). 
Second, pollution and blight were blatant and inescapable. Smog, 
soot, and the resultant smarting eyes and coughs from air pollution, 
streams and beaches closed to fishing and swimming because of water 
contaminants, plastic trash and toxic chemicals that would not go 
away, birds threatened by DDT, pesticide poisoning, fish kills, power 
plants and highways in the neighborhood, marshes filled for new track 
houses and streams channelized for navigation and drainage – all 
these threats were highly visible and impossible to ignore. 
Third, the social upheavals of the 1960s had given rise to a new gen­
eration of questioning, politically active, and socially concerned young 
people. The civil rights and anti-war movements showed that political 
activism could work. Some of the active figures were also not so 
young. Based on the teach-ins used to protest the Vietnam War, 
Wisconsin Senator Gaylord Nelson came up with the concept of a 
national teach-in for the environment, and thus launched what 
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Fourth, there was a widespread view that major corporations were 
getting away with murder. Eloquent writers emerged to make the case: 
Ralph Nader wrote Unsafe at Any Speed in 1965. Rachel Carson pub­
lished Silent Spring in 1962. The play had to have a villain, and corpo­
rate America was it. 
Fifth, the likely opposition — the business community — was 
caught off guard, without time to marshal its troops or gather its 
ammunition. Even environmental NGOs were surprised. The Sierra 
Club’s executive director later noted that they “were taken aback by the 
speed or suddenness with which the new forces exploded….We were 
1 severely disoriented” (Shabecoff, 1993).
Finally, there were the major precipitating events: the Cuyahoga 
River in Cleveland bursting into flames, the Interior Department’s 
proposal to flood the Grand Canyon, and, most significantly, the Santa 
Barbara oil spill in 1969. The rest, as they say, is history. 
principal characteristics of 
the early environmental agenda 
The global-scale challenges that concern us today were almost 
totally absent from the discussion in the 1960s and 1970s. Only glob­
al population growth and protection of the ozone layer were includ­
ed in the concerns of the time. 
There was no major body of science – or group of scientists – push­
ing these issues forward. Some individual scientists played major 
roles – Paul Ehrlich, John Holden, Barry Commoner, and George 
Woodwell among them. But the issues were advanced mainly by 
events and by the realities of people’s everyday experiences. 
Similarly, there was little need to try to define and promote an 
agenda. The agenda was defined by everyday incidents and the accu­
mulation of actions in response. It was Lois Gibbs and her efforts at 
Love Canal, for example, that put the issue of abandoned hazardous 
waste sites on the agenda, not scientists or the government, and it 
happened after much of the early environmental legislation had 
been passed. 
Shabecoff’s A Fierce Green Fire: The American Environmental Movement contains an excellent 
survey of today’s environmental movement. See also the U.S. Council on Environmental Quality,




















The Emergence of Global Issues 
If this was the domestic scene, where were the global-scale issues of 
primary concern to us? Much as the domestic agenda of the 1970s was 
forming in the 1960s, the global change agenda was quietly taking 
shape in the 1970s. Throughout the 1970s, a steady stream of publica­
tions with a planetary perspective emerged, calling attention to glob­
al-scale concerns. Most were authored by scientists with the goal of 
taking their findings and those of other colleagues to a larger audi­
ence. A number of these reports were path-breaking, defining the 
global environmental agenda, but not all of them met with universal 
acclaim. 
seminal global environmental reports – 1970-19782 
1970	 Man’s Impact on the Global Environment, Report of 

the Study of Critical Environmental Problems

(a scientific group assembled at MIT)
 
1971 	 This Endangered Planet, Richard Falk 
1972 	 Exploring New Ethics for Survival, Garrett Hardin 
1972 	 Only One Earth, Barbara Ward and Rene Dubos 
1974	 The Limits to Growth, Donella Meadows et al. 
1978	 The Human Future Revisited, Harrison Brown 
1978 	 The Twenty-Ninth Day, Lester Brown 
There were also numerous reports from scientific groups, especial­
ly panels and committees organized by the International Council of 
Scientific Unions, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, the 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), and the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). These reports 
included the now famous 1974 study by Rowland and Molina, explain­
ing the potential of CFCs to deplete the ozone layer. Their work 
remains the only environmental research to date to win the Nobel 
Prize. Also among these documents was the Charney Report, which 
was published by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences in 1979, and 
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told us most of what we needed to know about climate change to take 
action. These reports and the steady stream of publications from 
Lester Brown and his team at the Worldwatch Institute collectively laid 
out the key issues. 
Then, starting around 1980, a series of reports appeared seeking to 
pull together all of these issues into a coherent agenda for interna­
tional action. 
seminal global environmental reports – 1980-19903 
1980	 World Conservation Strategy, IUCN and UNEP 
1980	 The Global 2000 Report to the President, U.S. Council on 
Environmental Quality 
1981	 Global Future: Time to Act, U.S. Council on Environmental 
Quality 
1982	 The World Environment: 1972-1982, UNEP scientific team 
(Holdgate et al.) 
1983	 Environmental Research and Management Priorities 
for the 1980s, an international group of scientists 
organized by the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences 
1987	 Our Common Future, World Commission on Environment 
and Development (the Brundtland Commission Report) 
Predominantly scientific efforts were designed to bring global-scale 
challenges forcefully to the attention of governments. These syntheses 
collectively stressed ten principal environmental concerns: 
• Loss of crop and grazing land due to desertification, erosion, con­
version of land to non-farm uses, and other factors; 
• Depletion of the world’s tropical forests, leading to loss of forest 
resources, serious watershed damage (erosion, flooding, and silta­
tion), and other adverse consequences; 
• Mass extinction of species, principally from the global loss of 
wildlife habitat, and the associated loss of genetic resources; 















Rapid population growth, burgeoning Third World cities, and • 
ecological refugees;
 
Mismanagement and shortages of freshwater resources;
 • 
Overfishing, habitat destruction, and pollution in the marine envi­• 
ronment;
 








Acid rain and, more generally, the effects of a complex mix of air
 • 
pollutants on fisheries, forests, and crops;
 
Depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer by CFCs and other
 • 
gases. 
Clearly this was a new agenda, very different from the one 
that sparked the first Earth Day in 1970. 
stage-setting developments 
Political scientist Keith Caldwell has noted that two developments 
were needed before the international environmental movement could 
be born: environmental policy had to be legitimized at the national 
level, and the life-sustaining processes of the biosphere had to be per­
ceived as a common concern of all peoples. 
Caldwell sees the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment, 
the Stockholm Conference, as crucially important in both respects 
(Caldwell, 1996). Ably led by Maurice Strong, the Stockholm 
Conference forced many national governments to develop domestic 
environmental programs – including those in Europe, which were lag­
ging behind the United States at that point, though not today – and it 
legitimized the biosphere as an object of national and international 
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The Stockholm Conference also had a further major consequence 
– the creation of UNEP – which, as noted above, had a major role in 
the 1970s in framing the global agenda. The United Nations Environ­
ment Programme made estimates of deforestation and promoted 
strategies of action, convened the 1977 international conference on 
desertification, and promoted international agreements on the protec­
tion of migratory species and the World Climate Program of the 
World Meteorological Organization, all in the 1970s. 
By the mid-1980s, the intellectual and policy leadership of the sci­
entific community, the NGO community (groups such as IUCN, 
Worldwatch, and the World Resources Institute), and UNEP had paid 
off: a new and international environmental agenda had been estab­
lished, one that governments would have to address collectively in 
some way to be credible. The press for action on these ten issues was 
too strong to ignore. Intellectuals in the scientific and NGO commu­
nities had excellent media access to keep the pressure on and keep the 
issues in the public eye. It would take another decade for this to hap­
pen fully, but by the mid-1990s each of the ten challenges had become 
the subject of a major international treaty, plan of action, or other ini­
tiative (although the freshwater and marine initiatives are arguably too 
weak to count). 
What we see, then, is that the global agenda emerged and moved 
forward due primarily to a relatively small, international leadership 
community in science, government, the UN, and NGOs. They took 
available opportunities to put these issues forward – indeed they cre­
ated such opportunities – so that governments had little choice but to 
respond. The game that many governments played was to react, but 
not forcefully. 
domestic action and global indifference 
Against this background, it is instructive to compare the emergence of 
the global agenda with the emergence of the original, predominantly 
domestic agenda a decade earlier. The differences have proven conse­
quential in eliciting corrective action from governments. Several con­















• The issues on the domestic agenda were acute, immediate, and 
understandable to the public. Issues on the global agenda tend to 
be more chronic, more remote (at least from the North), techni­
cally complicated, and thus more difficult to understand and relate 
to. These differences have translated into major disparities in the 
degree of public awareness and support. 
• The global agenda did not spring bottom-up from actual impacts 
on people; rather, it was forged top-down at the international level 
by science (often disputed science), by NGOs (often with circum­
scribed credibility), and by a peanut-sized UN agency tucked away 
in Nairobi. 
• Unlike the domestic agenda, respect for national sovereignty 
requires agreement from many governments, often with different 
rankings of priorities. No government can be compelled to agree 
nor obligated without its consent. Thus treaties are hard to attain, 
and forceful treaties are a rare commodity. 
• The domestic agenda was largely translated into legislation before 
corporate and other opposition was aroused. Action on the global 
agenda has been pursued in the context of an alerted, prepared, 
and powerful opposition where corporate interests are viewed as 
threatened. 
• The world’s most powerful country led in the fight for national-
level action in the 1970s, but has largely failed to provide interna­
tional leadership on the global agenda. Indeed, the United States 
has frequently been the principal hold-out on international envi­
ronmental agreements. 
• The villainy of the global agenda is more ambiguous. The blame 
for global-scale environmental problems cannot rest solely on the 
shoulder of big corporations when lifestyles in the developed 
world, mismanagement by governments of both the North and 
the South, and other factors are so clearly implicated. Increasingly, 
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Domestic agendas can be addressed primarily through regulatory • 
means, but the global agenda requires major expenditures by gov­
ernments, including development assistance to the poorer coun­
tries. 
In light of these barriers to progress, it is a wonder that any has 
been made at all. How should one assess the progress of the last two 
decades – the decades during which we have been “on notice” that we 
faced extraordinary global environmental challenges? As noted earlier, 
there is a significant list of accomplishments that have followed in the 
wake of the emergence of the new global agenda. But as also noted, 
there have been severe constraints on seeking concerted international 
action. How has the play of these forces worked out in the real world? 
assessment and prospects 
Looking back, it cannot be said that the generations of the 1960s and 
1970s did nothing in response to the global call for action. Progress has 
been made on some fronts, but not nearly enough. There are out­
standing success stories, but rarely are they commensurate with the 
problem. 
For the most part, we have analyzed, debated, discussed, and 
negotiated these issues endlessly. My generation is a genera­
tion, I fear, of great talkers, overly fond of conferences. But on 
action, we have fallen far short. As a result, the threatening 
global trends highlighted twenty years ago are still very 
much with us, ozone depletion being the notable exception. 
But if we have not succeeded in reversing these trends, perhaps we 
have laid a good foundation for rapid action today. In fact, the results 
of twenty years of international environmental negotiations are disap­
pointing. It is not that what has been agreed, for example, in the con­
ventions on climate change, desertification, and biodiversity, is useless. 
But these treaties are mostly frameworks for action; they do not drive 














international discussions on world forests, which have never reached 
the point of a treaty. 
In general, international environmental law and its hundreds of 
treaties are plagued by vague agreements, minimal requirements, lax 
enforcement, and under-funded support. The weakness of most envi­
ronmental treaties should not be a surprise, however; they were forged 
in negotiating processes that give maximum leverage to any country 
with an interest in protecting the status quo. Similarly, the interna­
tional institutions created to address these issues – the UNEP and 
ECOSOC’s Commission on Sustainable Development – are among the 
weakest multilateral organizations. 
If the first phase of global environmental governance has 
been marked more by failure than success, it is clearly time to 
launch a second phase that corrects past mistakes and moves 
from talk to action. 
global environmental governance scenarios 
The World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) 
has sketched several broad paths in environmental governance: 
• The “FROG” – First Raise Our Growth – scenario calls for the res­
olution of economic challenges first. FROG is a business-as-usual 
scenario, leading to huge environmental costs, even in the eyes of 
business leaders. 
• “GEOPolity” is a success scenario in which sustainability is vigor­
ously pursued. In this case, people turn to government to focus the 
market on environmental and social ends and rely heavily on 
intergovernmental institutions and treaties. 
• The final scenario is “Jazz.” Jazz is not an acronym. It is a spirit, a 
world of unscripted initiatives, decentralized and improvisational. 
In this world, there is abundant information about business 
behavior; good conduct is enforced by public opinion and con­
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sumer behavior. Governments facilitate; NGOs are very active; 
business sees strategic advantage in doing the right thing (WBCSD, 
1997). 
The initial international response to the global change agenda has 
been to try to move the world from FROG to GEOPolity. It isn’t work­
ing. Getting serious requires new action on three mutually supportive 
fronts. 
Revising GEOPolity 
The current world of GEOPolity is designed to fail. It can be 
redesigned for success by insisting on new norm-setting procedures 
and new institutions, including a Global Environmental Organization 
(GEO). The case for an effective GEO is as strong as that for an effec­
tive World Trade Organization (WTO). The international community 
knows how to create plausible multilateral arrangements and has 
often done so in other, mostly economic, areas (Speth, 2002). 
Taking Jazz to Scale 
A second path to the future is to implement measures that can take 
Jazz to scale. Jazz is the most exciting arena for action today, with an 
outpouring of bottom-up, unscripted initiatives from business, NGOs, 
governments, and others: 
• Seven large companies, including DuPont, Shell, BP, and Alcan, 
have agreed to reduce their CO2 emissions fifteen percent below 
their 1990 levels by 2010. Indeed, Alcan is reported to be on track 
to reduce its emissions twenty-five percent below 1990 levels by 
2010, and DuPont is on schedule to reduce emissions by sixty-five 
percent. 
• Eleven major companies, including DuPont, GM, and IBM, have  
formed the Green Power Market Development Group and com­
mitted to develop markets for 1,000 megawatts of renewable ener­
gy over the next decade. 
• Home Depot, Lowes, Andersen, and others have agreed to sell 










managed forests certified by an independent group using rigorous 
criteria. Unilever, the largest processor of fish in the world, has 
agreed to do the same regarding fish products. 
NGOs have played important roles in forging these corporate 
initiatives. They are the real maestros of Jazz. Local govern­
ments, universities, and other entities have also contributed. 
Over 500 local governments have now joined a campaign to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Speth, 2002). 
Attacking the Drivers of Deterioration 
The third and most important path to sustainability is to address more 
directly the underlying drivers of environmental degradation (Speth, 
1995). 
Population. Analyses suggest that an escalation of proven non­• 
coercive approaches could lead to a leveling off of global popula­
tion at eight and a half billion people in this century. This will not 
happen without adequate support for the United Nations’ Cairo 
Plan of Action. 
Poverty and underdevelopment. Poverty is an important con­• 
tributor to environmental deterioration: the poor often have lit­
tle choice other than to lean too heavily on a declining resource 
base. But improved development prospects are also needed 
because the only world that works is one in which the aspirations 
of poor people and poor nations for fairness and justice are 
being realized. The views of developing countries in internation­
al negotiations on the environment are powerfully shaped by 
preoccupation with their own compelling economic and social 
challenges and distrust of the intentions and policies of indus­
trialized countries. Sustained and sustainable development pro­
vides the only context in which there is enough confidence, trust, 
and hope to ground the difficult measures needed to realize envi­
ronmental objectives. 
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Eliminating large-scale poverty is no longer an impossible dream. 
It could be accomplished in the lifetimes of today’s young people. 
But, as with population, achieving these goals is limited by inade­
quate development assistance, in this case compounded by protec­
tionist trade regimes and heavy debt burdens. 
Technology. The only way to reduce pollution and resource con­• 
sumption while achieving expected economic growth is to bring 
about a wholesale transformation in the technologies that today 
dominate manufacturing, energy, transportation, and agriculture. 
Across a wide front, environmentally sophisticated technologies 
are either available or soon can be. From 1990 to 1998, when oil 
and natural gas use grew globally at a rate of two percent annual­
ly, and coal consumption did not grow at all, wind energy genera­
tion grew at an annual rate of twenty-two percent and photo­
voltaics at sixteen percent. Denmark now gets fifteen percent of its 
energy from wind; Japan last year installed 100 megawatts of pho­
tovoltaic power. Transformation of the energy sector must rank as 
the highest priority. 
Market signals. Needed changes in technology and consumption • 
patterns will not happen unless there is a parallel revolution in 
pricing. The corrective most needed now is environmentally hon­
est prices. Full cost pricing is thwarted today by the failure of gov­
ernments to eliminate environmentally perverse subsidies (esti­
mated globally at $1.5 trillion per year) to ensure that external 
environmental costs are captured in market prices (Myers and 
Kent, 2001). We have no reason to expect major environmental 
improvement while these distortions persist. 
conclusion 
There is no great mystery about what must be done. What does remain 
a great mystery is how we get on that path. Political systems alternate 
between incremental drift and rapid change – a pattern of punctuat­
ed equilibria. The global environment has been addressed incremen­
tally, whereas we need major reform, a phase change, a tipping point, 
a rapid shift to a new equilibrium akin to the outpouring of U.S. 
domestic environmental concern in the 1960s and 1970s. 







It is possible that we are seeing the birth of something like this shift 
in the anti-globalization protests, in the far-reaching and unprece­
dented initiatives being taken by some private corporations, in the 
growth of NGOs and their innovations, in scientists speaking up and 
speaking out, and in the outpouring of climate and other environ­
mental initiatives by the religious community. We certainly must hope 
that something new and vital is afoot. 
There are many hopeful signs that things are beginning to change 
for the better, but we are still at the early stages of the journey to 
sustainability. Meanwhile, the forward momentum of the drivers of 
environmental deterioration is great. As former Presidential Science 
Advisor Jack Gibbons is fond of saying, “If we don’t change direction, 
we’ll end up where we’re headed!” And today we are moving rapidly to 
a swift, pervasive, and appalling deterioration of our environmental 
assets. There is still world enough and time, but the next few decades 
are crucial. The next doublings of the world economy cannot resemble 











    
references 
Brown, Harrison. 1978. The Human Future Revisited: The World 
Predicament and Possible Solutions. New York: W. W. Norton. 
Brown, Lester. 1978. The Twenty-Ninth Day: Accommodating Human 
Needs and Numbers to the Earth’s Resources. New York: W. W. 
Norton. 
Caldwell, Lynton K. 1996. International Environmental Policy: From the 
Twentieth to the Twenty-First Century. 3rd ed. Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press. 
Charney, J.G. 1979. Carbon Dioxide and Climate: A Scientific 
Assessment. Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences. 
Falk, Richard. 1971. This Endangered Planet. New York: Random House. 
Hardin, Garrett. 1972. Exploring New Ethics for Survival: The Voyage of 
the Spaceship Beagle. New York: Viking Press. 
Holdgate, Martin W., Mohammed Kassas, and Gilbert F. White. 1982. 
The World Environment 1972-1982. Nairobi, Kenya: United Nations 
Environment Programme. 
IUCN. 1980. World Conservation Strategy: Living Resource Conservation 
for Sustainable Development. Gland, Switzerland: International 
Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources. 
McNeill, J. R. 2000. Something New Under the Sun: An Environmental 
History of the Twentieth Century World. New York: W. W. Norton. 
Meadows, Donella H. et al. 1974. The Limits to Growth. New  York:  
Universe Books. 
Myers, Norman, and Jennifer Kent. 2001. Perverse Subsidies. 
Washington, D.C.: Island Press. 
Rowland, Sherwood, and Mario Molina. 1974. “Stratospheric Sink for 
Chlorofluoromethanes: Chlorine Catalysed Destruction of Ozone.” 
Nature 249: 810-814. 
Salomon, Jean-Jacques. 1995. “The ‘Uncertain Quest’: Mobilising 
Science and Technology for Development.” Science and Public Policy 









Shabecoff, Philip. 1993. A Fierce Green Fire: The American 
Environmental Movement. New York: Hill & Wang. 
Speth, James Gustave. 1985. Protecting our Environment: Toward a New 
Agenda. Washington, D.C.: Center for National Policy. 
_____. 1988. “Environmental Pollution: A Long-Term Perspective.” In 
Earth '88: Changing Geographic Perspectives: Proceedings of the 
Centennial Symposium, edited by Earth '88. Washington, D.C.: 
National Geographic Society. 
_____. 1995. “The Transition to a Sustainable Society.” Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences 89 (3): 870-872. 
_____. 2002. “Recycling Environmentalism.” Foreign Policy, July/August 
2002. 
Study of Critical Environmental Problems. 1970. Man’s Impact on the 
Global Environment: Assessment and Recommendations for Action. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
U.S. Council on Environmental Quality. 1979. Environmental Quality: 
Tenth Annual Report. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office. 
U.S. Council on Environmental Quality. 1980. The Global 2000 Report 
to the President – Entering the Twenty-First Century. Washington, 
D.C.: Council on Environmental Quality and United States 
Department of State. 
U.S. Council on Environmental Quality. 1981. Global Future: Time to 
Act: Report to the President on Global Resources, Environment, and 
Population. Washington, D.C.: Council on Environmental Quality 
and United States Department of State. 
UNEP. 2002. Global Environment Outlook 3. Nairobi, Kenya: United 
Nations Environment Programme. Available from http://www.grid. 
unep.ch/geo/geo3/index.htm 
Union of Concerned Scientists. 2001. “Warning to Humanity.” 
Renewable Resources Journal 19 (2): 16-17. 
Vitousek, Peter M., Harold A. Mooney, Jane Lubchenco, and Jerry M. 
Melillo. 1997. “Human Domination of Earth’s Ecosystems.” Science 










    
Ward, Barbara, and Rene Dubos. 1972. Only One Earth: The Care and 
Maintenance of a Small Planet. New York: W. W. Norton. 
WBCSD. 1997. Exploring Sustainable Development: Global Scenarios 
2000-2005. Geneva, Switzerland: World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development. 
World Commission on Environment and Development. 1987. Our 
Common Future. New York: United Nations. 
World Resources Institute. 2000. World Resources 2000-2001: People 
and Ecosystems. New York: Oxford University Press. Available from 
http://www.wri.org/wri/wr2000/toc.html 
Worldwatch Institute, ed. 2001. Vital Signs 2001: The Environmental 
Trends That Are Shaping Our Future, 2001 Edition. New York: W. W. 
Norton. 
James Gustave Speth is Dean of the Yale School of Forestry & 
Environmental Studies. Most recently, he served as Administrator of 
the United Nations Development Programme and chair of the UN 
Development Group. He was founder and President of the World 
Resources Institute, professor of law at Georgetown University, chair­
man of the U.S. Council on Environmental Quality, and senior attor­
ney and cofounder of the Natural Resources Defense Council. 
Throughout his career, he has provided leadership and entrepreneur­
ial initiatives to many environmental task forces and committees, 
including the President’s Task Force on Global Resources and 
Environment and the Western Hemisphere Dialogue on Environment 
and Development. In 2002, he was awarded the Blue Planet Prize for 













  -  
Flying Blind: Assessing Progress 
Toward Sustainability 
David Hales and Robert Prescott-Allen
summary 
For development to be sustainable, it must combine a robust economy, 
rich and resilient natural systems, and flourishing human communities. 
Rational pursuit of these goals demands that we have clear policy 
targets, operationalize them in terms of actions and results, devise 
analytical tools for deciding priority actions, and monitor and evaluate 
our progress. Goals that are not measurable are unlikely to be achieved. 
We invest in what we measure, and over time we become what we 
reward. Without valid and reliable assessment methodology and tools, 
we run the risk of achieving unintended and unanticipated results, and 
of wasting much of our investment. 
When the nations of the world convene in Johannesburg, South Africa 
for the World Summit on Sustainable Development, it will again be 
apparent that our worthwhile dreams have exceeded our capacity to 
manage effectively, in large measure because we have no systematic, 
valid, and reliable way to evaluate our progress, and no fixed point of 
responsibility for this task. 
This chapter offers a challenge to governments whose rhetoric calls 
for democratic participation, transparent actions, and real results, but 
whose practical actions fall short of these aspirations. There are no other 
commitments remotely achievable for the Johannesburg Summit that 
could be more valuable than a legally binding agreement to create the 
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the sustainability challenge 
As the gavel fell on the adoption of Agenda 21: Programme of Action for 
Sustainable Development in June 1992 in Rio de Janeiro, there was a 
strong sense that the nations of the world were on the road to sus­
tainability. The catalytic force of the Earth Summit led to the 
Convention on Biodiversity, the Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, and the Convention on Desertification, all of which entered 
into force during the 1990s. While the specifics of financial resources 
and technology transfer were intentionally left vague, the basis for a 
global partnership, seemed to be in place. 
Institutions were devised for the implementation of the Rio 
outcomes. In 1993, the General Assembly of the United Nations 
established the UN Commission on Sustainable Development to 
“review progress” on each chapter of Agenda 21 and assess overall 
headway. In 1997, the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated to operationalize 
the Framework Convention on Climate Change, including legally 
binding targets for reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. An 
Intergovernmental Panel on Forests and an Intergovernmental Forum 
on Forests have been established to apply the Forest Principles in 
programs for action at the national level. 
At every level, although not in every place, the roles of civil society, 
transnational corporations, and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) have evolved. More than sixty countries have formed nation­
al commissions for sustainable development, and more than four 
hundred cities and municipalities have adopted local versions of 
Agenda 21. Many corporations seem anxious to be seen as responsive 
to societal calls to play their part in raising environmental and labor 
standards worldwide. In 2000, the Organisation for Economic Co­
operation and Development (OECD), together with representatives of 
business, labor, and civil society, produced Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises, one of several examples of texts encourag­
ing corporate social responsibility. The World Economic Forum also 
routinely discusses corporate accountability and the role of corpora­
tions in promoting sustainable development. 
Yet in 2002, as the gavel is raised to convene nations and their devel­
opment partners in Johannesburg for the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development, a working definition of sustainable devel­
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structures for sustainable development at national and international 
levels dysfunctional to the point of irrelevance (Upton, 2000). 
A fundamental reason for high levels of dissatisfaction, dis­
cord, and unease is the lack of capacity to show real progress 
against the goals set by the Rio Conference. 
the rio decade: assessing progress 
Principle 1 of the Rio Declaration states that a “healthy and productive 
life in harmony with nature” is at the core of sustainable development 
and is an entitlement of people around the globe. Much has changed 
since 1992, but in terms of achieving the goal of sustainability, what have 
these developments meant? The answer, simply put, is that we don’t 
know. A summary tour of “facts” serves to illustrate this uncertainty. 
Are people richer or poorer? 
The World Bank argues that poor people the world over have 
increased their incomes, are better educated, and are living healthier 
and more productive lives. However, when these figures are disaggre­
gated by country, it is difficult to determine how much of the progress 
alluded to by the Bank has occurred in the past ten years. In many of 
the least developed countries, annual per capita income has decreased 
(UN, 1999). The gap between rich and poor has grown wider in many 
places. By 2000, the income of the richest fifth of the world’s people 
was seventy-four times that of the poorest fifth, and the assets of the 
richest two hundred individuals exceeded the combined wealth of the 
less wealthy forty percent of the world’s population (UNDP, 1999). 
The economies of some countries – Singapore, South Korea, Hong 
Kong, and Taiwan, for example – have done well. Indonesia, Thailand, 
and Argentina made apparent economic progress for the first part of 
the Rio Decade, and have faced economic disasters since. In other 
nations, little has changed. Average incomes in sub-Saharan Africa 
continue to be stagnant, as they have been since the 1960s, and many 
of the transition economies of Eastern Europe and Central Asia have 
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Is there enough food for everyone? 
Overall food production is sufficient to feed the current global popu­
lation of more than six billion people. Yet, the inability to transport 
and distribute that food, interruptions in food supply due to political 
instability, and chronic poverty have led to unremitting malnutrition 
in many urban areas and across sub-Saharan Africa. There are no 
major stocks of food fish that are not experiencing stress and decline, 
and many are collapsing. 
Has quality of life improved? 
Life expectancy has risen slightly, with gains in developing countries 
marginally outpacing those in the developed world (World Resources 
Institute, 1998). There have been substantial medical breakthroughs, 
but new threats to human health have also emerged. Major strides 
have been made in the reduction of diseases that have plagued so 
1many for so long. At the same time, AIDS, the leading cause of death 
in sub-Saharan Africa, has reduced life expectancy in twenty-nine 
African countries by seven years (UNFPA, 1999). Children the world 
over continue to die of treatable illnesses and maladies such as diar­
rhea, and preventive health care and affordable medicines are unavail­
able to most of the world’s people. 
Are societies more fair and just? 
The importance of good governance and democratic participation in 
the authoritative allocation of resources has been emphasized in the 
negotiated outcomes of every development-related international con­
ference of the decade. Elected governments at the national level have 
increased from 66 (out of 167) in 1987, to 121 (out of 192) at the end of 
2001. In many places, however, democratic reforms are fragile at best, 
and many of the world’s poor associate the growth of poverty with the 
spread of democracy. 
Are women and men treated equally? 
The role of women in many societies has changed substantially, and 
the international community clearly recognizes that gender equality is 
1 For example, iodine deficiency has been reduced in many parts of the world, and river blindness
has been eliminated in eleven countries in West Africa, opening new lands to cultivation and
adding years of productive labor. Dracunculiasis (guinea worm) cases have dropped from over
three million per year, spread over Africa and Asia, to less than 10,000, mostly in the Sudan. Polio
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a fundamental part of social justice. Women now hold more than ten 
percent of all national parliamentary seats, and the percentage of 
female cabinet ministers worldwide has risen from 3.4 in 1987 to 6.8 in 
1996. However, two-thirds of the illiterate adults in the world are 
women and two-thirds of the children who are not in school around 
the world are girls (UN, 1997). 
Is the environment better off? 
The world continues to lose habitats and animal and plant species at 
an astounding rate. The capacity of natural systems to respond to 
stress has thus decreased, resulting in floods, droughts, and other 
severe natural disasters. During the 1990s, there was a net loss of for­
est cover, although the rate of annual loss seems to have declined com­
pared to the rate of annual loss over the decade from 1980 to 1990. 
Developed countries have increased their forest cover since Rio, while 
developing countries show substantial deforestation. The health of the 
world’s coral reefs has declined significantly since 1992, with more 
than half of coral ecosystems currently considered endangered or 
threatened (Wilkinson, 2000). Efforts to abate land-based marine pol­
lution seem to have had only limited local effect. As Speth argues in 
this volume, many of the key environmental trend lines are deeply 
worrisome. 
Are human demands on the environment sustainable? 
Increasing human populations and inefficient patterns of consump­
tion continue to put additional pressure on already strained resources 
and natural systems. Every second since the adjournment of Rio has 
seen the birth of three new souls, each one of whom needs 1,400 calo­
ries and four gallons of water a day to survive. Half of all humanity 
now lives in cities, most of which are situated in coastal areas and river 
valleys literally on top of some of the world’s most productive agri­
cultural lands and marine ecosystems. 
Humans have long affected regional weather, yet this generation is 
the first to demonstrably affect the Earth’s climate. Synthetic 
endocrine disruptors – copycat hormones – are capable of changing 
basic life processes in ways that are difficult to anticipate. The devel­
opment of genetically modified species holds great potential for food 
security but has generated serious concerns for unanticipated and 
irreversible consequences to human and ecosystem health. 
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where are we on the sustainability curve? 
Combining these facts and figures does not provide a comprehensive 
picture of progress toward global sustainability. At best, we can say 
that some human lives have improved and some are under greater 
duress. Some natural systems seem to be doing better, others have 
been irrevocably changed, and none remain unaffected. And the prob­
lem is no less serious at lower governance levels. Assessing progress is 
equally difficult at regional, national, and local scales. National aver­
ages mask substantial differences among groups and places within 
countries, just as global figures obfuscate disparities among nations. 
Even when the economy and the environment are considered sepa­
rately, it is difficult to summarize whether we are better or worse off than 
a decade ago. From consideration of unconnected facts, even if they gave 
a valid picture of the “economy” or the “environment,” it is impossible to 
conclude just where we are in the transition to sustainability. 
Achieving sustainability requires defining its components in 
measurable terms and clearly fixing the responsibility to 
assess progress comprehensively. 
the value of measurement 
We approach the tenth anniversary of Agenda 21 with few nations hav­
ing adopted definitions of success in achieving sustainability and little 
practical clarity at the international level. Although the Millennium 
2	 3Goals and the Monterrey Consensus are substantial steps in the right 
direction at the international level, we still have no reliable roadmap 
to follow. Making progress toward sustainability is like going to a des­
2	 The eight Millennium Goals are set forth in the United Nations Millennium Declaration of
September 2000: (1) Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; (2) Improve maternal health; (3)
Achieve universal primary education; (4) Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; (5)
Promote gender equality and empower women, (6) Ensure environmental sustainability, (7)
Reduce child mortality; and (8) Develop a global partnership for development. 
3 The Monterrey Consensus is the final document adopted at the conclusion of the UN
Financing for Development conference on March 22, 2002, in Monterrey, Mexico, wherein
heads of state and government pledged to take a major step toward eradicating poverty and
achieving sustainable economic growth around the world. For more information about the


















  -  
tination we have never visited before, equipped with a sense of geog­
raphy and the principles of navigation, but without a map or compass. 
Rational pursuit of sustainable development demands that we have 
clear goals, that we operationalize those goals in terms of measurable 
results, that we devise analytical tools for deciding priority actions, and 
that we monitor and evaluate our progress (Prescott-Allen, 2001). A 
more quantified approach to sustainable development is necessary. 
Goals that are not measurable are unlikely to be achieved. We 
invest in what we measure, and over time, we become what 
we reward. Without a valid and reliable assessment method­
ology, we run the risk of achieving unintended and unantici­
pated results, and of wasting much of our investment in the 
future. 
A core set of indicators, marking goals and achievements, could 
help restructure our understanding of complex environmental and 
socioeconomic problems and redefine our thinking about appropriate 
response strategies. Measurement provides an empirical foundation 
for setting goals, for evaluating performance, for calculating the 
impact of our activities on the environment and society, and for 
benchmarking (IISDnet, 2000a). 
Good data and information provide the tools for detecting aggre­
gate effects and “tragedies of the commons” in the making. Given the 
spatial and temporal dispersion of environmental problems, quantifi­
cation of trends and impacts is critical to the understanding of possi­
ble cause and effect relationships and the initiation of a policy 
response. Moreover, numerical analyses facilitate the evaluation of 
policy success or failure and allow for faster redefinition of alterna­
tives. Facts, figures, and time series data on key indicators can narrow 
the range of disputes and reduce the polarization that often marks 
policy debates – whether about global climate change or pollution of 
a local lake (Esty, 2001b). 
Information systems can transform policy options as well. 
Comparative analysis helps to target investment, spur competition, 
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transparency and permit greater accountability. A quantified 
approach to environmental policymaking, therefore, could lead to bet­
ter decisionmaking, improved performance, and greater efficiency by 
reducing uncertainty, enhancing comparative analysis, defining points 
of leverage, benchmarking, and revealing best practices (Esty, 2002). 
measurement tools 
Information is critical to sound decisionmaking. Its collection and 
presentation, however, are vital to its relevance and impacts. The 
tracking and aggregation of data are carried out at several levels and 
with multiple purposes. Some of the most widely employed tools 
include accounts, indicators, indices, and assessments. 
Accounts 
Accounts are selective collections of numerical data, converted to a 
common unit (money, weight, area, or energy). They can reveal how 
many people are working, and whether there are more or fewer jobs. 
They can reveal the number of acres of wetlands in a particular juris­
diction, and whether that number is increasing or decreasing. 
Monetary and environmental accounting, the predominant approach­
es to measuring progress, are indispensable, but insufficient tools for 
measuring sustainable development. Collections of facts rarely allow 
for communication and consensus building among those who have 
different values and perceptions. 
The most influential accounting system is the System of National 
Accounts, codified and adopted by the United Nations in 1953 and 
most recently revised in 1993. The system records asset changes, 
income, and costs that can be measured and compared in monetary 
terms. It measures almost everything upon which humans can put a 
price, but excludes everything that humans usually consider priceless 
– from parenting and education to forests and air. The most common 
indicators derived from the System of National Accounts are the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) and the Gross National Product (GNP).
4	 The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) measures the total added value of enterprises operating in
a particular country and the Gross National Product (GNP) measures the total added value of
enterprises owned by citizens of a particular country. For example, goods produced by an
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Both GDP and GNP are inappropriate measures for human and 
ecosystem wellbeing. They show income, but not income 
distribution. They do not distinguish between productive and 
destructive activities, or between sustainable and unsustain­
able ones. Forest fires, hurricanes, cancer, crime, and disease 
all add to the GDP because dealing with them requires money 
to change hands. 
It is as if a business kept a balance sheet by merely adding up all 
transactions without distinguishing between income and expenses, or 
between assets and liabilities. This leads to an overestimate of income 
and encouragement of economic policies that cannot be sustained. We 
need a different measure of progress, a clear guide through the jumble 
5of contradictory statistics.
Indicators, Indices, and Assessments 
The primary alternatives to using accounts rely on assessments. 
Assessments assemble, summarize, organize, interpret, and possibly 
reconcile pieces of existing knowledge, and communicate them in a 
simplified manner. They are context-specific and do not attempt to be 
complete, but rely instead on measuring specific representative aspects, 
or indicators. Because they can be selective, assessments are better 
equipped than accounts to cover the wide range of issues necessary for 
an adequate portrayal of human and environmental conditions. 
Indicators represent a particular attribute, characteristic, or prop­
erty of a system (Gallopin, 1997). They require numerical data and 
time series to express trends. When a collection of indicators is aggre­
gated mathematically, an index is produced. Indices simplify complex 
phenomena and make it possible to gauge the general status of a sys­
tem (IISDnet, 2000a; WEF, 2002). 
5	 While other approaches have been proposed, including the Index of Sustainable Economic
Welfare (ISEW) (Daly and Cobb, 1994) and the Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI), the Achilles
heel of these and similar approaches is the difficulty of converting data to monetary units. For
things that are traded, the market price is used. For things that have marketplace equivalents,
oil in underdeveloped reserves for example, the market price is an adequate surrogate. For
everything else, contingent values or estimated cost of social and environmental damage
must be substituted. This reliance on monetary units as a single measurement obscures the
great diversity of methods, data sources, and assumptions that are actually used. Moreover,
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A number of assessment initiatives have been launched in the past 
few years as alternatives to traditional measurement practices focusing 
on one or several systems. Among the most effective efforts are the 
Human Development Report, the Living Planet Index, the Ecological 
Footprint, the Environmental Sustainability Index, the Compass of 
Sustainability, the Dashboard of Sustainability, and the Wellbeing 
Assessment. These indices differ in scope, in the weight given to the 
environment, and in the basis used for converting indicator measure­
ments to performance scores. Table 1 (pp 42-43) provides a brief 
overview of several key assessment initiatives. 
the value and promise of integrated assessments 
Rio defined sustainability in economic, social, and environmental 
terms, and postulated the interdependence and indivisibility of these 
factors. We have learned, often to our chagrin, and usually to our frus­
tration, that gains in economic welfare can often be offset by environ­
mental costs, and that environmental protection can lead to social 
costs. We need integrated assessment methodologies that will serve as 
navigational tools, allowing us to define starting points and bench­
marks along the way so that we can learn as we go. 
Integrated assessments seek to provide relevant information to 
decisionmakers rather than merely to advance understanding for its 
own sake. They also bring together a broader set of areas, methods, or 
degrees of certainty than would typically characterize a study of the 
same issue within the bounds of a single research discipline (CIESIN, 
1995). Integrated assessments separate signal from noise and help 
make sense of the signals. They meet the need for substantive infor­
mation and, when developed in a participatory fashion, provide the 
additional benefits of consensus on broad goals and support for diffi­
cult political actions. Integrated assessments enable improved coordi­
nation and targeting of resources. They can help decisionmakers 
understand the linkages between short- and long-term needs and 
between apparently diverse goals by illuminating both connections 
and thresholds of impact. In addition, integrated assessments provide 
mechanisms by which individuals can evaluate the sustainability of 
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the bellagio principles for assessing 
sustainable development 
In 1996 the International Institute for Sustainable Development con­
vened assessment specialists at the Rockefeller Foundation’s Conference 
Center in Bellagio, Italy to develop principles to guide the assessment of 
progress toward sustainable development. The Bellagio Principles state 
that assessments should meet the following ten criteria: 
1)	 Guiding vision and goals: Assessments should be guided by a clear 
vision of sustainable development and goals that define that 
vision. 
2) 	 Holistic perspective: Assessments should include review of the 
whole system as well as its parts and consider the wellbeing of 
sub-systems and both positive and negative consequences of 
human activity in monetary and non-monetary terms. 
3) 	 Essential elements: Assessments should consider equity and dis­
parity within the current population and between present and 
future generations. 
4) Adequate scope: Assessments should adopt a time horizon long 
enough to capture both human and ecosystem time scales. 
5) 	 Practical focus: Assessments should be based on an explicit set of 
categories that link visions and goals to indicators. 
6) Openness: Assessments should have transparent methods and accessi­
ble data; they should make explicit all judgments, assumptions, and 
uncertainties in data and interpretation. 
7)	 Effective communication: Assessments should be designed to 
meet the needs of the users and aim for simplicity in structure and 
language. 
8)	 Broad participation: Assessments should obtain broad representa­
tion of key professional, technical, and social groups, while also 
ensuring the participation of decisionmakers. 
9) Ongoing assessment: Assessments should develop a capacity to 
repeat measurement to determine trends and be responsive to 
change and uncertainty and adjust goals and frameworks as new 
insights are gained. 
10) Institutional capacity: Continuity of assessing progress should be 
assured by clearly assigning responsibility and support in the deci­
sionmaking process, providing institutional capacity for data col­
lection, and supporting development of local assessment capacity. 
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Table 1 Leading Assessment Initiatives 
Method Institution Categories of
measurements 
Description 
Human United Nations People Includes four separate 






• Education (school 
enrollment and 
adult literacy rate) 










• Human Poverty 
Index (separate 






World Economic Forum 
(Yale Center for 
Environmental Law and 
Policy, Yale University 













• Reducing human 
vulnerability 
• Social and 
institutional 
capacity 




classified in five 
categories. Each 
indicator includes 
several variables, for a 
total of sixty-eight 
variables. 





• Animal species 
in forests 
• Animal species 
in freshwater 
ecosystems 
• Animal species 
in marine ecosystems 
which monitor the 
changes over time in 
animal species in 









• Area of cropland 
required to produce
crops consumed 
• Area of grazing land 
required to produce 
animal products 
• Area of forest 
required to produce 
wood and paper 
• Area of sea required 
• Area of land required 




tion’s consumption of 
food, materials, or 
energy, by adding up 
six estimates of different 
types of areas required 
to produce the 
resources consumed 
by that population. 
The Ecological Foot­
print is measured in 
“area units.” 
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Method Institution Categories of
measurements 
Description 






Wellbeing of individuals 
for each of the four 
broad categories pro­
vides both quantitative 
and qualitative inform­
ation about progress 
toward sustainability. 
In each of the four 
categories, there is a 
minimum of three 
indices (stocks, flows 
and responses) and ten 
indicators. The four 
categories are summed 
into a Sustainable 
Development Index 








of indicators of three 
or four categories (the 
first three plus or 
minus Institutions) 
into a Policy Perform­
ance Index 
Wellbeing PADATA (Robert Ecosystem The Barometer of 
Assessment/ Prescott-Allen), World Sustainability is the 
Barometer of Conservation Union People only performance scale 












• Wellbeing Index 
• Wellbeing/Stress 
Index 
designed to measure 
human and ecosystem 
wellbeing together 
without submerging 




tors to be combined 
independently, keeping 
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case study: wellbeing assessment 
Wellbeing Assessment (Prescott-Allen, 2001) is an integrated assess­
ment methodology that can be used in both public and private sectors 
and from local to global levels. The basic hypothesis of Wellbeing 
Assessment is that sustainable development results from effective pur­
suit of human wellbeing and ecosystem wellbeing, and that the inter­
action between the subsystems can be measured and indexed. 
Wellbeing Assessment defines human wellbeing as “a condition in 
which all members of society are able to determine and meet their needs 
and have a large range of choices to fulfill their potential” and ecosystem 
wellbeing as “a condition in which the ecosystem maintains its diversity 
and quality (and thus its capacity to support people and the rest of life) 
and its potential to adapt to change and provide a wide range of choic­
es and opportunities for the future” (Prescott-Allen, 2001). 
Measurements 
Wellbeing Assessment measures the wellbeing of people and ecosys­
tems separately, yet considers them jointly by organizing the informa­
tion into two subsystems with five components each: 
People 
• Health and Population 
Wealth 

















Wellbeing Assessment identifies features of each dimension and 
organizes them into a hierarchy of progressively more specific and 
measurable parts. Indicators are chosen on the basis of representative­
ness, reliability, and feasibility. This procedure establishes a logical link 
between the subsystems and indicators, draws attention to elements 
that cannot be measured or on which there are no data, and leads to 
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Methodology 
Indicators are combined using the Barometer of Sustainability, a per­
formance scale with two axes, one for human wellbeing, the other for 
ecosystem wellbeing. Performance criteria – good, fair, medium, poor, 
and bad levels of performance – are defined for each indicator, 
enabling indicator measurements to be converted to scores and dis­
played on the axes. 
Scores can be combined into higher level indices and ultimately 
into a Human Wellbeing Index, an Ecosystem Wellbeing Index, a 
6Wellbeing Index, and a Wellbeing/Stress Index. Because of the ability 
to include a large number of indicators, scores in Wellbeing Assess­
ment are robust, and present a comprehensive picture less affected by 
a lack of data or by inaccurate data on individual indicators. Although 
underlying weights given to various variables and other assumptions 
can be debated, the indices provide clear, rapidly communicated pic­
tures of a society’s human and ecosystem wellbeing, how close a soci­
ety is to its goal of sustainability and how it compares with other soci­
eties, the rate and direction of change, and major strengths and weak­
nesses of the human and natural systems of the entity being assessed. 
the assessment challenge 
More information and data do not necessarily mean greater 
knowledge or efficiency. A flood of unconnected and often apparently 
contradictory facts can swamp the flow of useful information for 
decisionmaking. Assessing progress thus presents both a governance 
and a methodological challenge. 
From a governance perspective, authority and responsibility for 
data collection, analysis, and assessment are scattered, the process is 
dominated by special interests, and long-range planning and strategic 
decisionmaking are undermined. At every level, the capacity to collect 
and report data is fragmented and narrowly focused. When data are 
collected, they are assembled for specific and immediate purposes and 
then forgotten or poorly stored, usually separated from the assump­
tions, values, and purposes used in their collection. Differences in col­
lection methodologies are often obscured over time, and incompatible 
data are combined in ways that, at best, dilute meaning. 
6 Figure 1 shows a graphic representation of the Human Wellbeing Index and the Ecosystem
Wellbeing Index. 
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Figure 1 Human and Ecosystem Wellbeing Indices 
Source: Prescott-Allen, Robert. 2001. The Wellbeing of Nations: A Country-by-Country Index of 
Quality of Life and the Environment. Washington, D.C.: Island Press. 
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From a methodological perspective, we must learn how to define 
sustainability in terms of indicators that can be tracked and moni­
tored, understood and applied by decisionmakers, and that allow us to 
efficiently manage our investments of time, money, labor, and 
thought. And yet, even if we have such effective indicators, we still run 
the risk of having an unintelligible hodgepodge of information on our 
hands. 
Numbers, moreover, are not value neutral (Esty, 2002). “Northern” 
bias must be recognized and addressed. 
There is a tendency to think of “developed countries” as coun­
tries that have achieved sustainability. In fact, nations with a 
high standard of living irreversibly change their own natural 
systems, while potentially imposing excessive pressure on 
the global environment. Successful assessment methodolo­
gies will have to make evident and understandable the link­
ages between consumption, deployment of advanced tech­
nology, and resource impact, both local and global. 
Assessments must also function adequately at various scales, from 
local to global, and must lend themselves to aggregation and disaggre­
gation without loss of validity and reliability. They must allow for 
regional and global comparisons while retaining national and local 
relevance. That means, at a minimum, that the actions of all countries 
must be assessed on the same basic factors and measures, but that any 
system adopted at an international level must lend itself to expansion 
via local participation to reflect additional values, conditions, and 
aspirations. 
Examples of misleading global indicators abound, and pictures 
painted with broad brushes, as at the beginning of this chapter, can be 
both too rosy and too dire, often simultaneously. But to successfully 
address these challenges, we will need to assess progress on multiple 
fronts and at several levels simultaneously, and make decisions, the 
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next steps: johannesburg and beyond 
After a decade of investment and action, results are difficult to docu­
ment and almost impossible to interpret. When the nations of the 
world convene in South Africa in August 2002 for the World Summit 
on Sustainable Development, it will again be apparent that our worth­
while dreams have exceeded our capacity to manage effectively, in 
large measure because we have no systematic, valid, and reliable way 
to evaluate our progress, and no fixed point of responsibility for this 
task. 
The Monterrey Consensus emphasized the international commit­
ment to the goals of the Millennium Declaration, namely, “to elimi­
nate poverty, improve social conditions and raise living standards, and 
protect our environment.” The achievement of these goals will require 
an effective and transparent system for mobilizing public resources as 
well as strong, accountable institutions and measurement of results. 
The response from Johannesburg must be unequivocal and should 
include the following elements: 
A set of common indicators on which nations can collect and peri­• 
odically report, allowing national and local governments to tailor 
or add indicators of particular significance to a local context; 
A common, scientifically sound methodology for integrating data • 
sets into assessments of sustainability; 
The establishment of national obligations to collect and report • 
social, economic, and environmental data, with sanctions for non­
7reporting;
Clear standards for periodic assessment of progress toward sus­• 
tainability; 
The creation of an independent International Scientific Panel on • 
Sustainability, similar to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change under the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, with the authority and responsibility to collect and 
assemble data, and report fully, objectively, and publicly on 
progress toward achieving sustainability; 
7 Nations that do not report in a timely or adequate way could be ineligible for membership in
successor bodies to the Commission on Sustainable Development, and have their voting priv­
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Commitment to fund these assessments and the activities of the • 
Scientific Panel on Sustainability, such as commitment from 
donor countries to meet all costs of national reporting from the 
least developed countries, including capacity building. 
conclusion 
The essential link between responsibility and accountability is a valid 
and reliable measurement of change over time. This link was not 
forged at Rio and has not been addressed since. Despite the flood of 
data over the past decade, information regarding the performance of 
governments and society in the pursuit of sustainability has been nei­
ther systematically collected nor transparently and objectively report­
ed. We know little more today than we did ten years ago regarding our 
progress and the overall effectiveness of our actions. 
Governments are inherently uneasy about committing to goals and 
managing for results, although none can deny that both steps are nec­
essary for good governance. If they avoid the issue in Johannesburg as 
they did in Rio, we need only look at the experience of the last ten 
years to see the prospects for the next decade: more futile and incon­
clusive discussions, more sterile political debates over who is not 
meeting their obligations, and more wasteful investments nationally 
and internationally. We will continue to “fly blind.” 
There are no other binding commitments (“Type I Outcomes”) 
remotely achievable for the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development that could be more valuable than a commitment to cre­
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The North-South Knowledge Divide: 




This chapter argues that there is a knowledge divide between the North 
and the South resulting from the substantial difference in accumulated 
scientific knowledge about the two regions and their current unequal 
capacities for generating new knowledge. It outlines the consequences 
of the divide for global environmental governance, including the risk 
that (1) issues of the South will be less visible on the global governance 
agenda, (2) that “globalized” knowledge generated in other ecological 
zones and socioeconomic settings is less representative for conditions in 
the South, and (3) that as a result, the South is unable to participate on 
equal terms in global governance. 
This chapter further discusses two main strategies for addressing 
these consequences. The first strategy involves improving the generation 
of new knowledge about the South. This could be accomplished by 
strengthening the scientific community in the South, encouraging the 
scientific community in the North to carry out more research on the 
South, and expanding the groups that participate in the generation of 
new knowledge. The second strategy entails changing how decisionmak­
ers in global institutions deal with scientific knowledge. This could be 
done by facing uncertainty with greater resolve, making better use of 
existing knowledge about the South, and incorporating alternative 
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the north-south knowledge divide 
I see not just a gulf, but a yawning gulf, between the industri­
alized countries and the developing countries in terms of sheer 
numbers of scientists and engineers. (Serageldin, 1998: 43) 
The world’s scientific community is heavily dominated by developed 
countries, whether one looks at resources, the number of researchers, 
or scientific “production.” OECD countries contribute ninety-four 
percent of the indexed scientific literature. Moreover, measures of 
inequality between countries are more pronounced in scientific 
expenditures than in income: although the average per capita income 
of the thirty OECD countries is about sixty times greater than that of 
the roughly fifty countries classified by the World Bank as “low­
income economies,” average expenditures on science and technology 
per capita in the former are 250 times greater than those in the latter 
(Sagasti and Alcalde, 1999). More than ninety-six percent of world 
patents are registered by Japan, the countries of Western Europe, and 
the United States (Shrum and Shenhav, 1995). 
The number of scientists/engineers per million inhabitants in 
developing countries is 200 on average, while in developed countries, 
it is 2,800 on average (Serageldin, 1998). Of course, the picture varies 
greatly across developing countries, and a number of them have sig­
nificant research capacity. India, for example, has the third most pop­
ulous scientific community in the world (Kandlikar and Sagar, 1999: 
121). Africa, on the other hand, with fifty-three countries, has only nine 
merit-based science academies (Hassan, 2001). 
Developed and developing countries tend to group into two very 
rough physical and climatic categories. Developing countries, which I 
refer to here as the “South,” are primarily located in sub-tropical or 
tropical ecosystems. Developed countries, or the “North,” occupy 
1mainly temperate and arctic climates and ecosystems. Many 
commentators point out that the amount of research in environment-
Obviously this categorization of the world into South and North is a gross simplification.
Exceptions, for example, include Australia and the southernmost parts of the United States in
the North, and the extensive arid regions of the South. Both categories encompass countries
with vastly different levels of economic development, among other differences. The World
Bank, for instance, uses four categories in its classification of economies by income (World
Bank, 1999). Nevertheless, because I wish to focus on the distinctions between both ecosys­
tems and socioeconomic systems (see discussions in later sections), I confine the discussion













related disciplines such as biology, ecology, and ecotoxicology carried 
out in sub-tropical and tropical regions is very small compared to 
research in non-tropical latitudes (Bourdeau et al. 1989; Lacher and 
Goldstein, 1997). In addition, the North and its temperate and arctic 
ecosystems are sometimes cited as the “normal” or “standard” type in 
ecological sciences (Pomeroy and Service, 1986). 
The knowledge divide comprises multiple gaps – in basic 
environmental and social data, monitoring of change, 
assessments, and more comprehensive research on human 
and social systems. 
The Data Gap 
The data gap is fundamental, since data availability is critical for mon­
itoring, assessment, and further research. As stressed by Hales and 
Prescott-Allen in this volume, even in industrialized countries, data 
2are often too limited or too disparate to be usable. In developing 
countries, however, “even the most basic statistics are often lacking” 
(UN Economic and Social Council, 2001) and “[m]onitoring and data 
collection infrastructure of most developing countries is severely 
handicapped or non-existent” (UN System-Wide Earthwatch, 2000). 
The data gap is manifest for both local and global issues. 
Information on mercury poisoning among populations in the 
Amazon, for example, is largely absent, and yet pollution levels of 
mercury from gold mining operations are significant (Lacher and 
Goldstein, 1997). Knowledge in the South about the effects of the use 
of agricultural pesticides on human health and ecosystems is also eex­
tremely limited (Karlsson, 2000). 
In the area of global environmental change, the North carries out 
almost all basic research and analysis, and the relevance of the results for 
developing countries is not usually assessed (Gutman, 1994). Yet, it is 
those countries that are most likely to be negatively affected by global 
The scope of this gap is spelled out in the Environmental Sustainability Index (WEF, 2002). As
Esty (2002) argues, the importance of sound data as the foundation for environmental decision-
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3warming (Redclift and Sage, 1998). One of the exceptions to this pat­
tern is India, which has a community of climate researchers. Their 
research focus, however, has been almost exclusively on the impact of 
climate change on coastal zones and agriculture, and hardly any of the 
results have been published (Kandlikar and Sagar, 1999). 
The limited contribution to the body of scientific knowledge 
on global environmental issues from developing country 
scientists is not only a reflection of the unequal research 
capacity, but is also a result of different research priorities. 
Environmental issues of more acute local importance, rather 
than on a global scale, are engaging scientists in developing 
countries (Biermann, 2001; Gupta, 2000; Commission on 
Developing Countries and Global Change, 1992). 
The knowledge divide between North and South regarding envi­
ronmental issues could, from a historical perspective, be seen as just a 
phase of the scientific development process. It could be regarded as 
simply a knowledge gap that remains to be filled through more 
research. However, when science, both natural and social, is entering 
the policy process as the basis for environmental governance at the 
global, regional, and national levels, the knowledge divide becomes 
more than a purely scientific issue. It may have political consequences. 
consequences of the divide for global
environmental governance 
The international policy debate is in no small part shaped by the argu­
ments emerging from scientific research and analysis (Kandlikar and 
Sagar, 1999: 133). Policymakers put strong faith in science, particularly 
in natural science, to discover environmental threats, interpret the 
3 The IPCC finds that most of the less-developed regions are particularly vulnerable to climate
change, both because a larger share of their economies is in climate-sensitive sectors and
because they lack the resources to adapt. For example, small island states and low-lying
coastal areas are especially vulnerable to a rise in sea level and to storms and have a limited


















consequences, and even suggest policy options. At the global gover­
nance level, this is illustrated by the fact that “scientists represent the 
only members of civil society to be consistently asked to advise gov­
ernment representatives” (UNEP, 2000: 13). 
There are a number of scientific advisory processes at the global 
level through which scientists are invited to give advice on environ­
mental issues. Scientific expertise is sought in intergovernmental 
bodies like the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), in 
ad hoc expert groups to various conventions, in bodies that develop 
technical standards and global assessments on the state of environ­
mental knowledge, or in capacity building and multilateral aid 
projects. 
These scientific advisory processes contribute in three principal 
ways to intergovernmental deliberations (UNEP, 2000): 
• Catalyzing action by using science to set the terms of the debate; 
• Ensuring a significant scientific component in negotiations; 
• Establishing authoritative scientific standards for policy delibera­
tions, decisions, and implementation. 
Science is of significant importance to global deliberations. 
Relevant questions in relation to the North-South knowledge divide 
then become: 
• What knowledge do decisionmakers in global institutions consider? 
• If the desired knowledge is available, how it is used? 
• What type of influence does it have on the content and character 
of global environmental governance? 
Issues of the South Remain Off the Global Agenda 
Many argue that environmental issues addressed by governance at the 
global level tend to be those on the priority agenda of Northern coun­
tries (Agarwal, Narain, and Sharma, 1999; Gutman, 1994). These are 
usually issues of a “global character,” often including climate change, 
ozone depletion, and biodiversity. While the effects of climate change 
are likely to be most adverse and severe primarily for developing coun­
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concerns. Redclift and Sage (1998), for example, claim that for many in 
the South, the global environmental agenda is “essentially a Northern 
agenda, of little relevance to them.” The issues on which attention is 
focused are often far from the experience of environmental degrada­
tion of poor people in hamlets, villages, towns, and mega-cities in 
large parts of the world, where “the ‘environment’ consists of problems 
associated with health, shelter, and food availability” (Redclift and 
Sage, 1998: 501). These environmental issues, which the South priori­
tizes, are less visible on the global agenda. 
The comparative invisibility of environmental issues 
prioritized by the South can be linked to the North-South 
power gradient within the current international system, 
where the more powerful countries set the agenda. 
Nevertheless, it can also be argued that Northern dominance 
in setting the agenda is often supported by the invocation of 
science. 
It is difficult for the South to put up science-based arguments for 
alternative issues to prioritize. As Gutman (1994: 390) argues, the 
South “is unable to express its environmental priorities or assess the 
costs and benefits of the international environmental agenda put for­
ward by the North.” Agarwal et al. comment on the power of scientif­
ic discourse in setting the agenda, and how that handicaps the South: 
The focus on science can easily divert attention from problems 
that have a focus in other issues like poverty. A science-based 
environmental agenda is more likely to be an agenda determined 
by the science-rich North, which can neglect the environmental 
concerns of the poor nations. (Agarwal, Narain, and Sharma, 
41999: 5)
Issues of the South – Invisible Even When on the Agenda 
While the discussion above is concerned with the issues that make it 
to the global governance agenda, there are issues that are already on 
4 Agarwal et al. here make use of the common definition of scientists as natural scientists, in
this case environmental scientists. I would argue that scientists in other disciplines, such as
sociology, economics, and development studies, do focus on other issues like poverty as sub­










the agenda but whose relevance for countries in the South remains 
invisible due to lack of scientific data. 
The Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement 
The WTO agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures (SPS 
5Agreement) illustrates this point. With increasing trade and stricter 
standards established in importing countries, the issue of pesticide 
residues in agricultural products has gained in importance. The 
Agreement mandates that standards for the levels of pesticide residues 
in traded agricultural products — the Maximum Residue Limits set by 
the Codex Alimentarius — should be accepted by all parties to the 
Uruguay Agreements. These standards have thus become, indirectly, 
legally binding for the member countries of the WTO. 
Developing countries, however, have problems in generating 
residue trial data because the industry, which provides these 
data, only does so for crops of major economic importance 
(Codex Alimentarius Commission, 1997). The absence of 
Maximum Residue Limits for pesticides on crops that devel­
oping countries export can be a serious hindrance to trade. 
Industrialized countries have well-developed and enforced national 
legislation, as well as the capacity to produce residue trial data. 
Developing countries, on the other hand, often lack this capacity. 
Therefore, the globally agreed upon rules are least useful for those 
countries which in theory would benefit most from such coordinated 
regulations. 
Toxic Substances 
Another case in point can be found in the provisions of the multi­
lateral environmental agreements that address toxic substances posing 
health or environmental risks. The process of adding substances to the 
agreements requires a large amount of data showing the level and type 
of risk. Notably, the Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Pro­
cedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in Interna­
tional Trade (the Rotterdam Convention) of 1998 includes as one of 
For a detailed description of the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement and its implications
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the essential criteria for adding further hazardous pesticide formula­
tions to the Convention the “reliability of the evidence that the use of 
the formulation” causes health problems (United Nations, 1998). 
In this and other cases, developing countries face the risk of having 
their priority substances of concern not addressed due to lack of hard 
evidence of the health effects. There is little research in these countries 
on risks from chemicals. The types of specific chemical risks they face 
— which often come from the particular socioeconomic, institution­
al, and cultural circumstances in which the substances are used in 
developing countries — may therefore not appear on the priority lists 
of Northern countries. For instance, pesticides that may be used under 
strict safety conditions and without significant risks in developed 
countries, may pose significant health risks in developing countries 
when used by uneducated farmers without protective gear. 
Inappropriately “Globalized” Knowledge 
Another consequence of the knowledge divide occurs when 
“globalized” knowledge is not appropriate for situations and problems 
in the South. At the global level, scientific knowledge is often collected, 
analyzed, and summarized into assessments of particular environ­
mental problems. These efforts create a scientific foundation for 
decisionmaking at the global level. 
When most of the information assembled at the global level, or 
incorporated into global models, is generated in non-tropical latitudes 
and in developed countries, the assessments may be less valid for envi­
ronmental problems in the South for the following reasons: 
• There are unique ecosystems and species of both ecological and 
economic importance in the South that are only marginally pres­
ent in some developed countries (e.g., rain forests, mangroves, and 
coral reefs), and may not be sufficiently accounted for in global 
assessments. 
• There is a range of managed systems (agricultural, silvicultural, 
and aquacultural) equally unique to the tropics and sub-tropics. 
• Northern analysts may have unfounded assumptions, among 
other things, about patterns of human behavior – for example, 
that agricultural workers will wear protective clothing at all times 















• The type of diet, body weight, and general health conditions 
assumed in the determination of tolerable levels of toxic 
substances in the human body may be different. A level of contam­
ination by a substance in a food crop that is a marginal part of the 
diet can be relatively higher than in a food crop that serves as the 
staple food. People already weakened from other diseases or mal­
nutrition may also be more sensitive to toxic substances than the 
average healthy person in a developed country. 
The lack of good data, as well as the knowledge and science divide, 
contribute to the relative invisibility of Southern issues on the global 
governance agenda. In the area of climate change, for example, assess­
ments have sometimes been inaccurate. The Indian Methane 
Campaign was launched in 1991 in response to climate change studies 
done abroad, including a study by the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA, 1990), which attributed large emissions of methane to 
Indian sources. The campaign made its own assessment of Indian 
methane emissions and denounced the EPA’s findings (Kandlikar and 
Sagar, 1999: 123). 
Biermann (2001) cites the Indian scientists’ criticism of the IPCC 
regarding the lack of a separate chapter in their report on the mon­
soon, which is a central concern for research on climate change from 
their perspective. Furthermore, the modeling of the cost of carbon 
emission mitigation carried out for developing countries by scientists 
in the North is not satisfactory because “it is generally characterized by 
a lack of sensitivity to the differences between developed and develop­
ing countries” (Kandlikar and Sagar, 1999: 130). 
Although it might be expected that data from the North would be 
misleading if merely extrapolated to the South, the extrapolation is 
done time and again. Of course, tendencies to disregard local variabil­
ity on both global and local environmental issues can be interpreted as 
a pragmatic approach when there is a lack of local data. Whatever the 
reason, however, biases and inappropriateness for the conditions in 
developing countries are strongly noted in the South, particularly by 
scientists who are often excluded from the global scene. The knowl­
edge divide can thus impair global deliberations, when they are based 
on an unsatisfactory understanding of the geographically distinct 
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Inadequate Participation of Developing Countries
in Global Governance 
Another major consequence of the North-South knowledge divide 
pertains to the inadequate participation of developing countries in the 
provision of knowledge for global policy and action. The lack of 
national scientific capacity weakens the position of developing coun­
tries in multilateral negotiations and their participation in the con­
ventions. Even in institutions designed to be “global,” such as the 
6
IPCC, there is an enormous disparity in North-South participation.
Not only do developing country officials lack scientific input from 
their own researchers, but they also experience significant difficulty in 
coping with the masses of scientific and economic documents coming 
from the West. 
The lack of developing country science raises the question of a 
Northern bias in global assessments. It appears that the Northern bias 
may be more pronounced as one moves further from basic science 
(Kandlikar and Sagar, 1999). Moreover, global environmental 
assessments often fail to explicitly address value considerations, such 
as equity (Biermann, 2001), which is of particular relevance to 
developing countries. 
In the environmental domain, both the strong dependence on sci­
ence (natural science in particular), and the tendency to disguise value 
7judgments by “scientizing” the debate, increase the need to focus on 
the lack of participation of developing countries in scientific advisory 
processes. It is easy to fall into complacency by assuming that one need 
not pay so much attention to geographical representativeness because 
science is “objective” and, therefore, whoever is not involved in the 
decisionmaking would have arrived at the same conclusions (Yearley, 
1996: 118). Many researchers have pointed to the limits to complete 
objectivity in research and to the cultural dependence and implicit 
value judgments in natural science (Jasanoff, 1996). 
6	 In the 1996 IPCC Working Group I there were 158 authors from the United States, 61 from the
United Kingdom, 3 from India, and 7 from China. The relative participation looked similar in
Working Group II. Working Group III had 30 participants from the United States, 5 from the
United Kingdom, 7 from India, and 2 from China (Kandlikar and Sagar, 1999). 
7 Jasanoff (1996: 173) defines the act of “scientizing” an issue as “at once to assert that there are
systematic, discoverable methods for coping with it and to suggest that these approaches













With the value connotations associated with science, and particu­
larly its application in policy, it is clear that the present participation 
of the South in deliberations on global environmental governance, 
both scientific and political, is inadequate. It is a question of equity 
and fairness to present more balanced knowledge-based voices from 
developing countries in these arenas. 
bridging the knowledge divide: changing
the generation of knowledge 
Acknowledging the existence of a knowledge divide between the 
North and the South and its consequences prompts the question of 
what can be done to address the situation. Over the long term, bridg­
ing the North-South knowledge divide will require measures aimed at 
reducing the divide itself. Increasing the generation of scientific 
knowledge in the South and of the South will be critical in this respect. 
Four strategies could be pursued: (1) strengthening the data and sci­
ence foundations of the South; (2) strengthening the scientific com­
munity in the South; (3) encouraging more research on the South 
among Northern scientists; and (4) expanding the groups capable of 
generating scientific knowledge. 
Strengthening Southern Data and Science 
The most straightforward way to bridge the knowledge divide is to 
commit resources to strengthening the data and science foundations 
on which global environmental governance efforts depend. The value 
of baseline data comparable across countries is clear (Esty, 2002). Such 
metrics allow for trends to be tracked, problems spotted, policies eval­
uated, and “best practices” identified. Enormous potential gains could 
be achieved across many environmental problem areas simply by 
moving laggards toward the performance of those at the leading edge. 
Because of the belief that poverty and environmental degradation are 
causally linked (World Commission on Environment and 
Development, 1987), it would be essential to improve data on sustain­
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possible global environmental governance measures 
• A global environmental data initiative to track a set of key socio­
economic and ecological and environmental public health indica­
tors in all countries of the world on a methodologically consistent 
and comparable basis; 
• Beyond building a global environmental database, a true commit­
ment to closing the North-South knowledge gap, which would 
entail capacity building in the South. The developing world needs 
more scientists, economists, and researchers of all sorts; 
• Building up this capacity, requires (as discussed below) sustained 
commitments to education for several decades. 
Strengthening the Scientific Community in the South 
Part of the responsibility for strengthening the scientific community 
in the South lies in the hands of developing countries themselves who 
need to prioritize investment in science. But their efforts alone will 
not suffice. The role for bi- and multilateral aid agencies and 
Northern and international research programs in building this capac­
ity is critical. 
A number of actors are already involved in such capacity building, 
from national space agencies to UN organizations, from the interna­
tional academic community to individual researchers (Fuchs, Virji, 
and Fleming, 1998; EUMETSTAT, 1997; UN Economic and Social 
Council, 1997). It is even increasingly the case that international scien­
tific advisory processes have as a goal the facilitation of national level 
capacity building (UNEP, 2000). 
However, much capacity building is currently aimed at 
financing more Ph.D. degrees for developing country citizens, 
providing funds for large scale cooperation projects on global 
environmental change research, and granting travel money 
to bring scientists from the South to scientific conferences 
and expert meetings. These efforts do not suffice to provide 




















Research funding is predominantly nationally based. Up until now, 
there has been no explicit mandate in global environmental gover­
nance (such as in the UN Environment Programme and the Global 
Environment Facility) to fund basic research based on the competitive 
merits of research proposals. Most of the resources go to assessments 
of previous research rather than the generation of new knowledge. 
possible global environmental governance measures 
Establishment of small “micro research grants” for individual research
 
projects in countries with limited research capacity.8 Existing expert
 
bodies under multilateral environmental agreements or other UN
 
bodies could administer these grants. These agencies would have the
 
best overview of the specific research gaps hampering their work.
 
Similar to the success in the field of micro credit, where very little 
money goes a long way for development in poor communities, rather 
humble research grants for salaries and equipment might lead to sub­
stantial research results in many developing countries. When com­
bined with assistance to make the results internationally available, 
such measures could make significant contributions to reducing the 
knowledge divide. 
Increasing the Number of Northern Scientists Working on the South 
The second approach to increasing knowledge of environmental and 
human systems in the South is to strengthen the scientific communi­
ty of the North for the South, by increasing the number of Northern 
scientists who conduct field studies in the South. When they carry out 
their work in close partnership with local scientists, they benefit in 
their own research from local knowledge and experience while also 
contributing to the capacity of their Southern partners. This approach 
may necessitate capacity building for the Northern research commu­
9nity on local ecological and socioeconomic contexts in the South.
8	 I am grateful to Dr. Arthur L. Dahl for this suggestion and for contributing valuable input to
discussions on global governance measures in general. 
9	 Dasgupta (1998: 22) argues for such an approach among economists who study environmen­
tal issues. 
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Northern scientists could learn to better incorporate the priorities and 
realities of the South, both within research and policy processes. 
possible global environmental governance measures 
•	 Establishing of clear communication channels between UN bod­
ies, such as convention secretariats, and Northern funding agen­
cies, such as research councils and private foundations. Priority 
research areas could thus be suggested; 
•	 Convening UN expert meetings in the South, even if the majority 
of experts are from the North, combined with field trips with local 
experts. 




The third approach to reducing the knowledge gap is to expand the 
groups that participate in the generation of scientific knowledge. The 
limited numbers of scientists in the South, and the extremely limited 
resources available for monitoring and research activities, warrant 
more innovative approaches. For example, if high school students 
across these countries, as part of their education, gathered basic data 
on environmental and social parameters under the guidance of 
researchers and with the support of the educational infrastructure, the 
cadre of observers and the amount of data collected would increase 
dramatically. There are already a number of successful examples where 
this has been tried. 
School children, non-governmental organizations, major 
groups, and amateur volunteers have helped to collect data 
and fill data gaps, and the UN Secretary-General has 
encouraged the Commission on Sustainable Development to 
develop this further (UN Economic and Social Council, 2001). 
  
  




Including these new groups in science production is not only a 
pragmatic approach to collecting data; it would also contribute to an 
aspect of human development that all should be entitled to: 
The intellectual tools and approaches of science should be made
 
accessible in all countries, and to all levels of the population, in
 
order to allow all persons to be active participants in finding
 
solutions to environmental problems and defining appropriate
 




A complementary approach would be to make the newest global 
data (satellite images, for example) available for natural resource 
management decisions at the local level. 
possible global environmental governance measures 
•	 Strengthening support for projects that incorporate training for
 
various civil society groups and the private sector, enabling them
 
to participate in data collection;
 
•	 Promoting the development of simple monitoring and research
 
methods that could be used by local groups;
 
•	 Establishing various central cores of stable funding for long-term
 
monitoring projects on specific environmental degradation prob­
lems;
 
•	 Encouraging the international scientific community to make its
 




Making the tools of the scientific enterprise available to larg­
er sections of the population of the world would not only 
bridge the knowledge divide, but is likely to increase the level 
of trust between various stakeholders in decisionmaking 
processes, from the global to the local level. 
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Another approach to bridging the knowledge divide would be to take 
the divide at face value and to focus on how it is addressed in gover­
nance, trying to change the way decisionmakers deal with knowledge 
and uncertainty. Getting global institutions to change their decision-
making processes to reduce the negative consequences of the existing 
knowledge divide could entail three strategies: (1) facing uncertainty 
with more care and rigor; (2) making better use of available knowledge; 
and (3) considering alternative knowledge in the policymaking process. 
Dealing with Uncertainty 
Facing uncertainty with more care will entail greater acknowledge­
ment of the limits of knowledge, clearer focus on underlying assump­
tions, and, at times, a precautionary approach. 
Those engaged in global environmental policymaking must take 
more care to construct their analyses on solid foundations. Special 
attention must be given to getting data from the South. Modeling 
must be done in ways that reflect the experiences and realities of the 
developing world. Where extrapolations or assumptions are used, the 
basis for these starting points should be made explicit. Ranges of val­
ues and the use of multiple scenarios can also help to ensure that 
uncertainties are addressed in ways that generate a more neutral ana­
lytic foundation for global environmental action. 
Utilizing Existing Scientific Knowledge in the South 
A second approach that global institutions could adopt is to make 
better use of the scientific knowledge about the South that is available. 
It will take effort to find these data. Travel may be necessary to 
physically collect them, as this knowledge is unlikely to be catalogued 
and found through the databases of libraries accessible over the 
internet. It may require spending more time to locate scientists from 
the South – or scientists from the North whose specialty is 
environmental impacts in the South – and more resources to bring 
them to meetings in scientific advisory processes at the global level. It 












controlling the data found. Simultaneous translation at meetings may 
also be necessary, as language frequently is an obstacle to 
contributions from Southern scientists. 
A lot of science from the South never reaches the international sci­
ence arena. Many, especially younger, researchers in the South publish 
in local journals, particularly in the fields of agriculture, silviculture, 
and aquaculture (IDRC, 1991). In many cases, the language barrier pre­
vents scientists from publishing in international journals and they are 
confined to the domestic or regional science community. Funds for 
the translation of some of this body of knowledge would help to close 
the knowledge gap. 
Considerable information and analyses are also generated by agen­
cies, domestic and foreign, governmental and non-governmental, 
which work directly on environmental management and sustainable 
development in the South. Much of the research and writing in the 
development community, such as internal project reports, usually 
remains in the gray literature and never reaches the scientific journals 
(Kammen and Dove, 1997). This literature could be made more acces­
sible and incorporated into global-level discussions. 
possible global environmental governance measures 
•	 Systematic efforts to bring forth “hidden” scientific knowledge to
 
scientific advisory processes at the global level;
 
•	 Broadening the disciplines represented in global decision process­
es, i.e., including the social sciences, to expand the base of data
 
and information (UNEP, 2000);
 
•	 New commitments of resources for assisting scientists from the
 
South in making their research results internationally available –
 
both through publications and through participation in interna­
tional meetings.
 
Incorporating Other Sources and Types of Knowledge 
The third approach to changing decisionmaking requires a somewhat 
different mindset within global institutions, in order to broaden the 
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makers to acknowledge that highly validated science cannot do every­
thing and that there may be value in examining the wealth of experi­
ence captured in local and traditional knowledge, especially of indige­
nous people. 
The knowledge divide looks different if one includes local knowl­
edge. For example, local people may have considerable knowledge of 
species interconnections, natural variations in biogeophysical factors 
in the local context, and an integrated understanding of how their 
own actions influence the natural resources they depend on, even if 
they cannot express this knowledge in the language of modern sci­
10 ence. There is a considerable amount of local knowledge in these cat­
egories that could be of value to decisionmaking. One scientific advi­
sory body that has started to discuss how to approach traditional 
knowledge is the Committee on Science and Technology of the 
Convention to Combat Desertification (UNEP, 1998). Non-govern­
mental organizations (NGOs) are also a potential channel through 
which such local experiences could reach the global level. 
possible global environmental governance measures 
•	 Systematic dialogue between government-appointed experts in 
scientific advisory bodies and NGOs to explore ways of sifting out 
the valuable local experiences of communities that do not nor­
mally participate in policymaking processes. Such an exchange 
could in turn encourage the participation of scientists from multi­
ple disciplines and the formulation of further research priorities;11 
•	 Scientific validation of alternative types of knowledge. To this 
end, scientists should be encouraged to collect and “test” local 
knowledge. Traditional knowledge should be “systematized” and 
put to the tests of normal scientific validation and peer-review; 
•	 Dissemination of alternative types of knowledge and information 
to policymakers through the normal scientific channels. 
10	 In many cases, this knowledge is in the process of being lost because people migrate to urban
areas, are forced off their land, etc. 












The world is divided into two civilisations that interact strong­
ly, albeit in a one-sided way. One civilisation is based on the 
growth of scientific knowledge, the other demonstrates a more 
or less passive acceptance of results generated by the first. 
(Salomon, 1995: 9) 
While Salomon makes this statement in the context of a general dis­
cussion of the role of science and technology for development, this 
chapter argues that the gist of his conclusion is also applicable to envi­
ronmental governance at the global level, despite a significant and 
growing scientific enterprise in many developing countries. The natu­
ral-science-dominated discourse on global environmental issues, the 
reluctance to take action under uncertainty, and the limited scientific 
capacity of the South put developing countries at a disadvantage in the 
global environmental governance arena. 
The “globalization” of knowledge based largely on findings in 
Northern societies and ecosystems presents additional obstacles for 
developing countries in global deliberations. Possible approaches to 
addressing the knowledge divide and its negative consequences on 
global environmental governance, discussed in this chapter, can be 
summarized as follows: 
measures to bridge the knowledge divide 
Changing the Generation of 
of Knowledge 
• Launch an initiative to collect 
baseline environmental data 
across all countries of the world; 
• Strengthen the scientific com­
munity in the South; 
• Strengthen the scientific com­
munity in the North researching 
in the South; 
• Expand the groups participating
participating in the generation 
of new knowledge. 
Changing
Decisionmaking 
•Face uncertainty more 
carefully and rigorously; 
• Use available knowledge 
about the South better; 
• Identify, test, and, where 
appropriate, incorporate 
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The knowledge divide and its consequences cannot be considered a 
problem of the South alone, but rather a collective problem for the 
international community, since the North and the South are ultimate­
ly part of the same physical and social whole. Any serious approach to 
addressing the knowledge divide should consider not only the goal of 
making global environmental governance more equitable and more 
broadly knowledge-based, but also the deeper underlying issue of 
what it means for people to be involved in the generation of knowl­
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The Role of NGOs and Civil Society 
in Global Environmental Governance 
Barbara Gemmill and Abimbola Bamidele-Izu 
summary 
This chapter identifies five major roles that civil society might play in 
global environmental governance: (1) collecting, disseminating, and 
analyzing information; (2) providing input to agenda-setting and policy 
development processes; (3) performing operational functions; (4) 
assessing environmental conditions and monitoring compliance with 
environmental agreements; and (5) advocating environmental justice. 
Three case studies – the Crucible Group, TRAFFIC, and global ecosystem 
assessment processes – illustrate the success NGOs have had in stepping 
up to these roles. 
International decisionmaking processes seek legitimacy through the 
involvement of civil society, yet formal mechanisms for NGO 
participation within the UN system remain limited. Ad-hoc civil society 
participation should be replaced by a strengthened, more formalized 
institutional structure for engagement. The chapter offers concrete 
suggestions for such measures, including: 
• Wider use of the “commission” model for long-term, substantive 
involvement of civil society in global policymaking processes; 
Assistance for the development of NGO networks; 
Development of standards for civil society participation and 
engagement in international decisionmaking processes; 
Creation of a comprehensive database of information and analysis at 
different geographic and political levels; 
Involvement of a larger part of the public in issue spotting, 
assessment, and monitoring functions; 
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introduction 
Globalization has considerably weakened traditional governance 
processes. Increasing global economic integration has reduced the 
power of national governments while granting other economic and 
political actors access to the world stage. The 1990s witnessed a dra­
matic increase in the involvement of non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) in global governance (Charnovitz, 1997). 
NGOs and other civil society groups are not only stakeholders 
in governance, but also a driving force behind greater inter­
national cooperation through the active mobilization of pub­
lic support for international agreements. 
Enabling the constructive participation of civil society in global 
environmental governance is thus one of the most important tasks for 
policymakers concerned with the effectiveness of global governance 
(Gemmill, Ivanova, and Chee, 2002). 
This chapter explores the potential for strengthened roles for civil 
society, and especially non-governmental organizations, within a new 
or a restructured global environmental governance system. We argue 
that civil society should play a major role in five key areas: 
Information collection and dissemination; • 
Policy development consultation; • 
Policy implementation; • 
Assessment and monitoring; • 
Advocacy for environmental justice. • 
We further contend that existing structures do not enable civil 
society to fulfill these roles effectively and offer suggestions for reform 
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who and what is civil society? 
The first step in examining civil society participation is describing 
exactly who is included within the delineation of civil society. In the 
broadest sense, civil society has been characterized as a sphere of social 
life that is public but excludes government activities (Meidinger, 
2001). Michael Bratton describes civil society as social interaction 
between the household and the state characterized by community 
cooperation, structures of voluntary association, and networks of 
public communication (Bratton, 1994). The term civil society is gen­
erally used to classify persons, institutions, and organizations that 
have the goal of advancing or expressing a common purpose through 
ideas, actions, and demands on governments (Cohen and Arato, 1992). 
The membership of civil society is quite diverse, ranging from indi­
viduals to religious and academic institutions to issue-focused groups 
such as not-for-profit or non-governmental organizations. In the realm 
of environmental governance, NGOs are the most prominent actors 
and therefore comprise the main focus of this chapter. NGOs are: 
Groups of individuals organized for the myriad of reasons that
 
engage human imagination and aspiration. They can be set up
 
to advocate a particular cause, such as human rights, or to
 
carry out programs on the ground, such as disaster relief. They
 
can have memberships ranging from local to global.
 
1(Charnovitz, 1997: 186)
NGOs involved in environmental governance are highly diverse, 
including local, national, regional, and international groups with var­
ious missions dedicated to environmental protection, sustainable 
development, poverty alleviation, animal welfare, and other issues. 
The diversity of civil society and its value to official intergovern­
mental processes on the environment are acknowledged in Agenda 21, 
the comprehensive sustainable development blueprint adopted at the 
1992 Rio Earth Summit. The document does not make use of the term 
civil society, although it expressly recognizes the members of civil 
society as a major constituency. 
Charnovitz further points out that, “Indeed, some NGO’s are more ‘global’ than intergovern­
mental organizations. For example, the International Amateur Athletic Federation includes
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The Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), responsible 
for implementing Agenda 21, classifies civil society into the following 
2Major Groups:
• Women 
• Children and Youth 
• Indigenous Peoples and Communities 
• Non-governmental Organizations 
• Workers and Trade Unions 
• The Scientific and Technological Community 
• Business and Industry 
• Farmers 
All of the Major Groups are officially recognized by the United 
Nations through an accreditation mechanism developed specifically 
for NGOs (Pace, 2002). 
A noteworthy question connected to the definition of civil society 
is whether business and industry should be included in this social 
grouping. While Agenda 21 considers business and industry part of civil 
society, some observers contend that, because they already have con­
siderable influence over international governance processes through 
informal lobbying opportunities and formal influence channels, busi­
ness and industry should not be included in civil society (Meidinger, 
2001). Because this chapter focuses on the participation of NGOs, it is 
not essential to resolve the business and civil society delineation ques­
tion within these pages, although determining how business should 
participate within governance is clearly of great importance. 
overview of civil society participation: expanding
ngo involvement 
The participation of civil society in global governance is increasing in 
significance, but is not unprecedented. NGO involvement is usually 
considered a late-twentieth-century phenomenon, but in fact it has 
2 The CSD also recognizes the role of local authorities, which are removed enough from the
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occurred for over two centuries (Charnovitz, 1997). The recent rate of 
proliferation of non-governmental organizations, however, is notable. 
In 1948, for example, the United Nations listed forty-one consultative 
groups that were formally accredited to participate in consultative 
processes; in 1998, there were more than 1,500 organizations with vary­
ing degrees of participation and access (Simmons, 1998). Numerous 
factors, from the development of information technology to the 
greater awareness of global interdependence to the spread of democ­
3racy, explain the rise of NGOs. 
The United Nations is the intergovernmental organization that has 
most openly recognized and endorsed the need to collaborate with the 
4non-governmental sector (Weiss, 1999). Historically, the UN cooper­
ated with NGOs primarily as partners in the implementation of cer­
tain programs, particularly in the areas of emergency response, 
human rights, and election monitoring. 
Due to their critical role in service delivery and implementa­
tion, civil society organizations have long been recognized as 
“partners” of the UN system, especially in environmental 
negotiations. 
Over the past decade, environmental NGO activity within UN 
processes has intensified. Prior to the 1990s, while various social 
movements may have utilized the UN as a global forum to call atten­
tion to particular agendas, the focus was not on influencing the offi­
cial UN deliberations. Through the process leading up to the 1992 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED), environmental organizations began intense internal capac­
ity building efforts to gain more sophisticated understanding of the 
international policymaking process (Conca, 1996). Some of the inno­
vations at the time – most notably, parallel NGO fora held alongside 
UN conferences – are now a routine element of intergovernmental 
deliberations (Fomerand, 1996). 
3	 Interestingly, the first intergovernmental environmental summit, the 1972 UN Conference on
the Human Environment, is cited as one factor behind the rise in NGOs (Conca, 1996). 
4	 Other intergovernmental bodies, such as the World Trade Organization, the International
Monetary Fund, and the G-7 have no provisions for formal involvement of non-governmental
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The UN Conference on Environment and Development was of par­
ticular significance to NGOs. Agenda 21 declared the need for new 
forms of participation: 
The United Nations system, including international finance 
and development agencies, and all intergovernmental organi­
zations and forums should, in consultation with non-govern­
mental organizations, take measures to . . . enhance existing or, 
where they do not exist, establish mechanisms and procedures 
within each agency to draw on the expertise and views of non­
governmental organizations in policy and program design, 
implementation and evaluation. (UN, 1994: Chapter 27) 
The 1992 Earth Summit thus affirmed that the commitment and 
genuine involvement of non-state actors are critical to reaching sus­
tainable development goals. 
Throughout the 1990s, NGOs continued to focus on official UN 
deliberations and the international policy arena. A variety of channels 
have served NGOs in their purpose of participating and influencing 
international deliberations. NGOs sought accreditation at internation­
al intergovernmental conferences where they could lobby government 
delegates, organize briefings, and even officially address plenary ses­
sions. A number of government delegations to international confer­
ences are now formally including NGO representatives. In the prepara­
tory process for the 1996 UN Conference on Human Settlements 
(Habitat II), for example, NGOs and local authorities participated in 
the informal drafting groups that drew up the Declaration and 
Programme of Action. Within the policymaking circle of the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), NGOs had a say 
in establishing the agenda and other aspects of the negotiations 
process for the 1998 Aarhus Convention on Public Access to 
Information, Participation in Decisionmaking and Access to 
Environmental Justice. In both of these cases, a special, semi-official 
status was accorded to civil society representatives. 
Successes and Challenges in Civil Society Participation:
Differing Roles and Rules for Engagement 
New forms of NGO participation have changed the nature of 
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community has begun to recognize that effective global action 
requires meaningful stakeholder involvement in international 
policymaking and implementation (Wapner, 2000). NGO involvement 
in global environmental governance can take a variety of forms (Esty, 
1998, 2002; Charnovitz, 1997): 
• Expert advice and analysis. NGOs can facilitate negotiations by giv­
ing politicians access to competing ideas from outside the normal 
bureaucratic channels; 
• Intellectual competition to governments. NGOs often have much 
better analytical and technical skills and capacity to respond more 
5quickly than government officials;
• Mobilization of public opinion. NGOs can influence the public 
through campaigns and broad outreach; 
• Representation of the voiceless. NGOs can help vocalize the interests 
of persons not well-represented in policymaking; 
• Service provision. NGOs can deliver technical expertise on particu­
lar topics as needed by government officials as well as participate 
directly in operational activities; 
• Monitoring and assessment. NGOs can help strengthen inter­
national agreements by monitoring negotiation efforts and 
governmental compliance; 
• Legitimization of global-scale decisionmaking mechanisms. NGOs 
could broaden the base of information for decisionmaking, 
improving the quality, authoritativeness, and legitimacy of the 
policy choices of international organizations. 
Civil society’s involvement in global environmental governance has 
enriched the process and strengthened outcomes in a number of 
6places and in a number of ways. In fact, it is the participation of non­
governmental groups that makes the process “global” and not simply 
5	 For a further discussion of the need for both “competition” and “cooperation” from NGOs in
global-scale policymaking, see Esty and Geradin’s argument in Regulatory Competition and 
Economic Integration: Comparative Perspectives (2001). 
6	 For a detailed assessment of the value of multi-stakeholder participation in environment and
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channels for ngo participation
in international organizations 
1.	 NGO representatives can be included on a national delegation to 
an international conference to advise delegates from their govern­
ment (Cairo Population Conference in 1994); 
2.	 Representatives from a NGO can be included on a national delega­
tion to an international conference to represent the NGO and con­
duct negotiations (International Labor Organization); 
3.	 NGOs can send delegates to semi-public international conferences 
(IUCN has a membership that includes 699 NGOs as well as states 
and government agencies); 
4.	 An international organization can set up an advisory group that 
includes experts from NGOs, who do not represent the NGO (UN 
Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters); 
5.	 An international organization can give NGOs an opportunity to 
participate in ongoing policy development (Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species); 
6.	 An international organization can enlist NGOs to help in imple­
menting programs (UN High Commissioner for Refugees); 
7.	 An international organization can give NGOs an opportunity to 
participate (not necessarily in a negotiating role) in an official con­
ference to draft a treaty (ECOSOC); 
8.	 An international organization can give NGOs an opportunity to 
participate in preparatory committees for an international confer­
ence (Rio Earth Summit in 1992, Johannesburg Summit on 
Sustainable Development in 2002); 
9.	 An international organization can hold a special session to give 
NGOs an opportunity to make presentations (General Assembly on 
sub-Saharan Africa in 1986); 
10.	 An international organization can include NGOs as members 
(International Commission for Scientific Exploration of the 
Mediterranean Sea). 
Source: Charnovitz, Steve. 1997. “Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International
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“international.” While many governments agree that NGO participa­
7tion is indispensable, many also feel that the drawbacks of civil soci­
ety participation may outweigh the benefits. Arguments and concerns 
abound on both sides. Some are fretful that NGOs might constitute 
special interest groups, and that their participation would invariably 
result in policy distortions. Others fear that intergovernmental deci­
sionmaking processes would become bogged down by NGOs, which 
are not necessarily representative of or accountable to their particular 
constituencies (Nichols, 1996). Decisionmakers are also anxious that 
NGOs may seek to usurp the sovereign powers of governments. 
However, some of these concerns may be overstated, considering 
the advantages of civil society involvement. Civil society can help 
build the political will for a new approach to development that inte­
grates environmental and social goals. Non-governmental organiza­
tions can serve as alternatives to weak or inadequate democratic insti­
tutions, as avenues for more inclusive dialogues, and as conduits for 
disseminating information on activities and issues within the interna­
tional system. 
These and other significant characteristics of civil society participa­
tion in governance are explored in the following three case studies. 
The Crucible Group: Harnessing the Power of Diverse Voices 
The Crucible Group is a multinational, multidisciplinary gathering of 
experts that first met officially in 1993 to discuss the control and 
management of agricultural genetic resources. The initial goal was to 
identify issues, trends, and use options. While agricultural genetic 
resources are of crucial importance to biotechnology and genetic 
engineering, there are serious debates surrounding their ownership 
and control as well as the equitable sharing of benefits. The group — 
twenty-eight individuals from nineteen countries — included 
grassroots organizers, farmers, trade diplomats, agricultural research 
scientists, intellectual property specialists, and agricultural policy
8analysts from both the North and South.
Recognizing the diversity of perspectives and priorities, the group 
did not seek consensus, but was able to agree on twenty-eight recom­
7	 Many European governments, for example, provide a very significant part of the budget of
non-governmental organizations. 
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mendations for policymakers. The first summary of the deliberations 
and the recommendations, People, Plants, and Patents: The Impact of 
Intellectual Property on Trade, Plant Biodiversity, and Rural Society, was 
published in 1994 (IDRC, 1994). Having now evolved into the Crucible 
Group II, with more than forty-five participants from twenty-five 
countries, the group has continued to meet to revisit many unresolved 
issues and consider a number of new ones. As a neutral forum, the 
Crucible Group II has promoted open discussion among participants 
who might otherwise never have been at the same table. The Group 
launched a second volume, Seeding Solutions: Policy Options for 
Genetic Resources, at the April 2002 Conference of Parties to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity. The report provides valuable 
input into the debate and development of guidelines on intellectual 
property issues, rights of farmers, mechanisms for benefit sharing, and 
appropriate governance structures for conservation of plant genetic 
resources. 
Several conclusions can be drawn from the Crucible Group experi­
ence: 
• A dialogue does not have to produce consensus to be useful for 
governance purposes; 
• A process designed to include non-state actors will reflect a broad­
er spectrum of views and may generate more creative approaches 
to solving problems; 
• A process where government and non-government participants 
are equal partners in a project is more likely to generate "buy in" 
and thus useful results. 
Not all governance projects involving civil society, however, have 
achieved a balance of influence among participants. In fact, multi-
stakeholder dialogues – especially those that are of very short dura­
tion – are losing favor with many in civil society. Some feel that the 
term stakeholder undermines communities and individuals struggling 
for their rights and that it implies equality among participants, which 
is not always the case. Clearly, for multi-stakeholder processes to serve 
as a vehicle for meaningful civil society participation, they must pro­
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The Global Environment Outlook and the UN Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment: Helping to Fill Research and Analytical Gaps 
One of the most important roles that NGOs can play in global envi­
ronmental governance is to provide up-to-date information on criti­
cal issues. Governments often turn to NGOs to fill research gaps that 
stand in the way of effective decisionmaking. Certain NGOs, such as 
the World Resources Institute (WRI) and IUCN – The World 
9Conservation Union, have crafted their mandates around the role of 
information provider. These groups are dedicated to the production of 
accurate, up-to-date research and data on the most pressing environ­
mental issues. 
Whereas governmental bodies and intergovernmental organ­
izations often lack analytical capacity or are hampered by 
bureaucratic constraints and other obligations, NGOs can 
focus on a dynamic research agenda, and move quickly to 
address new issues. 
The Global Environment Outlook (GEO) of UNEP and the recent­
ly launched UN Millennium Ecosystem Assessment are good examples 
of formalized non-governmental assessment processes and inter-orga­
10nizational networking. At the core of these processes lies a global 
network of collaborating groups responsible for regional inputs. 
Global system assessment is integrated with local environmental 
reporting. NGOs and other non-state actors such as academic and 
research institutions are the main contributors, providing reports and 
data analysis. In the case of the GEO assessment, the final reports are 
reviewed by government representatives before publication. NGOs 
have not yet been allowed participation in the verification process. 
These large-scale assessments require considerable amounts of 
funding. The contributions of charitable organizations, such as the 
9	 IUCN – The World Conservation Union is an important example of collaboration between state
and non-state actors. While formally an NGO, this organization includes a number of state
agencies among its members. 
10 Different reports of the UNEP’s Global Environment Outlook Report Series can be viewed at
http://www.unep.org/GEO/index.htm For more information about the Millennium Ecosystem
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United Nations Foundation, for international environmental research 
are indispensable. Funding matters do raise some concerns in terms of 
the autonomy of NGO research and analysis. The complicated 
dependence that NGOs and many academic and research institutions 
have on governmental and other donor funding concerns some 
observers in terms of the freedom civil society members have in con­
ducting the research and analysis they contribute to governance 
processes. The funding situation, however, is not likely to change. 
Financial relationships and dependencies should therefore be trans­
parent and open to scrutiny. 
TRAFFIC: Ensuring Effective Implementation 
A third example of civil society fulfilling an essential environmental 
governance role is provided by TRAFFIC, the wildlife monitoring net­
work for the 1975 Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
11Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).
TRAFFIC is a partnership between WWF – World Wide Fund For 
Nature and IUCN – The World Conservation Union. It was estab­
lished in 1976 to assist the CITES Secretariat in implementing the pro­
visions of the Convention. The Convention covers more than 30,000 
species of animals and plants and has been endorsed by over 150 coun­
tries (Rosser, Haywood, and Harris, 2001). The diversity of the traded 
goods covered under CITES, which range from medicinal herbs to 
exotic pets, requires a level of international, on-the-ground coordina­
tion that would be difficult for a single intergovernmental institution 
(Wijnstekers, 2001). 
TRAFFIC is a key component in the implementation of CITES. The  
NGOs behind the partnership are able to utilize their resources world­
wide to operate twenty-two offices in eight regional programs, making 
TRAFFIC the world’s largest wildlife trade monitoring organization 
(TRAFFIC, 2001). Its program priorities are threatened species and 
ecoregions, resource security, and international cooperation. 
Members lobby decisionmakers to ensure that trade in plant and ani­
mal species does not pose a threat to species conservation, and collab­
orate with governments and the private sector in developing econom­
ic incentive programs to encourage sustainable trade. TRAFFIC has 
been particularly successful in data collection, on-the-ground inves­
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tigative tasks, and in-depth research. Through its research and out­
reach initiatives, TRAFFIC has become a key resource for governments 
and other NGOs, providing decisionmakers with critical information 
and analysis and prompting initiatives to ensure sustainable trade. 
strengthening civil society participation in global
environmental governance 
As indicated by the three cases discussed above, civil society – name­
ly, the NGO community – has particular strengths to bring to global 
environmental governance. The creativity, flexibility, entrepreneurial 
nature, and capacity for vision and long-term thinking often set NGOs 
apart from governmental bodies. A revitalized global environmental 
governance regime would thus benefit from greater participation of 
NGOs in global policy processes. What follows is a discussion of five 
key potential roles for civil society organizations in a strengthened 
global environmental governance system. 
Information-Based Duties 
As shown by the Global Environment Outlook and Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment processes, NGOs have much to offer in the way 
of information collection, dissemination, and analysis. Numerous 
other examples exist in which NGOs serve a key information-based 
role. One of the most significant relates to the Conferences of Parties 
and other meetings held in conjunction with multilateral environ­
mental agreements such as the UN Convention on Biological Diversity 
and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Often, the 
meetings are distinguished less by what is said in plenary session than 
by the wealth of research and policy documents produced by NGOs 
and other civil society constituents and released specifically to coin­
cide with the official events. Many conference delegates read these 
opinion papers and other documents, which often shed new light on 
the costs of inaction and the options for change. Another common 
opportunity for civil society members to provide input into intergov­
ernmental negotiations comes in the form of a single statement devel­
oped by NGOs present and released at the close of the official event. 
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• Wider acceptance and use of the “commission” model. Short-term 
consultations often yield less valuable information than do multi-
stakeholder commissions (similar to the World Commission on 
Dams) provided with sufficient investment of time and 
12 resources. 
• Assistance in the formation of networks. UN convention secretariats, 
for example, could facilitate ongoing, high-level multi-stakehold­
er knowledge networks that make a directed effort to bring expert­
ise to bear on science and policy challenges, including perspectives 
from marginalized groups. 
• Mechanisms to support “give and take.” While officials may read the 
opinion pieces and research documents NGOs release, there is 
often little feedback and very limited opportunities for back and 
forth dialogue. The institution of “notice and comment” process­
es, formal advisory panels, and other informal mechanisms for 
information exchange between government officials and NGOs 
could pay real dividends. 
• Efforts to agree to disagree. Seeking “consensus” is often a mistake. 
Consensus can be difficult to reach, resulting in prolonged discus­
sions of watered-down conclusions, “forced” agreements, and a 
failure to communicate valid perspectives. An acceptance on the 
part of intergovernmental decisionmakers of a civil society state­
ment reflecting multiple opinions would often be more useful. 
Inputs into Policy Development 
Over the past decades, NGOs have assumed a more active role in the 
process of agenda-setting and policy development (Porter, 2000). 
NGOs have been instrumental in notifying the public, governments, 
and international organizations of critical new issues for many years. 
In 1945, NGOs pushed for inserting human rights language into the 
UN Charter and have been active in that policy domain since. Global 
environmental issues gained prominence in the 1970s also as a result 
of NGO activities. In the 1980s, forestry concerns were included on the 
agenda of intergovernmental deliberations under the pressure of 
NGOs (Humphreys, 1996). In 1997, six NGOs played a key role, 
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through the International Committee to Ban Landmines, in convinc­
ing governments to embrace the successful intergovernmental land-
mine treaty (Weiss, 1999). 
The ability of NGOs to place issues on the global agenda does much 
to enhance their ability to participate in the later stages of decision-
making. As pointed out by former Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd 
Axworthy, “Clearly, one can no longer relegate NGOs to simple advi­
sory or advocacy roles . . . They  are  now  part  of  the way decisions have 
to be made” (cited in Simmons, 1998). The question of what consti­
tutes meaningful civil society participation in decisionmaking, how­
ever, is still being explored as NGOs and intergovernmental bodies 
continue to develop working relationships. 
To this end, the development of a structure for civil society partic­
ipation and engagement in international decisionmaking processes is 
necessary. Currently, modalities of involvement vary from being a full 
13partner as in the case of the International Labor Organization to 
denial of access (even as observers) as in the case of the World Trade 
Organization. While each international agency would need to tailor 
participation standards to its particular objectives, a minimum set of 
criteria should be elaborated. The following elements need to be 
addressed: 
• Clear articulation of rules, rights, and commitments to consulta­
tion with civil society beyond time-limited NGO fora; 
• Clearly delineated selection criteria for NGO participation in con­
sultations and advisory groups, placing an emphasis on diversity; 
• Establishment of guidelines for the process of NGO contributions; 
• Commitment to respectful treatment of NGO documents; 
• Support for publication and dissemination of NGO submissions to 
delegates at relevant international meetings; 
• Formalized submission process for NGO recommendations and 
comments to intergovernmental bodies; 
13	 The International Labor Organization was established in 1919 with a tripartite governance 
structure – governments, business, and labor are equal partners in the decisionmaking
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• Provision for feedback and response to NGO submissions by inter­
governmental bodies or national governments; 
• Mechanism for monitoring the implementation of these compo­
nents. 
A more formalized structure for NGO participation would be 
useful in addressing some of the current obstacles to civil society 
involvement in global environmental governance. The wariness that 
governments and others have of NGO involvement might be reduced 
if baseline standards defined the rights and responsibilities of 
governmental and non-governmental entities in a clear and consistent 
manner. 
Operational Functions 
As demonstrated by the example of TRAFFIC, the UN system usefully 
engages civil society entities as operational partners in many circum­
stances. The role of NGOs in implementation of worldwide policy 
efforts has greatly increased since the mid-1980s, when NGOs began to 
fill gaps left in the provision of services by reduced roles for many 
development agencies (Simon and Dodds, 1998). Non-governmental 
organizations are particularly useful in an operational context, as they 
can provide implementation tailored to specific conditions and can 
“make the impossible possible by doing what governments cannot or 
will not do” (Simmons, 1998). This is especially true with regard to the 
management of natural resources, which is often best handled by 
community-based organizations who have a stake in local environ­
mental conditions and are free from many of the conflicting demands 
experienced by governments. And, in fact, the preamble to Section III 
of Agenda 21 underscores the need for individuals and groups, espe­
cially at the local level, to participate in decisions that may affect the 
communities in which they live and work. 
A significant portion of the world’s ecological “hot spots” are locat­
ed in rural – often very poor – areas of developing countries. As a 
result, the burdens of ecological damage, as well as the burdens asso­
ciated with ecological regeneration, are borne primarily by people in 
these areas (Agarwal, 1998). NGOs and other groups in the developing 
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and often lack a visible presence or audible voice in international gov­
ernance processes (Breitmeier and Rittberger, 2000). The activities of 
Shack/Slum Dwellers International, a network of grassroots develop­
ment groups in fourteen countries, are illustrative of one way in which 
Southern groups can build greater presence on the international stage. 
Through the use of micro-financing and other programs, Shack/Slum 
Dwellers International leverages the resources of its member groups to 
provide them with financial support, information, and advice on 
development strategies and related issues. Using their collective power, 
the federation has developed a voice on the global policymaking stage 
(Edwards, 2001). 
The operational functions of NGOs within a reformed global envi­
ronmental governance system could be strengthened by: 
• Expanded efforts at inclusion of local, community-based groups 
with knowledge of the issues at hand; 
• Capacity building targeted at enhancing communication between 
local groups and other governance partners; 
• Support for initiatives to measure and monitor service delivery by 
NGOs — and the use of benchmarking and the identification of 
“best practices” as a way to improve performance. 
Assessment and Monitoring 
Performance assessments and monitoring of environmental condi­
tions undertaken by NGOs may hold decisionmakers in international 
arenas publicly accountable for decisions in ways that the intergov­
ernmental system itself could never accomplish (Gaer, 1996). As 
Thomas Weiss notes, “NGOs are . . . capable of making sensitive or 
politically important information public – something that intergov­
ernmental organizations often are reluctant or loathe to do because of 
their dependence on member states for resources” (Weiss, 1999). A 
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As shown by TRAFFIC, for example, environmental NGOs are 
critical actors in compliance monitoring of international 
agreements and in finding more accurate compliance data 
than governments are willing to provide. Much room exists, 
however, for greater civil society involvement in this impor­
tant area of governance. 
There is an urgent need to account for the needs of developing 
countries, to acknowledge the limitations they face in conducting 
monitoring and assessment activities, and to provide support for the 
enhancement of these functions within governments and civil society 
alike. Key measures that could facilitate the assessment and monitor­
ing role of NGOs include: 
• Creation of a comprehensive database for information and analysis 
at different geographic and political levels. NGOs are key providers 
of local environmental data and information. A coherent mecha­
nism for data collection and analysis will encourage this function 
and facilitate a two-way information flow; 
• Involvement of a larger part of the population in assessment and 
monitoring functions. The inclusion of civil society groups in data 
collection would greatly contribute to filling knowledge gaps as 
well as enhance knowledge development, increase interest, and 
promote engagement. This will be especially beneficial to devel­
14oping countries;
• Support for knowledge-generating institutions in developing coun­
tries. Universities are key generators of knowledge, yet they are 
among the most under-funded institutions in developing coun­
tries. Funding and communication technology transfer will be 
critical to their ability to perform these functions. 
14 For a detailed analysis of the gap between scientific capacities in developed and developing
countries, its consequences for global environmental governance, and recommendations for
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Advocacy for Environmental Justice 
Over the past few decades, NGOs in many countries have been 
extremely effective in highlighting disparities in who bears environ­
mental burdens and who gets the benefits of environmental invest­
ments. Some groups have issued reports. Others have brought public 
interest litigation to defend environmental rights as well as to clarify 
and enforce laws. If a reformed global environmental governance sys­
tem were to include a dispute settlement mechanism, it is easy to see 
the potential contributions NGOs and other civil society members 
could make to such a structure. The submission of “friends of the 
court” opinions would be well-suited to the skills and interests of 
NGOs. In fact, the Aarhus Convention envisions a process by which 
NGOs could seek judicial remedy against other parties, such as 
national governments or private sector entities, for environmental 
harms or crimes. 
conclusion 
Designing governance structures that draw NGOs into global-scale 
environmental problem solving, policymaking, and implementation 
remains an important global challenge. Civil society has much more 
to offer to intergovernmental processes. Indeed, the very legitimacy of 
international decisionmaking may depend on NGOs as a way to 
ensure connectedness to the publics around the world and substitute 
for true popular sovereignty, which international bodies, devoid of 
elected officials, lack. A number of UN projects and programs are 
already benefiting from the contributions of NGOs in areas as varied 
as information collection and dissemination, policy implementation, 
monitoring and assessment, norm-setting, and policy development. A 
revitalized global environmental governance system must facilitate 
both an expansion of these roles for NGOs and the development of 
better-defined processes of participation. 
A number of difficulties remain. Civil society participation requires 
a significant commitment of time as well as substantial financial 
resources from governments and intergovernmental bodies. Diversity 
within the global civil society community precludes the reaching of a 
consensus position that could be easily channeled into intergovern­
mental negotiations. It is imperative that NGOs explore innovative 
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forms of networking through regional coalitions, for example, to help 
ensure the inclusion of a multitude of voices from developing coun­
tries and to make civil society involvement in governance more effec­
tive. 
The contributions from civil society participation need to be 
enhanced through a strengthened, more formalized structure 
for engagement. UN programs seek legitimacy for their poli­
cies through the involvement of civil society, yet formal 
mechanisms for NGO participation within many parts of the 
UN system remain limited. 
An improved governance structure would acknowledge the role of 
NGOs and other members of civil society and devise formal channels 
for participation. Ad-hoc acceptance of civil society participation 
should be replaced by institutional arrangements among UN member 
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Regional Environmental Governance: 
Examining the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) Model 
Koh Kheng Lian and Nicholas A. Robinson 
summary 
Regional systems of environmental management are an essential com­
ponent of global environmental governance, complementing gover­
nance efforts at the national and global levels. This chapter analyzes the 
role and functions of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
in the environmental domain as one model for regional governance. 
ASEAN’s tradition emphasizes non-interference in its members’ 
domestic affairs, seeks consensus and cooperation, and aims to facilitate 
national implementation of regional agreements. Two main areas have 
served as a focal point for regional environmental cooperation within 
ASEAN: management of shared natural resources (biodiversity) and pol­
lution control (air pollution from forest fires). 
The ASEAN experience in environmental management illustrates the 
strengths and limitations of environmental governance at the regional 
level, with important lessons for the global level. The organization’s 
emphasis on cooperation favors regional policy and soft law formula­
tions. However, the general lack of concrete instruments for translating 
ASEAN commitments into national level action has hindered implemen­
tation of effective programs. ASEAN’s limitations could be reduced if the 
organization were understood as an essential, but not exclusive, part of 
an environmental governance system, working and cooperating with 
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regional environmental governance 
Global sustainable development requires actions to be taken in each 
country in accordance with national capacities. The key to success in 
addressing transboundary harms is a structure that connects interna­
tional policymaking with national implementation. National action 
can be encouraged through strengthened global networks, improved 
data and information systems, and new financing arrangements, but 
work at the national level remains critical. 
The regional level represents a critical middle ground between the 
global and national scales (Dua and Esty, 1997). Contiguous states may 
collaborate to sustain shared ecosystems and solve common problems. 
Indeed, many transboundary issues appear first at the regional level, 
affecting several neighboring countries. Pollution of a shared river 
basin or loss of habitat across the migration range of a species, for 
example, are as relevant at the regional as at the national level. No 
country can cope effectively with shared environmental problems on 
its own. Regional systems of environmental management are thus 
essential to securing agreements for, and implementation of, specific 
action programs (Kimball, 1999). 
Regional integration of national activities for sustainable 
development can be advanced through measures such as 
harmonization of standards, joint development of 
environmental management systems, and collaborative 
capacity building projects. None of this will happen, however, 
without an effective institutional framework to facilitate it. 
the association of southeast asian nations 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was founded in 
1967 to encourage stable relations among Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore, the Philippines, and Thailand, and to resist the destabiliz­
ing influences of the war in Vietnam. To promote stability, ASEAN fos­
tered economic, social, and cultural cooperation in the spirit of equal­
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bership to include Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar 
1(Burma), and Vietnam.
During the first phase of cooperation, the national ASEAN 
Secretariats carried out projects without a formal treaty system. 
Subsequently, ASEAN has developed increasingly sophisticated meas­
ures for policy coordination. The Association seeks to meet its goal of 
closer cohesion and economic integration by building a recognized 
ASEAN community. In 1997, the ASEAN heads of state and government 
gathered in Kuala Lumpur to mark the Association’s 30th anniversary. 
The outcome document of that meeting, ASEAN Vision 2020, attests to 
the achievements of the past thirty years and elaborates a vision for 
the future of the region: 
That vision is of ASEAN as a concert of Southeast Asian 
Nations, outward looking, living in peace, stability, and pros­
perity, bonded together in partnership in dynamic develop­
ment and in a community of caring societies. (ASEAN, 1997) 
The Hanoi Plan of Action, 1999 – 2004, was formulated pursuant 
to ASEAN Vision 2020 and covered some fifteen areas relating to the 
environment. 
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The “ASEAN Way” 
Regional cooperation to build stable relations in Southeast Asia has 
become known as the “ASEAN Way,” a collaborative approach empha­
sizing three fundamental standards: 
• Non-interference or non-intervention in other member states’ 
domestic affairs, as underscored in the United Nations Charter, 
Article 2(7); 
• Consensus building and cooperative programs rather than legally 
binding treaties (but in an exceptional situation, a binding agree­
ment may be possible); 
• Preference for national implementation of programs rather than 
reliance on a strong region-wide bureaucracy. 
The emphasis on consensus is also reflected in ASEAN methods for 
dispute resolution. In the Pacific region, due to the influence of the 
British Commonwealth, most disagreements are settled with formal 
judicial methods (Cameron and Ramsay, 1996). Disagreements 
between the nations of ASEAN, on the other hand, are generally settled 
through conciliation and consultation, which is seen as a way to min­
imize tensions and avoid unnecessary conflicts (Narine, 1999). 
ASEAN Organizational Framework for Managing 
Environmental Matters 
There is no core ASEAN bureaucracy. The small Secretariat, based in 
Jakarta, has a limited facilitation role. Activities are undertaken by 
each ASEAN member state at the national level. ASEAN embraces the 
tenet of common but differentiated responsibilities. Members agree 
on common measures, decide how to implement them, and con­
tribute according to their capabilities, acknowledging that ASEAN 
member states have achieved different levels of development and 
therefore have different capacities for action. 
When ASEAN was established in 1967, environmental management 
was not expressly recognized as a concern (Koh, 1996). ASEAN 
integrated the environment into its complex system of regional 
consultations on economic, social, technical, and scientific 
development following the Stockholm Conference on the Human 
Environment in 1972. 
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ASEAN’s Senior Officials on the Environment carry out a series of 
activities in the environmental domain: 
• Preparing for ASEAN’s regional participation in international 
environmental governance deliberations; 
• Establishing guidelines pertaining to pollution, biodiversity, cli­
mate change, forests, and related environmental matters; 
• Working toward harmonization of environmental standards for 
ambient air and river quality. 
In each country, National Focal Points are responsible for carrying 
out ASEAN initiatives. Member states are increasingly willing to 
assume greater responsibilities to increase ASEAN’s environmental 
effectiveness, as demonstrated by the Philippines’ decision to host 
ASEAN’s Regional Centre for Biodiversity Conservation and Malaysia’s 
agreement to manage the Marine Turtle Conservation Program. The 
current framework for ASEAN environmental management and coop­
eration is reflected in its institutional architecture (see Figure 1). This 
structure facilitates cooperation among ASEAN member states and 
enhances the Association’s ability to cooperate with other countries. 
A Summit of the ASEAN heads of state and government, ASEAN’s 
highest decisionmaking body, is held every three years. These high-
level panels pave the way for intermediate, ministerial-level meetings, 
and provide proposals for decisions to be adopted by consensus at the 
ministerial level. Ministerial meetings by sector – including agricul­
ture and forestry, economics, energy, environment, finance, labor, 
regional haze, rural development and poverty alleviation, science and 
technology, and social welfare – are convened in tandem with the 
Summit. Every three years, well before the meeting of the heads of 
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Figure 1 ASEAN’s Organizational Framework 
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approaches to solving environmental problems 
The “ASEAN Way” faces new challenges as it knits together programs 
across the ten Southeast Asian states, yet the very fact that the ASEAN 
Way is regarded as a defined approach, distinct from the more for­
malistic parliamentary decisionmaking systems of Europe and North 
America, is evidence for the proposition that ASEAN bears close study 
by those interested in strengthening regional and global environmen­
tal governance. 
ASEAN’s approach to environmental governance and its institu­
tional responsibilities and achievements can be illustrated by its efforts 
to manage biodiversity conservation and to address transboundary air 
pollution from forest fires. 
Biodiversity Conservation: Addressing Global Priorities Using
Regional Management 
Southeast Asia is a “mega-rich” region in terms of biological diversity. 
These resources require careful conservation management. 
Unsustainable logging and conversion of forests into agricultural land 
have had adverse impacts on biodiversity across the region. 
Biodiversity conservation has thus become an issue of significant 
interest to ASEAN member states (Koh, 2002). Recognizing the need to 
share information and to shape a common approach to biodiversity, 
member states initiated a Working Group of ASEAN Senior Officials 
on the Environment and an ASEAN Regional Centre for Biodiversity 
Conservation. The four core functions of the Centre illustrate the 
problem solving approach that ASEAN has adopted regarding envi­
ronmental concerns: 
• Networking and Institution Building 
Strong national institutions are critical for the implementation of 
regional policies. To this end, a network of national biodiversity 
reference units has been established, connecting scientific knowl­
edge and promoting information exchange. The network is also 
charged with the task of developing and implementing an exchange 
program for academics and researchers from ASEAN institutions, 
as well as designing policies for biodiversity conservation. 
• Data and Information Management 
Sound data on natural resources and environmental trends are 
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tion. The Biodiversity Centre creates, shares, and maintains elec­
tronic data repositories regarding biodiversity and has the capaci­
ty to link its records to other international databases. 
• Research and Development 
The accumulation of scientific knowledge and understanding is 
seen as critical in the environmental domain where many uncer­
tainties persist. The Biodiversity Centre has taken on the role of 
coordinating regional efforts in determining research priorities, 
organizing conferences to finalize the regional research agenda, 
and providing funds for applied biodiversity research activities. 
• Education and Training 
The sustained build up of capacity for the execution of common 
policies and decisions is an important governance function. The 
Biodiversity Centre assists institutions in formulating their training 
needs, and designs and carries out training and education programs. 
Across the region, in cooperation with the European Union, the 
ASEAN Regional Centre for Biodiversity Conservation is creating 
management systems for biological conservation as a foundation for 
sustaining the region’s natural resources. The Centre serves as the 
main focal point for networking and institutional linkage among 
ASEAN member countries, and with other regional organizations, to 
2enhance the region’s capacity to promote biodiversity conservation.
The process also prepares the ASEAN members to participate in the 
Conference of Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity. 
Transboundary Air Pollution: Addressing National Issues with
Regional Impacts 
Air pollution from burning biomass in Southeast Asia has become a 
recurrent environmental challenge that causes serious adverse eco­
nomic and health impacts (Tan, 1996). The use of fire to transform 
forest areas into agricultural land has uncontrollable consequences 
during the dry periods that the region experiences as a result of El 
Niño climate oscillations. This problem is particularly serious in 
Indonesia, where the practice of forestland burning is largely prohib­
ited by statute, but where enforcement is hindered by lack of commu­
nity education, inadequate administrative capacity, and corruption. 
Once fires spread out in dry weather, the capacity to extinguish them 
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is limited and the smoke becomes a transnational pall, known as 
“haze.” As a result, ambient air quality standards are breached and 
breathing the air in certain cities throughout the region becomes a 
health hazard (Tay, 1998). 
In 1995, ASEAN adopted the Cooperation Plan on Transboundary 
Pollution, which included measures for addressing transboundary 
atmospheric pollution, transboundary ship-borne pollution, and 
transboundary movement of hazardous wastes. The Cooperation Plan 
demonstrated a region-wide level of commitment and spirit of coop­
eration on environmental issues that had not been seen before. 
Unlike biodiversity, however, haze is a sub-regional issue, involving 
the original ASEAN member states. Thus, rather than employing the 
typical ASEAN-wide working group structure, a Haze Technical Task 
Force was developed. The Cooperation Plan has been largely ineffec­
tive, unfortunately, because it lacks an operational agenda. In the 
absence of targeted mitigation activities, the region suffered a major 
bout of transboundary air pollution in 1997. Progress has been too 
slow to effectively avert the recurrence of the haze (Robinson, 2001; 
Tan, 1999; Tay, 1998, 1999), reflecting the preference of the states of 
ASEAN for cooperative and consensual discussions, or soft law, over 
3the adoption of international agreements, or hard law.
The recent landmark ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze 
Pollution, however, signed on 10 June 2002 in Kuala Lumpur, demon­
strates that in a crisis situation, ASEAN members can rally together to 
reach consensus on a hard law instrument. The Agreement seeks to: 
• Prevent land and forest fires through better management policies; 
•
 Establish operational mechanisms to monitor land and forest fires;
 
• Strengthen regional land and forest fire-fighting capability and 
other mitigating measures. 
Under the Agreement, parties oblige themselves to: 
• Develop information systems, including monitoring, assessment, 
and early warning to prevent and monitor transboundary haze 
pollution; 
3	 This reluctance is also evident in the 1985 ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of Nature
and Natural Resources, negotiated with the cooperation of the International Union for the
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), which remains to be ratified by enough
states to enter into force. 
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• Provide necessary information regarding haze pollution originat­
ing within their borders; 
• Take legislative, administrative, and other relevant measures to 
implement the Agreement. 
An ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Transboundary Haze Pollution 
Control was also established to facilitate cooperation among the par­
ties. Similar to the ASEAN Regional Centre for Biodiversity 
Conservation, its functions comprise data and information collection 
and analysis, networking, and capacity building. The Centre for 
Transboundary Haze Pollution Control is mandated with information 
clearinghouse functions regarding environmental threats, scientific 
capacities, technological options, and financing possibilities. It does 
not possess enforcement power. Whether the policies promoted by the 
Centre will be fully implemented at the national level remains to be 
seen, however, since there are no enforcement mechanisms and agen­
cies at the ASEAN level. 
evaluation of asean’s contribution to 
environmental governance 
What can we learn from the ASEAN record of regional environmental 
governance? First, ASEAN draws on a strong sense of regional identity 
to bring together diverse cultures and political traditions to promote 
cooperation and to shape common policies. Second, it does so by 
respecting each country’s internal procedures, and building capacity 
within each nation to meet agreed program objectives. Third, ASEAN’s 
emphasis on consensus and capacity building is ill equipped to deal 
with urgent events, as demonstrated by the lack of adequate response 
to regional fires and haze. This inadequacy has led some ASEAN 
commentators to call for a stronger emphasis on the implementation 
of policy and the initiation of necessary reforms (Tay, Estanislao, and 
Soesastro, 2001). 
When ASEAN’s environmental policies are considered in light of 
the region’s environmental needs, several key strengths become 
apparent: 
• Adaptation capacity. In many instances, ASEAN has demonstrated 
an ability to adapt to new circumstances. ASEAN overcame the 
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in 1979, and the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, when the 
organization was expected to disband (Funston, 1999); 
• Effective regional policy formulation. ASEAN has been remarkably 
successful in shaping a common regional environmental policy 
4framework (see box on ASEAN Sustainability Framework). By 
respecting each country’s internal procedures, ASEAN has facilitat­
ed cooperation; 
• Stable relationships among members. The non-interventionist 
approach has contributed to building relatively stable relations 
among member states. The community building process has facil­
itated social and political interaction, rather than interference, and 
has reduced intra-ASEAN tensions (Snitwongse, 1995); 
• Sound foundation for implementation. ASEAN’s consensus building 
process has created a sound foundation for implementation. For 
instance, the Working Group on Nature Conservation and 
Biodiversity has drafted an ASEAN framework agreement on 
access to genetic resources, which may be effective in shaping a 
common approach among the administrations and parliaments of 
the ASEAN States, or may form the basis for a new regional hard 
law instrument. It also is likely to minimize – in advance – possi­
ble regional trade disputes on the subject. 
Despite the proliferation of policies on sustainable development, 
declarations, resolutions, plans of action, and programs, the imple­
mentation of agreements within ASEAN is usually rather slow. Some 
of the key limitations and barriers to effectiveness include: 
• Non-intervention. The “ASEAN Way” follows too blindly the prin­
ciple of non-intervention, undermining the possibility of adopt­
ing practical measures to cope with regional problems. Diplomats, 
political leaders, and scholars have urged ASEAN to re-examine 
the meaning of its non-interventionist norm (Tay, Estanislao, 
Soesastra, 2001); 
• Inadequate support. Lack of expertise, information and data, fund­
ing, and organizational support within ASEAN have often led to  
suboptimal results; 
4	 This common policy framework is the product of ASEAN Action Plans between 1978 and 1992,
culminating in a Strategic Plan, 1994-98 (Koh, K.L. 1996), which was implemented to establish
a region-wide process for implemention of Agenda 21. 
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asean sustainability framework 
ASEAN’s policies, in soft law instruments, set forth a common regional 
policy framework for sustainable development with the following policy 
guidelines (Koh, 1996): 
• Environment Management. Endorse and employ environmental 
impact assessments, optimal land use plans, and town and country 
planning or zoning plans; 
Nature Conservation. Develop new practicable approaches for 
preserving forest wildlife and ecosystems; monitor the quality of 
environment and natural resources to enable compilation of ASEAN 
state of the environment reports; 
Marine Conservation. Develop practicable methods for management 
of pollution discharges; 
Industry. Ensure reasonable control of waste discharges at the early 
stages of project formulation; recycle waste; develop suitable systems 
for control of toxic and hazardous waste; 
Education and Training. Enhance public awareness; introduce 
environmental subjects in schools and universities; provide technical 
training in environmental information systems; encourage wider 
involvement in environmental management; promote cooperation 
among governments, NGOs, universities, and business communities 
within ASEAN; 
Environmental Legislation. Develop appropriate legislation to 
support proper management in the development of the 
environment; 
Information Systems. Establish monitoring programs for surveillance 
of sensitive environmental resources; promote use of remote sensing 
to establish databases; develop comprehensive environmental 
information systems to facilitate decisionmaking; 
Enhanced ASEAN Joint Action. Facilitate closer cooperation of the 
ASEAN member states to act in unison in incorporating 
environmental concerns into economic policies to provide better 
foundation for natural resource management; 
International Cooperation. Establish cooperation with developed and 
developing countries and international agencies for transfer of 
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• Inadequate information. The absence of a monitoring and surveil­
lance mechanism limits the ability of ASEAN to gather informa­
tion on environmental trends and risks and to respond effectively; 
• Lack of a dispute resolution mechanism. Because the ASEAN Way 
emphasizes decisionmaking through consensus building, it lacks 
an effective dispute settlement process. Thus, ASEAN often opts 
for conflict avoidance rather than conflict resolution (Narine, 
1999: 360). 
Learning from Success and Failure 
In the ten years since the UN Conference on Environment and 
Development, ASEAN has done much to both integrate all Southeast 
Asian nations into one region, and to regard the region as a shared 
ecosystem. The political cooperation and economic negotiations 
toward more liberalized trade relations will be facilitated by the estab­
lishment of a sound, common environmental policy framework. 
The “ASEAN Way,” with its non-interventionist approach, has 
promoted building stable relations, agreeing upon general 
policy, and fostering capacity building measures. However, 
arresting environmental degradation patterns also requires 
affirmative action – which by definition must be interven­
tionist, albeit in agreed ways, based on scientific knowledge. 
A number of measures would enable significant improvement in 
that direction: 
• The Association could create a regional “cooperation team” to be 
deployed throughout the region to prevent or contain environ­
mental catastrophes, using appropriate information and scientific 
knowledge. Such a system is already in place for marine oil spills 
and could be replicated for terrestrial environmental problems. 
ASEAN could draw on its rich history of cooperation to create such 
teams. This would enhance respect for sovereignty, not undermine 
it, as the inability to avert an environmental disaster is a greater 
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• ASEAN might agree to establish eco-labeling schemes for palm oil 
and timber products in order to address the capital investment 
that is a cause of the forest fires in Indonesia and deforestation 
throughout the region. This scheme would enable consumers to 
make informed market decisions and would help deter the illegal 
process of setting fires to clear land. 
• ASEAN could mete out sanctions against palm oil companies that 
are responsible for the fires, rather than pursuing a conciliatory 
approach of negotiating behind closed doors, "saving face" for 
their neighbors. 
ASEAN has adopted a reactive rather than a proactive approach to 
environmental protection. Since there has been intermittent warfare 
throughout the region for fifty years, reluctance to intervene in mem­
ber states’ affairs is understandable. Nonetheless, ASEAN member 
states should differentiate illegitimate or hostile meddling in each 
other’s affairs from the promotion of effective policies and environ­
mental justice across the region. 
In the case of Indonesian forest fires, for instance, neither those 
states whose nationals invest in the Indonesian palm oil plantations or 
timber operations that instigate forest burning, nor Indonesia, whose 
resources are being damaged, should tolerate the injury to other 
ASEAN states from the haze. The prevalent regional attitude of defer­
ence towards the domestic affairs of one’s neighbors can thus lead to 
violations of Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, which stress­
es that states have “the sovereign right to exploit their own resources 
pursuant to their own environmental policies and the responsibility to 
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause 
damage to the environment of other states or of areas beyond the lim­
its of national jurisdiction.” As Singapore Ambassador Tommy Koh 
has observed, “ASEAN’s corporate culture prevented Indonesia’s 
5neighbors from engaging her in a free and candid exchange of views.”
6Others in the region have arrived at similar conclusions.
5	 Quoted in The Straits Times, 10 July 1998, at page 48. 
6	 For instance, at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting of the member countries held in Manila
in 1998, Thailand urged ASEAN to adopt the principle of “flexible engagement.” The Thai for­
eign Minister Surin Pitsuwan stated: “Perhaps it is time that ASEAN’s cherished principle of
non-intervention is modified to allow ASEAN to play a constructive role in preventing or
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An analysis of the ASEAN Way in light of the organization’s 
successes and failures reveals that ASEAN is better equipped 
to deal with issues where members’ interests converge than 
problems where members have opposing interests. Indeed, 
ASEAN’s consensus-based approach works well when all 
countries in the region share similar goals, but when states’ 
interests diverge, this same approach leads countries to 
evade issues and avoid negotiations. 
ASEAN has been shown to be effective in dealing with the manage­
ment of common natural resources such as biodiversity. In the case of 
the Indonesian haze, however, pollution from one country is causing 
damages in neighboring areas, and the implementation of costly 
measures in Indonesia may be required to preserve the environment 
elsewhere in the region. Finding an effective solution to this issue may 
necessitate more serious measures and could accelerate the evolution 
of ASEAN from a regional body capable of arriving at an environmen­
tal policy consensus to one capable of implementing that consensus. 
prospects for cooperation: the regional-global
interface 
Regional environmental governance structures are a part of an envi­
ronmental governance architecture spanning the local and the global 
levels (Esty, 1999). Initiatives at the regional level complement, rather 
than substitute for, the policies and efforts of international institu­
tions. To this end, global mechanisms need to facilitate regional envi­
ronmental initiatives. Three major forms of cooperation between 
ASEAN, or other regional organizations, and international environ­
mental governance institutions could be especially valuable: informa­
tion systems, international best practices, and dispute settlement. 
Information Systems 
Global-level governance structures could serve as an important source 
of data and information, allowing for more effective regional policy 
formulation. A repository of data on environmental indicators from 
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of risks, trends, causes, and possible responses. A Global 
Environmental Information Clearinghouse, as outlined by Esty and 
Ivanova in this volume, could serve in this capacity and fill in the data 
gap that hampers effective environmental policy at the regional and 
national levels. Moreover, a global mechanism for information gather­
ing and dissemination would promote a two-way flow of information. 
National and regional agencies and non-governmental organizations 
could access a wide range of relevant data, allowing for better problem 
identification, prioritization, and resource deployment. At the same 
time, regional organizations could serve an intermediary repository 
function for local level information collection efforts and encourage 
broader engagement in the policy process by a larger segment of the 
general public (see Karlsson, this volume). 
International Best Practices 
Information sharing on implementation strategies, technologies, and 
policies may be another area of potentially essential cooperation 
between the global and regional levels. Best practices in problem solv­
ing on a range of issues could provide a useful tool for regions facing 
similar challenges. One area in which ASEAN could share its experi­
ence, for example, is in the efforts to resolve conflicts between trade 
and environmental interests, which “increasingly appear as flash 
points that divide nations, creating tensions that could cause some 
countries to renege on commitments to an open market” (Dua and 
Esty, 1997). ASEAN’s shrimp exports were embargoed by the United 
States in 1996 on the grounds that shrimp trawlers in those countries 
did not use the turtle-excluding device, a tool that significantly 
7reduces the number of deaths of sea turtles in shrimp harvesting. The 
embargo prompted a concerted effort at protection, conservation, 
replenishment, and recovery of sea turtles and of their habitats, based 
on the best available scientific evidence, taking into account the envi­
ronmental, socio-economic, and cultural characteristics of individual 
8
ASEAN members. Information on best practices and policies con­
7	 Malaysia and others challenged the U.S. trade restrictions under the dispute settlement pro­
cedures of the World Trade Organization. In October 2002, however, the WTO Appellate Body
ruled in favor of the United States, confirming that the ban of shrimp represented a valid envi­
ronmental concern compatible with WTO laws (USTR, 2001). 
8	 Under the agreement, each ASEAN country is to nominate specialists to form a Technical
Experts Working Group, the purpose of which is to prepare a Marine Trade Conservation
Programme and Work Plan for endorsement by the ASEAN Fisheries Working Group and
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cerning the effective management of trade and environment interests 
could form one of many areas of collaboration among regions, facili­
tated by a global information clearinghouse. 
Dispute Settlement 
International organizations could also assist regional bodies and 
member states in resolving disputes. As exemplified by ASEAN, when  
conciliation is not possible and interference with the national policies 
of a member state is not a viable option, resolving disputes becomes a 
significant challenge. However, countries may be willing to accept 
arbitration from an external court or organization that is trusted as 
impartial by all parties involved in the dispute. Resorting to such a 
venue would not conflict with the principle of non-intervention in 
domestic affairs, and might enable countries to reach agreement on a 
set of difficult issues. One example of a situation in which ASEAN 
members have referred to an international body is the dispute between 
Malaysia and Indonesia over the islands of Sipidan and Litigan, which 
was referred to the World Court (Narine, 1999: 377). Similar interna­
tional arrangements could also be used for environmental matters. 
conclusion 
Regional environmental governance through ASEAN offers valuable 
lessons for intra-regional cooperation. Notwithstanding the evident 
need within ASEAN countries to devote greater attention to imple­
mentation of shared policies, ASEAN has been successful in shaping a 
common regional environmental policy framework and establishing a 
basis for capacity building throughout the region. ASEAN’s consensus 
building process may have created a sound foundation for future 
implementation of common policies. But the weaknesses of this 
process are evident too – especially where views, values, and interests 
diverge. Over the longer term, the flexibility of the “ASEAN Way” may, 
in fact, help ASEAN to build a stronger basis for regional action and 
effective policymaking. As emphasized by Ambassador Tommy T.B. 
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The dream of a united Europe has been shared by Europeans 
for more than 300 years. That dream is still not completely 
realized. Viewed in this light, the progress that has been 
achieved by ASEAN in the last seven years has been quite 
remarkable. Although ASEAN was formed primarily for the 
purpose of promoting economic and cultural cooperation 
among the member nations, the two outstanding achieve­
ments of ASEAN to date have been the forging of a sense of 
community among the five member nations and what I will 
call confidence-building. (Koh, 1998) 
Regional environmental governance represents an indispensable 
link between, and complement to, national and global initiatives. As 
illustrated by the ASEAN case, to be more effective, regional systems 
for environmental governance need to supplement cooperative policy 
formulation with effective mechanisms to facilitate implementation of 
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Global Public Policy Networks 
as Coalitions for Change 
Charlotte Streck 
summary 
Numerous international agreements have been concluded over the past 
few decades, yet on a global scale environmental quality has deteriorat­
ed. Traditional legal and institutional arrangements for environmental 
protection have not lived up to the task. The time is ripe to complement 
the traditional governance system with innovative elements of “net­
worked governance,” bringing together governments, the private sector, 
and civil society organizations. 
Over the last decade, global public policy networks have emerged as a 
possible element of such a governance structure. These open, flexible, 
and transparent structures have formed around issues of common inter­
est. The World Commission on Dams, the Global Environment Facility, 
and the flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol are three examples of 
networks that have been instrumental in forging successful working 
arrangements. These models are worth examining more closely. Global 
public policy networks, coordinated by international organizations, 
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the limits of traditional bureaucracies 
Global problems demand global responses. Key issues that pose a 
direct threat to the common future of our planet include climate 
change, depletion of the ozone layer, loss of biodiversity, maritime 
pollution, and trade in hazardous waste, among others. Traditionally, 
global governance was viewed as intergovernmental cooperation to 
solve common environmental problems. Governments today are com­
peting with private entities for power, influence, and representation 
(Reinicke, 1998; Strange, 1996, 1997). A world of growing internation­
al interdependence, increasing economic and political liberalization, 
and technological change cannot be regulated at the national level or 
by traditional intergovernmental cooperation alone (Rischard, 2001). 
Several key characteristics distinguish today’s reality from tradi­
tional governance contexts: 
National economies are increasingly integrated through trade and • 
financial flows, the spread of knowledge, and the movement of 
people; 
Technological change and economic integration have created • 
transnational economic and social networks of interdependence 
that are difficult to regulate through national legislation; 
Traditional bureaucracies often lack the knowledge and flexibility • 
to react to today’s complex and fast-moving governance chal­
lenges. 
The instruments of international policymaking currently at our 
disposal – international treaties, institutions, and agencies – have 
proven insufficient to meet the challenges of an increasingly global­
ized and interdependent world in a timely and efficient manner. New 
institutional and operational responses are necessary to deliver meas­
urable environmental results through an inclusive and transparent 
process. Flexible and integrative networks may show one way to 
address international problems more quickly and effectively than 




   












Recent trends in international governance indicate that the 
focus has shifted from intergovernmental activities to multi-
sectoral initiatives – from governance at the international 
level to governance across different levels, and from a largely 
formal, legalistic process to a less formal, more participatory 
and integrated approach. 
emerging alternatives: global public policy networks 
Global public policy networks are a recent addition to the system of 
global governance. Such networks have appeared mainly at the inter­
national level, where a constant need for policy solutions and the lack 
of a central government leave room for innovative structures. They are 
multisectoral partnerships linking different sectors and levels of 
governance and bringing together governments, international organi­
zations, corporations, and civil society. 
Global public policy networks offer a promising model for how to 
handle new governance problems because complex political, economic, 
and social systems cannot be governed by a single sector – the public 
sector – or from a single level – the national level. Governance struc­
tures building on networks are able to bridge the gap between the 
public, the for-profit, and the non-profit sectors and integrate human 
and financial resources to find solutions to multifaceted problems. 
Networks have emerged around issues of public health, financial reg­
ulation, international crime, and the global environment. 
Where networks appear spontaneously around certain problem 
areas, they should be integrated more consciously into a system of 
global environmental governance. The effectiveness of less formalized 
and flexible networks could then point toward a more viable solution 
to protect the global commons. 
features of global public policy networks 
Global public policy networks generally form around issues of an 
international character. They minimize hierarchy through the involve­
ment of multiple stakeholders across many sectors. The network par­
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ticipants bring complementary resources to the process, allowing for 
synergies and more effective responses: 
A typical network (if there is such a thing) combines the volun­
tary energy and legitimacy of the civil society sector with the 
financial muscle and interest of businesses and the enforcement 
and rule-making power and coordination and capacity-build­
ing skills of states and international organizations. Networks 
create bridges that enable these various participants to exploit 
the synergies between these resources. They allow for the pool­
ing of know-how and the exchange of experience. Spanning 
socioeconomic, political, and cultural gaps, networks manage 
relationships that might otherwise degenerate into counterpro­
ductive confrontation. (Reinicke and Deng, 2000) 
Several key features characterize successful global public policy 
networks: 
Diversity. The trilateral nature of global public policy networks, • 
involving the public sector, civil society, and business, makes them 
distinct institutional arrangements. In the context of economic, 
social, and cultural globalization, the participation of the private 
sector has become critical to finding effective solutions to interna­
tional problems. At the same time, political liberalization has led 
to a rapid growth of transnational advocacy coalitions of non-gov­
ernmental organizations (NGOs), which need to be involved in 
policymaking (Gemmill and Bamidele-Izu, this volume; Tamiotti 
and Finger, 2001; Wapner, 2000). 
Openness and flexibility. Global public policy networks offer pol­• 
icy mechanisms adaptive to a constantly changing environment 
and open to new actors. Different approaches of policymaking 
and varying cultural perspectives increasingly demand recogni­
tion and integration. Networks provide a vehicle for incorporating 
such diverse perspectives, including local knowledge, and involv­
ing affected communities in the problem-solving processes. 
Speed. Global public policy networks provide for rapid responses • 
and rapid “activation of reputational effects” (Rischard, 2001). 



















options, and an action plan, and launch a concrete effort for their 
attainment. Moreover, through the political energy and urgency 
they generate, networks can put pressure on traditional institu­
tions to respond in a quicker and more efficient manner. 
Subsidiarity and legitimacy. Global public policy networks • 
respond effectively to the need for delegating policy processes to 
the governance levels that can most effectively formulate and 
implement policy solutions. They provide a means of imple­
menting agreements and policies at various levels of decision-
making. Through the open architecture now allowed by the 
internet, participation in networks at multiple levels is facilitated, 
leading to greater legitimacy and ultimately to the development of 
common global norms. 
Due to their structure, networks are largely opportunistic, and are 
most likely to emerge in situations of political deadlock. A stalemate 
can trigger a special engagement by institutions and individuals who 
can assume leadership roles in bringing stakeholders together. Global 
public policy networks can also emerge wherever national policymak­
ers lack the information, knowledge, or means to address complex 
policy issues, or where responses need to be built on a broad consen­
sus of stakeholders. Finally, networks may arise around treaties, where 
diverse stakeholders are expected to take a coordinated approach in 
translating international consensus into action. 
functions of global public policy networks 
There is so much variation among networks that no consistent pattern 
of network-building under specific circumstances and conditions has 
1yet been observed. However, it is possible to highlight different func­
tions that networks perform even though no simple typology can do 
justice to the full range of network activities: 
Agenda-setting. Global public policy networks can bring new• 
issues to the international agenda and initiate public discourse on 
the issues at stake. Moreover, they can “increase the prominence of 
issues that are already on the global agenda by articulating clear 
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and focused goals, often justifying them on incontrovertible moral 
grounds” (Witte, Reinicke, and Benner, 2000). A handful of 
individuals with the right leverage and powers of persuasion can 
create a common vision and convince important actors to throw 
their weight behind an issue. 
Standard-setting. An important role for global public policy • 
networks is the development of soft law guidelines and other non-
binding legal instruments. Whereas treaties often provide a 
framework for international cooperation in a certain policy field, 
conferences of parties and other fora of international negotiations 
are not suited to formulating quick policy responses on burning 
issues. Networks can help affected parties or their representatives 
reach compromises that can then be poured into soft law agree­
ments or standards. 
Generating and disseminating knowledge. The rapid change in the • 
state of knowledge, and in the technological capabilities for its 
transmission, have often left governments at a disadvantage in 
comparison with the private sector, and even NGOs. Global public 
policy networks can serve as tools for gathering existing knowl­
edge in a fast and efficient manner and even for the generation of 
new knowledge where gaps have been identified. A number of net­
works – the Roll Back Malaria Initiative of the World Health 
Organization, the Consultative Group on International 
Agricultural Research, and the Global Water Partnership – have 
made the generation and dissemination of knowledge their pri­
mary activity. 
Bolstering institutional effectiveness. By addressing participatory • 
shortcomings, global public policy networks can facilitate building 
institutions, increasing their effectiveness and broadening their 
constituency base. During the institution building stage, multi-
sectoral networks can help raise awareness of issues and gather 
political and financial support. Subsequently, institutionalized 
multi-stakeholder participation can ensure transparency, encour­










Providing innovative implementation mechanisms. Some global • 
public policy networks could be formed with the specific purpose 
of translating the results of intergovernmental negotiations into 
concrete action. 
the value and promise of global public policy networks 
Ultimately, global public policy networks represent a potential strate­
gy for governments, businesses, and NGOs to address the challenges of 
interdependence and globalization in an effective, participatory, and 
sustainable manner. 
The promise of these networks lies in two central domains. 
First, through their ability to formulate quick responses to 
urgent problems, networks offer the opportunity to close the 
operational gap that characterizes international environ­
mental policy today. Second, through their multisectoral and 
non-hierarchical structure, networks promise to bridge the 
participation gap that often is the main reason behind 
international political deadlocks. Because of these two 
characteristics, global public policy networks generate 
benefits that go beyond the sum of their parts. 
case studies: network structures in environmental 
policy 
Global public policy networks in the environmental domain are more 
prevalent than any other type of public-private network, with the 
possible exception of public health networks. These networks, 
however, vary substantially from case to case, and carry out many 
different functions. The following examples illustrate the range of 
inter-sectoral cooperation, the variety of functions and operational 
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Standard-Setting Networks

Case Study: The World Commission on Dams
 
Large dams bring together many of the issues central to conflicts over 
sustainable development at the local, national, and international 
levels. The World Commission on Dams (WCD) demonstrates the 
potential of multi-sectoral networks to contribute to international 
consensus building and standard-setting. 
Origins of the World Commission on Dams 
For many years, large dam projects were synonymous with develop­
ment and economic progress. Costs were underestimated and many 
environmental and social impacts ignored. Over time, civil society 
from both the North and the South organized to protest the construc­
tion of large dams. A global alliance of NGOs was formed, through 
which coordinated resistance grew and even escalated into conflicts. 
By the early 1990s, opponents and proponents of large dams had 
reached a stalemate that brought several large dam projects to a halt. 
The World Commission on Dams was formed in 1998 as a two-year 
initiative in response to this political deadlock. 
Operation of the World Commission on Dams 
Inclusiveness, openness, and transparency are the key principles 
around which the WCD was formed. The mandate of the Commission 
was broad and comprehensive – to undertake a global review of the 
effectiveness of large dams for development and to establish interna­
tionally acceptable criteria and guidelines for future decisionmaking 
on dams. Twelve individuals, acting in their personal capacities and 
chosen to reflect regional diversity, expertise, and stakeholder per­
spectives, comprised the Commission. 
With funding from a variety of public, private, and civil society 
organizations, the WCD conducted a comprehensive global review of 
the performance and impacts of large dams. It held public consulta­
tions on five continents and was funded through a new model involv­
ing contributions from governments, businesses, and NGOs. The 
Commission  operated under the core values of equity, efficiency, par­
ticipatory decisionmaking, sustainability, and accountability, which 
provided the essential test to be applied to decisions relating to the 
construction of large dams. The Commission developed criteria for 
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future large dam projects and formulated a set of guidelines for Good 
Practice on how to meet these criteria. The final report was published 
2at the end of 2000 (WCD, 2000).
Lessons for Global Environmental Governance 
The WCD illustrates the potential of collaborative arrangements to 
overcome an international stalemate and to formulate a set of soft 
guidelines that can alter the political landscape around an issue rife 
with conflict. Several important lessons can be gleaned from the 
inception and operation of the WCD (Witte, Reinicke, and Benner, 
2000): 
• Establishing a basic measure of trust is critical for consensus 
building and standard-setting in a conflict-ridden environment, 
although it is time consuming and costly. 
• A truly trisectoral structure, process, and funding, as well as sourc­
ing of knowledge are key to building consensus and closing the 
operational and participatory governance gaps. 
• Time limitation is an important precondition for effectiveness of 
concrete initiatives. Time-bound activities ensure the pertinence 
of the results and preclude degeneration into a “talk shop.” 
• In highly contentious policy arenas, a participatory and inclusive 
approach, using open sourcing to pool knowledge, is imperative 
for producing effective and politically sustainable results. 
The completion of the process that the WCD had embarked upon 
generated a series of reactions. The criticism from some governments, 
industries, and community-based organizations, together with an 
unenthusiastic response by the World Bank, showed that the consensus 
of the Commission did not translate into a broader stakeholder con­
sensus (Dubash et al., 2001). While it was unrealistic to believe that the 
Commission could solve all of the issues around the construction of 
large dams, it created a document which initiated a process that could 
lead to a consensus. Without a doubt, the WCD has created a standard 
– albeit informal and not legally binding – against which future proj­
ects involving the construction of large dams will be measured. 
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Networks and Institutional Flexibility 
Case Study: The Global Environment Facility 
The Global Environment Facility (GEF) has attempted to 
operationalize a unique and integrative governing structure which 
combines structural flexibility with a strong ability to adapt to a 
changing environment. The Facility answers new challenges of 
international public policy with a new type of international 
institution, bridging the traditions of UN and Bretton Woods 
agencies, like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. 
Origins of the Global Environment Facility 
The Global Environment Facility was established as a three-year pilot 
program in March 1991. It provides co-financing to developing 
countries and economies in transition for projects with global 
environmental benefits. Its grants finance only for the incremental 
costs of projects – the extra costs incurred in the process of 
redesigning an activity vis-à-vis a baseline. The Facility’s financing is 
available for investment and technical assistance in five focal areas— 
global warming, biodiversity, international waters, ozone depletion, 
and persistent organic pollutants. The operational responsibility is 
shared among the UNDP, UNEP, and the World Bank as 
implementing agencies. 
Operation of the Global Environment Facility 
During its pilot stage, the GEF attracted significant criticism. The 
dominant role of the World Bank provoked mistrust from developing 
countries, which saw the GEF as an instrument of conditionality. Non­
governmental organizations possessed no formalized rights within its 
framework. Following the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, however, the role 
of the GEF as the key financing mechanism for the global environment 
was recognized and a restructuring for its integration into the UN-
driven convention system ensued. 
As a result of negotiations around the restructuring, the GEF 
emerged as a new international entity linking different interests and 
stakeholder groups. Developing countries, UN agencies, and the 
majority of NGOs were in favor of a mechanism with a governance 
structure similar to the UN system and the values of the UN regime, 
namely, transparency, accountability, democracy, and universality. In 















projects. The World Bank and OECD countries, on the other hand, 
preferred the governance structure of the Bretton Woods system and 
argued in favor of efficiency, cost effectiveness, effective management, 
and executive abilities. The new governance structure became an 
amalgamation of traditional features of UN and Bretton Woods insti­
tutions. Through the restructuring process, the GEF became more 
transparent, more democratic (with a double majority voting system), 
and more detached from the control of the World Bank (Streck, 2001). 
It built a significant role for NGOs, recognizing the value of institu­
tionalizing alternative perspectives (Esty, 1998). 
Lessons for Global Environmental Governance 
Although today’s GEF is far from ideal, its governance structure shows 
features of a network that tries to flexibly integrate multiple actors. 
This network structure has contributed to several key strengths of the 
GEF: 
Adaptability. Comprising actors with divergent and shifting inter­• 
ests, the GEF must adapt in order to survive. Its mandate and over­
all goal of protecting the global environment requires it to respond 
to a constantly changing environment both outside and inside the 
organization. 
Cooperation. Despite the differences in resources, ideology, and • 
interests among GEF participants, there is a common understand­
ing among all countries that cooperation is necessary to address 
global environmental issues. Cooperation between North and 
South is greater in the GEF than in other fora. The increasing par­
ticipation of developing countries over the years indicates a gener­
ally positive outlook for the GEF. 
Transparency and participation. The GEF is among the most• 
transparent of the existing international institutions. NGO repre­
sentatives are allowed to attend the GEF Council meetings not only 
as observers, but also as active participants. They have a right to 
make statements on each topic on the agenda except during the 
discussion of the GEF budget. NGOs played an important role in 
the establishment and restructuring of the GEF and continue to 
facilitate coalition building, to influence the debate, and to serve as 
partners in implementing GEF projects. 
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• Innovation. The GEF submits itself to internal and external evalu­
ations and is characterized by a strong ability to innovate, evolve, 
and change. Soft law agreements dominate over legally binding 
treaties. The renunciation of binding and sometimes narrow legal 
structures enables the creation of new and innovative mechanisms 
that comprise the GEF. 
ngo activities within the global environment facility 
•	 Contribute to consultations prior to each Council meeting; 
•	 Observe at Council meetings; 




•	 Generate data, information, and independent analyses; 
•	 Provide inputs to other activities initiated by the 

Secretariat (monitoring and evaluation activities, pro­
grams, and operational strategies)
 
•	 Lobby for donor contributions. 
However significant, the strengths of the GEF do not disguise 
important flaws within the institution. Shortcomings include the very 
limited integration of the private sector, a problem of asymmetry of 
power, and overall operational complexity. 
Implementation Networks of the Kyoto Protocol 
Case Study: The “Flexible Mechanisms” 
Through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint 
Implementation (JI), the flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol, the 
Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change estab­
lished a platform that allows public-private networks to develop, exe­
cute, finance, and supervise projects. The different stages of the project 
cycle involve a broad range of actors from developed and developing 
countries, as well as from international development and finance insti­
tutions. The design of these new institutional mechanisms allows for the 













Origins of the Flexible Mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol 
Through the so-called “flexible mechanisms” of project-based emis­
3sion crediting or emission trading, the Kyoto Protocol fosters the cre­
ation of markets for greenhouse gas emission reductions. Under JI and 
CDM, Parties that have agreed to abide by greenhouse gas emission 
reduction targets may achieve some portion of their targets beyond 
their own borders. The global climate benefits from emissions reduc­
tions regardless of where they occur. The CDM encourages the 
achievement of emissions reductions in developing countries and the 
Joint Implementation mechanism in economies in transition. These 
flexible mechanisms are designed to enhance the cost-effectiveness of 
greenhouse gas emission reduction policies (Freestone, 2001). 
The Prototype Carbon Fund is a multi-donor trust fund estab­
4lished and administered by the World Bank. Launched in 1999, the 
Carbon Fund brings interested parties from developing and industri­
alized countries together to implement projects that follow the rules 
set forth under the Kyoto Protocol. At its second closing in 2000, six 
5	 6countries and seventeen private sector entities had agreed to partic­
ipate in the Carbon Fund. Public sector participants contributed U.S. 
$10 million each and private sector participants $5 million each, bring­
ing the size of the fund to $145 million. The Fund’s projects are expect­
ed to generate emission reductions that, once certified by an accredit­
ed independent third party, could be used by industrialized countries 
toward their compliance with emission reduction obligations under 
the Kyoto Protocol. 
Operation of the Kyoto Flexible Mechanisms 
The World Bank launched the Carbon Fund even before the Parties to 
the Convention on Climate Change had approved the implementation 
guidelines for the mechanisms. By creating the Fund, the World Bank 
took the lead in implementing CDM and JI projects and the first step 
3	 Emission trading, established under Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol, forms part of the flexible
mechanisms. However, since it does not involve the execution of projects, it does not promote
the creation of implementation networks. 
4	 Resolution 99-1, authorizing the establishment of the Prototype Carbon Fund, was approved by
the Executive Directors of the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). 
5	 Canada, Finland, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. 
6	 These include Tokyo, Chubu, Chugoku, Kyushu, Shikoku, and Tohoku, Mitsubishi and Mitsui
(Japan); BP (United Kingdom); Deutsche Bank and RWE (Germany); Electrabel (Belgium); Gaz
de France (France); Norsk Hydro and Statoil (Norway); Fortum (Finland) and Rabobank (through
Gilde Strategic Situations BV) from the Netherlands. 
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from talk to action. It created a “prototype” network designed to 
evolve and provide a platform for discussion for participating govern­
ments and companies. The Fund is intended to translate emerging 
international obligations into the hard law of property rights. By 
preparing the early market in carbon transactions, it also opened the 
door to a new source of income for developing countries and 
economies in transition while promoting a shift toward less environ­
mentally destructive behavior. 
The Carbon Fund pays for the emission reductions it purchases on 
delivery. It bundles projects to reduce transaction costs. Assets are 
certified and verified by an independent third party. In order to be 
certified, the projects must lead to real, significant, and long-term 
climate change mitigation benefits and result in emission reductions 
additional to any that would occur in the absence of the project. While 
in the years to come other networks are likely to emerge in this area, 
the Carbon Fund already shows how various actors can work together 
to translate the international agreement on project-based activities 
under the climate change regime into action. The Carbon Fund thus 
combines some of the features of the “internalization deals” described 
by Whalley and Zissimos in this volume, as it compels private actors 
to consider the incremental costs of climate change to others. 
Lessons for Global Environmental Governance 
A greenhouse gas emission control implementation network is 
emerging under the framework of the project-based mechanisms of 
the Kyoto Protocol. The CDM and JI provide examples of incentive-
based mechanisms supported by a global public policy network: 
Dealmaking. The flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol open • 
the door for negotiated project arrangements underpinning the 
broader framework of international law and demonstrate the via­
bility of project-based “dealmaking.” 
Matching interests. The flexible mechanisms bring together the • 7public and the private sectors. The motivation behind the engage­
ment of different participants varies. Industrialized countries and 
7 Non-governmental experts are represented in a Technical Advisory Group to the Prototype
Carbon Fund. NGOs are also important partners in raising general awareness and in provid­
ing a platform for knowledge dissemination. Environmental NGOs also play an important role
in developing and implementing projects. 











private companies are interested in supporting emission reduc­
tions for credit against their reduction targets. Developing coun­
tries and development agencies are interested in promoting devel­
opment. Civil society seeks to foster activities to mitigate global 
warming and to bring development to local communities. These 
various interests can be matched through bargains and deals. 
Matching resources. Each actor brings different and important • 
resources to the table – funding, projects, opportunities to cut 
emissions, specialized knowledge, or political leverage. Each par­
ticipant in the fund in general and in each project in particular has 
an interest in the success of the fund and its operations. 
Participants are able to cooperate in order to achieve the common 
goal – to the benefit of the global environment. 
supporting global public policy networks 
International organizations can play an important role in fostering 
and supporting global public policy networks. They could perform a 
convening and a supporting function, providing leadership, a plat­
form for sustained deliberation, and financing. International organi­
zations could also serve as advocates and implementors of the norms 
developed by global public policy networks (see box on International 
Organizations and Global Public Policy Networks). Proposals to 
strengthen global environmental governance should be developed 
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international organizations and 
global public policy networks 
International organizations can help to create and sustain global public 
policy networks through various roles: 
• International organizations may act as conveners, bringing all the parties 
to the table, mobilizing key constituencies and providing a forum to 
exchange views. United Nations agencies in particular have acted as con­
veners, successfully making use of their credibility across different sectors. 
• International organizations can provide a platform or “safe space” for peo­
ple and institutions coming together in a network, by establishing a level 
playing field for negotiations. In highly contentious policy domains, pro­
viding such a haven and bringing together outside parties may also have 
a catalytic effect on negotiations. 
• One of the clear lessons learned from the empirical work on trisectoral 
networks is that social entrepreneurship is of crucial importance for the 
setup of a network. While there is no reason to believe that such leader­
ship must necessarily emerge from the public sector, political high-profile 
leadership on the part of international organizations in the initiation 
phase has in some cases proven to be decisive. 
• International organizations can advance norms developed by public policy 
networks. Sustainable development and human rights are two realms 
where the interplay between public policy networks and international 
bodies has helped to change global understanding and expectations. 
• International organizations also serve as multilevel network managers. 
With the dual trends of greater devolution of authority through decen­
tralization and the strengthening of supranational forms of governance, 
the challenge for international organizations is to develop strategies for 
simultaneously interacting with the appropriate levels of governance on 
particular issues at appropriate stages of the public policy cycle. By serv­
ing as a hub, international organizations can facilitate multi-tier linkages 
(local-national-global) in public policymaking. 
• Despite often limited budgets, international organizations sometimes act 
as financiers, providing resources for a range of programs related to the 
implementation of global public policies. 
Source: Witte, Reinicke, and Benner. 2000. “Beyond Multilateralism: Global Public 












A sound institutional architecture for global governance must com­
bine features of traditional intergovernmental cooperation, imple­
mentation of national legislation, and innovative networked gover­
nance approaches. Instruments of international law and intergovern­
mental cooperation need to be supplemented by structures that can 
react faster and promote consensus among stakeholders. 
Dynamic in both process and structure, global public policy net­
works can provide alternative means to finding solutions where tradi­
tional policy or lawmaking have not or cannot deliver effective results. 
Networks can facilitate international policy processes as well as 
encourage and assist effective implementation. Networks, however, are 
dependent on existing or future international organizations to provide 
a platform through which stakeholders can engage in collaborative 
management of global affairs. 
Strong environmental governance structures, built on a set of net­
works, coordinated and initiated by international organizations, may 
close current participatory, operational, and institutional gaps in glob­
al environmental governance and provide a more successful means of 
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Sustaining Global Environmental 
Governance: Innovation in 
Environment and Development 
Finance 
Maritta R.v.B. Koch-Weser 
summary 
The 1992 Rio Earth Summit established a sustainable development plan 
of action, Agenda 21, but failed to achieve a global governance and 
finance system strong enough to implement it. Experience suggests that 
the additional funding needed for global-scale investments in environ­
ment and sustainable development is unlikely to come from the public 
sector alone. New efforts to fund the necessary initiatives must therefore 
come from enlightened citizens, social entrepreneurs, and the growing 
segment of the business community that associates shareholder value 
with sustainability and corporate social responsibility. 
This chapter highlights a series of policy reforms that must underpin 
any improvements in global environmental governance. It argues, in 
addition, that funding must be increased significantly, and proposes the 
creation of 1) a Johannesburg Commission on Sustainable Development 
Finance, and (2) a new global financing mechanism – a Sustainable 
Development Exchange Facility. 
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the millennium gap 
To improve global environmental management, we need a stronger 
global environmental governance system. Stronger governance 
requires not only a solid financing system, but, very importantly, 
environmentally friendly national and international fiscal policies and 
legislation. 
No matter how much the 1992 Rio Earth Summit appears to have 
galvanized governmental and public support for the environment, 
recent budget numbers stand in stark contrast to public rhetoric. 
Accelerated, often irreversible losses of biodiversity, forests, and ocean 
resources attest to the fact that we are not meeting the Rio targets. 
Instead, we are witnessing a deepening crisis. 
Budget numbers reveal waning international commitment to the 
environmental cause and broader, overall stagnation in official devel­
opment assistance. Today’s public finance picture for the environment 
is epitomized by the limited resources of the United Nations 
Environment Programme. UNEP’s core budget of some $44 million 
annually (UNEP, 2001: 45) falls woefully short of its needs in fulfilling 
its global mandate. 
Overall, trends in development aid allocations show continuous 
decline. The gap between official development assistance (ODA) 
pledges by the international community and actual contributions has 
never been wider. 
Despite unprecedented levels of global wealth, the long­
standing pledge by governments to contribute 0.7 percent of 
gross domestic product (GDP) to development assistance has 
remained largely unfulfilled. Instead, contributions since 1992 
have fallen to 0.2-0.1 percent of GDP in many developed 
countries. 
At the same time, the 2000 UN Millennium Summit committed 
national governments to numerically specific and time-bound targets 
for sustainable development. The global community has committed 


















million people out of poverty over the coming decade). To achieve this 
goal, the world needs an estimated additional annual amount of $50 
billion in official development assistance (ODA). 
This wider-than-ever gap – “the Millennium Gap” – between 
meager ODA pledges, on the one hand, and growing new 
commitments, on the other, must be narrowed and closed. 
The World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in 
Johannesburg could continue to chart the course that the 2002 
Monterrey Conference on Financing for Development outlined. In the 
Monterrey Consensus, heads of state agreed to mobilize financial 
resources and to achieve the national and international economic con­
ditions required to fulfill internationally agreed development goals, 
including those contained in the UN Millennium Declaration. 
It remains to be seen whether the Monterrey Conference should be 
hailed as a major success. So far, all it seems to have produced is a 
broader feeling of goodwill and promises for timid increases in devel­
opment finance – many of which have yet to be approved and enact­
ed by national parliaments. 
In fact, the Monterrey Consensus provides neither new visions nor 
grand designs. In addition, a few weeks after the Monterrey 
Conference, its promises for greater global fairness have been derailed 
by stepped-up trade distortions in the form of increased agricultural 
subsidies. 
The leaders gathered in Monterrey also failed to come to the rescue 
of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) – the only true additional 
line of environmental grant funding made available by the interna­
tional community since the 1992 Rio Earth Summit. Established in 1991 
as an experimental program, the Global Environment Facility was 
1instituted as a permanent body after the 1992 Rio Earth Summit. GEF 
funding is available for investments and technical assistance to address 
five major threats to the environment – global warming, biodiversity 
loss, degradation of international waters, ozone depletion, and persist­
ent organic pollutants. The World Bank, UNDP, and UNEP share the 
responsibility for operating the GEF. Official pledges to the GEF had 
See Streck, this volume, for an analysis of the GEF. 1 
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increased in earlier years – in 1994, thirty-four nations promised $2 
billion in support of the GEF’s missions and in 1998, thirty-six nations 
pledged $2.75 billion (GEF, 2002). Recently, however, and in spite of its 
fine performance, liquidity at the GEF has reached a low point. 
It is ironic that at the very time we approach the Johannesburg 
Summit, funding for the GEF has fallen and stalemate about its future 
has ensued. Some of the GEF’s sponsors are failing to meet their fund­
ing obligations. And the majority – who would be willing to continue 
to contribute and perhaps increase their support – does not wish to 
bail out those who fail to pay up, and on goes the downward spiral. 
This is a most depressing spectacle. 
the fifty billion dollar challenge 
An additional $50 billion per year – the sum stipulated by the inter­
national community to close “the Millennium Gap” – is a large sum. 
It has become clear that, for the time being, there is no 
prospect of achieving this goal within the current ODA frame­
work alone. We must therefore chart a second, complemen­
tary path to fulfill the commitments our societies have made. 
We could meet the “fifty billion dollar challenge” by scaling up a host 
of already successful innovative strategies and by testing some more 
recently proposed additional options: 
Voluntary efforts. Most require synergies between, on the one• 
hand, civil society voluntarism and private sector social responsi­
bility systems, and, on the other hand, government legislation con­
ducive to voluntary giving. 
Mobilization of large numbers of small contributions. In the elec­• 
tronic billing and internet age, billions of tiny contributions can be 
raised at minimal administrative cost, and aggregated as sizable 









Creation of special funds, credit insurance, and lines of socially • 
and environmentally oriented banking.
 
New paths of government engagement. Charges for the use of the
 • 
global commons, voluntary or imposed charges on capital flows or 
2	 3currency transfers, or Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) are among 
the proposals. 
A scaling up of a broad-based approach to innovative 
sustainable development finance, involving all of the above, 
would need to be promoted from a suitable institutional 
base. Thus, institutional reform and a commitment to a 
stronger environmental policy structure must be advanced in 
tandem with a new system of finance. 
policy reforms plus finance 
Before setting out an innovative finance agenda for Johannesburg in 
more detail, there is a need to address the arguments of policy reform 
advocates who suggest that the world should firmly hold on to its 
national purse strings until major policy reforms are put into place. 
They rightly claim that the lack of finance for sustainable development 
is of subordinate importance when compared to the importance of 
policy reforms. They also stress the need to root out poor governance 
and corruption, and establish new partnerships and alliances. 
Some commentators argue that only if structural reforms on a 
greater scale came along would all be well. Consider, they say, the 
amounts – hundreds of billions of dollars – that could be mobilized 
2	 Such charges are known as the Tobin tax – a very small tax, a fraction of one percent, on cur­
rency transfers across borders. It is intended to discourage speculation, but to remain small
enough not to affect trade in products and services. See Patomaki (2001) for the case for a
Tobin tax. 
3	 Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) are a form of financial assistance to developing countries. They
are a claim on the freely usable currencies of International Monetary Fund (IMF) members, in
that holders of SDRs can exchange them for these currencies (IMF, 2002). When countries
exchange their SDRs for hard currency, they have to pay interest on the amount they receive,
but not so long as they keep their allocations in the form of SDRs. See Soros (2002) for a
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by debt relief, reductions in subsidies and other perverse economic 
incentives, and the elimination of trade barriers. They are right in 
many respects. The current global regime is off balance. What can 
small amounts of ODA achieve in the face of much larger, countervail­
ing currents? This case has already been made convincingly for more 
than ten years now – starting with the World Bank’s 1992 World 
Development Report on Environment and Development. It is addressed 
under the World Bank’s debt initiative for heavily indebted poor coun­
tries, and under various proposals advocating the cancellation of debt 
servicing on old debts and the increase of grants and loans to develop­
ing countries (Sachs et al., 1999; Greenhill, 2002). Likewise, there is 
broad recognition of the fact that a reduction in import barriers in 
developed countries can positively support poverty alleviation in 
exporting countries in the developing world (IISD, 1994). 
As much as they are needed, policy reforms should not be 
construed as substitutes for actual finance. They will not 
trickle down soon as direct sources of finance for urgently 
needed programs. Nor should they be construed as the pre­
condition for any stepped-up support in line with the UN 
Millennium Goals. 
The “fifty billion dollar challenge” remains: additional cash finance 
for development is needed now to pay for nature protection, educa­
tion, sanitation, cleaner production, preventative health, natural disas­
ter mitigation, and many other pressing needs. 
Some analysts say that it is not money, but development effective­
ness – the efficiency with which available funds are used – that is the 
real problem. Arguments that the key problems are institutional and 
that money does not matter are wrong-headed. To the contrary, insti­
tutional performance usually improves with adequate finance. In 
many poor countries, success can only come when institutions are 
strengthened financially and when public employees receive incomes 
decent enough to keep them outside the corruption trap. 
A related concern is transparency and good governance. Some will 
say that not a penny should be given to developing countries so long 
 
  












as they fail to root out corruption and poor governance. This view 
reflects universally held ideals as well as research findings. A report of 
the United Nations General Assembly states that “transparent and 
accountable governance” is necessary for “the realization of social and 
people-centered sustainable development” (UN General Assembly, 
1997). Similarly, studies by the World Bank have shown that develop­
ment effectiveness is closely correlated with good governance 
(Buckley, 1999; Evans and Battaile, 1998). Transferring scarce resources 
to corrupt governments with proven records of misusing aid may 
aggravate poverty among the world’s most vulnerable nations 
(Easterly, 2001). The World Bank and many bilateral donors put their 
money strategically where they witness better governance and with­
hold it explicitly from others. 
And yet, the “good-governance-or-else” policy can also reflect an 
alarming lack of sincerity and understanding of institutional 
complexities. The quest for pure and transparent governance as a 
precondition for aid serves, at times, as a moral case for inaction – to 
the detriment of the poor and of urgent, time-bound sustainable 
development needs. If, for example, an ecosystem or biological species 
were threatened with extinction, we are obliged to ask whether their 
eternal fate should really be made so single-mindedly contingent on 
the quality of a temporary, current local government. 
Some people and some threatened ecosystems will need 
support in spite of governments. And we cannot address the 
threats in the poorest regions if we insist on corruption being 
cleared up first. Development finance must not stay away, 
but try to make a positive difference within the current 
reality by advancing the good elements and people within 
bad systems. 
In addition to reforms in policies and good governance, emerging 
public-private partnerships are frequently seen as one of the most 
effective strategies to address environmental and broader sustainable 
development issues. Public-private partnerships offer an alternative to 
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privatization “by combining the social responsibility, environmental 
awareness and public accountability of the public sector, with the 
finance, technology, managerial efficiency and entrepreneurial spirit 
of the private sector” (UNDP, 2002). Moreover, government efforts to 
develop partnerships with the private sector would lower the risks and 
costs of investments for private firms (Shin, 2001). However, public-
private partnerships at times seem to be prematurely hailed as “the 
solution.” For now, many of them remain exceedingly ad hoc and 
small scale. To be considered a major global avenue to sustainable 
development, these partnerships must mature. 
To sum up, efforts to advance policy reforms, development effec­
tiveness, good governance, and public-private partnerships should all 
be seen as underpinnings, but not as substitutes, for improvements in 
sustainable development finance. Regardless of what other strategies 
are undertaken to promote sustainable development, the need for 
additional finance from new sources remains unchanged. 




Two years ago, there were hopes that Johannesburg might become a 
watershed – overcoming the post-Rio shortcomings in global 
environmental governance and finance. These hopes have not been 
realized. The Monterrey conference took a step in the right direction, 
but did not go far enough. Time has now run out for a serious finance 
initiative to emerge in Johannesburg. Instead, the best possible WSSD 
outcome would be to launch a serious, in-depth technical work 
process, which might lead to tangible reforms over the course of the 
coming two years. The pre-Johannesburg process has produced an 
analysis of current shortfalls as well as many good ideas. These ideas 
now need to be galvanized in a follow-up process. A Johannesburg 
Commission on Sustainable Development Finance should be 
launched at the Summit – with terms of reference and the requisite 







A Commission on Sustainable Development Finance should 
be launched to serve as an incubator for new ideas to pro­
mote development of funding instruments and institutional 
options. A technically skilled and multi-disciplinary team 
should be assigned to work for one to two years on financial, 
legal, and institutional designs, outside the formal public sec­
tor domain. Developing new financing systems requires 
space for entrepreneurship and innovation outside custom­
ary institutional confines. 
The proposed Finance Commission should build on the achieve­
ments of previous government-focused initiatives, such as the Zedillo 
Commission. New emphasis should be placed on voluntary contribu­
tions by non-government entities, including corporations, NGOs, and 
citizens. The Johannesburg Commission should also examine the pos­
sibilities for encouraging private agents to participate in development 
finance efforts, and simultaneous ways to involve the public sector. 
The Finance Commission should develop design options and test 
concepts in the context of a meaningful consultation and engagement 
process. Its work should lead to pilot projects and actual start-up 
engagements. 
Members of the Johannesburg Commission on Sustainable 
Development Finance should come from the world of innovative 
leaders and entrepreneurs, think tanks, foundations, NGOs, the pri­
vate sector, and the government sector. Because the requisite thinking 
“outside the box” will require large degrees of creativity, freedom, and 
independence, the process of innovation would best be driven by 
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the zedillo commission 
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan appointed the Zedillo Commission, 
a panel of eleven financial experts under the Chairmanship of former 
Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo, in December 2000. Members 
included former U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin and 
former French Finance Minister and President of the European 
Commission Jacques Delors. Annan asked panel members to identify 
practical means of fulfilling international commitments to fight 
poverty, as set out at the 2000 Millennium Assembly, and building 
political momentum for the March 2002 Monterrey Conference on 
Financing for Development. 
The report of the Zedillo Commission, Financing for Development, 
was presented in June 2001 at UN Headquarters in New York. The 
report advanced several reforms, including the creation of an 
International Tax Organization that would develop national tax pol­
icy norms, consideration of a global tax on carbon emissions, and 
new Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) allocations by the IMF. Unlike 
several civil society organizations, the Commission expressed skepti­
cism at the idea of an international tax on financial transactions 
(Tobin tax). The Commission also suggested that the World Trade 
Organization attempt to fully integrate developing countries into 
the world trading system and called for the consolidation of the var­
ious organizations that share responsibility for environmental issues 
into a Global Environmental Organization. 
http://www.un.org/reports/financing/index.html 
a new global financing mechanism: a sustainable
development exchange facility 
The proposed Johannesburg Commission on Sustainable 
Development Finance should consider setting up a Sustainable 
Development Exchange Facility. Such a Facility would complement 
current multilateral and bilateral funding. The existing multilateral 
institutional system for financing sustainable development relies pri­
marily on the World Bank and the regional development banks in 













structure of the proposed johannesburg 
finance commission 
Membership: The Commission Members would be experts drawn 
primarily from non-governmental organizations and corporations, 
with some representatives from international organizations and the 
public sector. They would guide and oversee the work of a technical 
secretariat. 
Secretariat: A small technical secretariat, under the leadership of a 
director appointed by the Commission, would – in close consultation 
with innovators, experts and subject matter leaders around the 
world – carry out the day-to-day work of the Commission. 
Mandate: The Commission would be given a mandate to: 
•	 Identify creative ways of raising funds for sustainable 
development, emphasizing the interconnection between private 
capital and social capital (non-governmental social entre­
preneurship for sustainable development). 
•	 Conceive of a system that would permit the continuous 
generation of new sources of funding. During its mandate and 
subsequently through a successor institution, the Commission 
would permanently seek new sources of funding. 
Duration: The Commission’s original mandate would extend over 
two years. It would be succeeded by a more permanent system, 
perhaps conceived along the lines of the Sustainable Development 
Exchange Facility outlined below, in order to continue the task of 
finding new sources of funding for development. 
Development Programme also plays a critical role in capacity build­
ing, and the Global Environment Facility supports environmental 
efforts of global significance. 
The purpose of a Sustainable Development Exchange Facility 
would be to achieve genuine financial “additionality.” Its quest for 
funds should not interfere or compete with current fundraising by 
civil society organizations or public entities. Such an Exchange 
Facility would succeed the proposed Johannesburg Finance 
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The Exchange would develop several business options in parallel, in 
response to varying needs. It would: 
• Raise and channel funds for loans or credit guarantees among the 
banking and insurance industries; 
• Seek to raise funds for grants among the private sector and civil 
society; 
• Develop financial sources based on international charges and 
taxes; 
• Foster productive interrelationships between civil society and 
business initiatives and governmental schemes, such as tax breaks 
and other incentive systems; 
• Become a continuous driver for financing deals, continually seek­
ing out new and creative funding modalities; 
• Be a trustworthy link for financiers and donors with implement­
ing institutions, which would become eligible for funding on the 
basis of a certification system. 
The Sustainable Development Exchange Facility would need to be 
incorporated as a cooperative, franchise-type system. It could com­
bine the functions of a foundation and/or trust with services among 
its certified membership. The Exchange’s governing body would com­
prise representatives predominantly from the private sector and civil 
society. At the same time, it would need to have strong and structured 
links to public sector local, national, regional, and international 
institutions. 
The Exchange could start small and grow as “proof of concept” is 
achieved. To help attain the UN Millennium goals, the Exchange 
would have to be designed to eventually reach globally significant pro­
portions. Pre-existing Exchange-type facilities (which exist under var­
ious social entrepreneurship ventures) could opt to accede to it. 
The proposed Exchange would need strong leadership and con­
vincing performance to engage increasing numbers of financiers and 
donors. It must be designed as a learning institution with continuous 
innovation functions to develop ever-smarter new instruments and 
methods. Above all, it must insist on and monitor the integrity and 










    
    
    
-  
The structure of the Exchange would bring into interaction four 
elements: financiers and donors, recipients, certification services, and 
financial services (Figure 1). It would be supported by two external 
pillars: eminent experts, as a resource for the Exchange’s certification 
services, and public sector development programs and supportive 
governmental structures. 





















Recipients of the Exchange Facility 
The Exchange Facility would function as a results-oriented environ­
ment and development resource service for accredited users. 
Recipients would typically be non-profit organizations focused on 
sustainable development through programs in environmental protec­
tion, poverty alleviation, provision of basic social services, or renew­
able energy projects. Private companies and public entities in need of 
compensation for adoption of environmentally superior business 
practices or technologies could also qualify as users with the 
Exchange. 
For the recipients, the Exchange would facilitate matching pro­
posed projects with financier and donor funds. Against a simple set of 
eligibility standards, it would apply streamlined project review and 
approval procedures, relying primarily on the track records and 













    
Financiers and Donors to the Exchange Facility 
Sources of funding for the Exchange Facility could fall into a series of 
highly varied categories. 
Donations would remain a central category. Some of the funding 
might come from governments. All funding would be on a voluntary 
basis, including: 
Regular voluntary subscriptions. Very small amounts could have a• 
significant cumulative effect. If given the option, individuals 
worldwide could choose to contribute through different kinds of 
payment plans. For example, contributors’ utility, telephone or 
credit card bills could be rounded up to the dollar every month, or 
an amount of $0.05 could be deducted from their bank accounts 
after a certain number of transactions as a contribution to the 
Exchange Facility. 
Corporate grants. Corporations could be encouraged to make• 
donations. These could take the form of one-time grants. They 
could also take the form of a long-term commitment of a very 
small percentage of revenue from a product line to match an envi­
ronmental cause that requires continuous funding. Corporate 
grants of this sort could be publicized, benefiting the corporation’s 
reputation, and advancing the general concept that shareholder 
value is associated with corporate responsibility and sustainability. 
Donations by philanthropists. Affluent individuals could be• 
encouraged to make significant grants to finance projects in their 
name. 
International lotteries. In addition to voluntary donation pro­• 
grams, the Exchange Facility, with the approval of national gov­
ernments, could organize an international lottery and/or collabo­
rate with existing lottery systems. Given the international nature 
of the initiative, all citizens would be eligible to participate and 
potentially win a considerable amount in convertible currency. 
The proceeds from the lottery would be contributed to and ear­















   
 
-  
Private sector finance would be equally important. The Exchange 
Facility should seek to collaborate with private sector financiers will­
ing to accept below market profit levels for environmentally friendly 
ventures. The Exchange would, for example, work with: 
Development financiers willing to invest in development and• 
environment projects that promised at least a minimum measure 
of return; 
Insurance companies or banks willing to guarantee/provide col­• 
lateral for meaningful commercially fundable environment and 
development entrepreneurship ventures. 
Public contributions could also become significant. The Exchange 
Facility could work with governments and international organizations 
worldwide to set up other international schemes that would not place 
a burden on national budgets. These could include: 
• International transaction surcharges. These taxes could involve 
micro-percentages on capital flows, currency flows, or trade- or 
labor-related transactions. The Tobin tax on international curren­
cy transfers is an example of this kind of surcharge. While the 
Tobin tax itself has its critics, some of its underlying concepts 
could inspire alternative schemes suitable for fundraising for 
development finance. 
• User charges for global public goods. Very small fees could be 
imposed on goods that relate to car registrations, international 
travel or tourism – for instance, in connection with charges on 
aviation gasoline, flight tickets, or high seas transportation. In 
aggregate, these could add up to very significant sums. 
• Global energy or carbon tax. Some scholars have called for a tax on 
carbon emissions to secure a more appropriate level of global 
emissions – a proposal that has been endorsed by the Zedillo 
Commission. By linking the money levied through such a tax with 
the proposed Sustainable Development Exchange Facility, such a 
carbon tax could produce a double benefit for the environment. 
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The Certification System of the Exchange Facility 
A certification system would regulate recipient access and participa­
tion in the Exchange. For donors and financiers, such a system would 
provide a guarantee that their money is likely to be well spent, by 
organizations that have demonstrated their competence in the past. 
Certification would give financiers a realistic picture of the qualities 
and risks of applicant recipient institutions. 
The certification system would draw on eminent experts world­
wide. Some would come from academia and civil society, others from 
institutions like the World Bank, the UNDP, and the secretariats of 
various multilateral environmental agreements. A Global 
Environmental Mechanism and its global environmental information 
clearinghouse could also play a role in the proposed certification 
process (see Esty and Ivanova, this volume). 
Demonstrable achievement and good past performance 
would be at the core of applicant certification. Development 
entrepreneurs and other potential recipients would need to 
apply to the certification system before receiving any finan­
cial (applicant certification) support. 
Recipients who participate in the Exchange should also be required to 
submit to periodic re-certification; that is, to a general review of their 
achievements and administrative and accounting practices. Poor per­
formers would lose their certification temporarily or permanently 
depending on the case. In reviewing proposed projects and programs, 
the Exchange would rely largely on the good judgment of applicants, 
provided their past record lent them sufficient credibility. Within tight 
timeframes, criteria, and service standards, a basic review of projects 
would be carried out. 
Institutional reviews in the course of the certification process 
would also permit the Exchange to attend to rather specific requests 
and designations made by donors. The Exchange could thus serve as a 
broker between donors and users, matching particular donor prefer­
















A Financial Service Window 
A financial service window could also be established to administer and 
leverage funds received from donors. A financial service window 
might foster the development of a web of standardized high quality, 
transparent, and duly audited transactions between participating cer­
tified sponsors, financiers, and recipients. The financial service win­
dow would support certification services in monitoring the progress 
of ongoing projects. 
While the certification service window would evaluate 
progress primarily in terms of sustainable development 
criteria, the financial service window would audit the users 
and ensure that funds had been used appropriately. The 
financial service window could also provide feedback to 
donors through regular financial and other progress reports, 
and use the results in the overall promotion of the Exchange. 
Beyond directly funded projects, funds could be used to leverage lim­
ited resources. The monies might be used to stimulate and promote 
investment by private companies in cleaner production technologies 
(Deere and Bayon, 2002). Financial incentives could be particularly 
effective at promoting environmental investment among small and 
medium-sized enterprises whose characteristics, cost structures, and 
technical support needs allow them to respond better to promotional 
strategies than to imposed charges or taxes. 
the benefits of an exchange facility 
The proposed Exchange Facility would aim to be an efficient connec­
tion between private capital and social capital. It could develop into: 
An instrument to facilitate the work of those who serve the poor • 
directly. A fundamental constraint of the current institutional 
arrangements for financing environment and development is the 
mandate of the Bretton Woods institutions to provide financing 
 
   







    
exclusively through national governments. So long as internation­
al institutions are obliged to reach the poor through the manda­
tory intermediation of governments – many of whom who are 
not committed to the wellbeing of their citizens – many efforts 
will come to naught. Instead, much like servicing the commercial 
private sector through the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC), social entrepreneurs should be treated under the Exchange 
as direct clients in recognition of their key roles in front-line 
development work. 
• Just-in-time funding. Based on its institutional certification sys­
tem, the Exchange could be designed with the capacity to approve 
new projects in a short time – from a few weeks to a few months 
– in contrast to official ODA processes, which often take years. 
• Emergency stand-by funding arrangements. In some cases, even a 
response time of a few weeks can be too long. In this regard, the 
Exchange Facility could establish an emergency oriented stand-by 
system with the potential to rush with funds to the site of critical 
problems. This mechanism might be deployed to protect endan­
gered environmental species or resources in times of calamity, 
war, migrations, fires, floods, and other disasters. To facilitate 
these operations, an “International League of NGOs” might organ­
ize environmental monitoring efforts along the same lines that 
Amnesty International does for human rights (Susskind and 
Ozawa, 1992: 159) and might find interested donors through the 
Exchange. 
• Continuity funding. More than any of the existing sources of fund­
ing for development, the Exchange would prioritize sustained 
support for long-term programs, recognizing the importance of 
operation and maintenance beyond project start-up periods. For 
example, following start-up environmental investments in the 
1980s and 1990s, funding is now required for the long-term main­
tenance of established protected areas and services. Ecosystem 
conservation requires small, uninterrupted contributions, rather 
than one-time grants. In linking donors to users, therefore, the 












• Low transaction costs. The Exchange would work with a minimum 
of core staff, and rely otherwise on outside technical experts who 
would be engaged on a task basis. To the greatest extent possible, 
the Exchange should remain an (almost) virtual institution, rather 
than turning into yet another development bureaucracy. 
The effectiveness of the Exchange will depend on the degree of con­
vergence between the interests of financiers, donors, and recipients. 
Donors and Financiers of the Exchange Would Benefit From: 
• The ability to earmark funds in accordance with geographical, 
thematic, or institutional preferences they might have;
 
• Transparent information about the project selection process, cri­
teria, and results;
 
• Feedback on funded projects through internet-based reports from
 
recipient institutions and users, along with periodic monitoring, 
evaluation, and independent audit reports, as well as the option to 
visit sites; 
• Quality assurance services. 
Recipients of Funds From the Exchange Would Benefit From: 
•
 Assistance in matching highly varied needs with the equally
 
• 
diverse interests of the donor community; 
Advice and support for efforts to seek commercial loans for viable 
• 
sustainable development investments; 
Guarantees and insurance instruments to back up market-based 
• 
transactions for the environment;
 
Advice on the design and development of projects;
 
• Leveraging and co-financing for cooperative funding schemes;
 
•
 Grants for operations not eligible for commercial finance;
 
• Advice on sound management and reporting practices.
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conclusion 
The “Millennium Gap” can be narrowed and eventually closed. 
Multiple financing mechanisms could be mobilized and, in aggregate, 
provide the required additional funding. Much of the initiative to 
make this happen will need to come from civil society and the private 
sector, in close collaboration with governments. 
This agenda can only advance with careful technical design – a task 
the proposed Johannesburg Commission on Sustainable Develop­
ment Finance should take on. The design of the Finance Commission 
will need to be tested, implemented, and refined – a task for which the 
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Making Environmental Deals: 
The Economic Case for a World 
Environmental Organization 
John Whalley and Ben Zissimos 
summary 
Others in this volume have spelled out what the problems are on the 
global environment front. We discuss how these issues might be 
addressed. We advance a rationale for a new international environ­
mental body – a World Environmental Organization or WEO – whose 
primary function would be to facilitate bargains on the global 
environment. 
We use, as a point of departure, the international trade regime. The 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization 
(GATT/WTO) tries to liberalize trade in goods and services by removing 
border impediments through negotiated exchanges of trade policy con­
cessions. We suggest that a World Environmental Organization (WEO) 
should have a similar principal focus, namely, removing impediments to 
bargaining (and trades) on the global environment. Exchanges of com­
mitments on forest cover, maintenance of coral reefs, species manage­
ment, biodiversity protection, and other environmental concessions in 
return for cash, policy changes (trade policy changes, for instance), and 
other considerations might fall under the bargaining umbrella of a WEO. 
We contend that such bargains would result in improved environ­
mental quality and transfers of resources for developmental purposes to 
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what we are not proposing 
Our idea differs from those underpinning other recent proposals for a 
global environmental body, stemming, in one way or another, from 
the trade and environment debate now embroiling the World Trade 
Organization. Calls have come from high levels, including WTO 
Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi, for a new body separate 
from the WTO, where environmental issues could be discussed. 
According to several academics, such a body would be more qualified 
than the WTO to resolve conflicts between trade agreements and the 
environment (Charnovitz, 1993; Runge, 2001; Esty, 2000). Prominent 
politicians, such as French President Jacques Chirac, former French 
Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, and former Soviet leader Mikhail 
Gorbachev, have suggested the need for both a strengthened and con­
solidated global environmental agency, and an agency to oversee pres­
ent international environmental treaties and other arrangements now 
1in place.
Our view is that these calls have not really focused on how to 
address central or substantive environmental policy problems, but 
instead have dealt with tangential issues, in proposals that are likely to 
be inconsequential in impact. Even worse are vague proposals to 
strengthen the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), to 
oversee enforcement of existing environmental treaties (which con­
tain their own enforcement arrangements), or to provide an alterna­
tive location in which to discuss trade and environment issues (von 
Moltke, 2001; Juma, 2000). Neither the restructuring proposals nor the 
tinkering reforms deal with the central global environmental problem, 
namely, the relative lack of internalization of cross-border and global 
externalities. 
The issue is not one of seeking out mutually agreed upon state­
ments of principle of what constitutes sound environmental manage­
ment (in the tradition of sustainability, the Stockholm Declaration, 
the Brundtland Report, the Rio Declaration, and Agenda 21) or sug­
gesting reorganization of current institutional arrangements, but 
rather of how we design mechanisms to achieve internalization goals. 








    
the challenge of internalizing cross-border externalities 
We regard the lack of “internalization of cross-border and global exter­
nalities” as the central global environmental problem. An externality is
 
a (usually negative) consequence of the production of a commodity that
 
is not reflected in its price. In other words, society’s valuation of the
 
good does not reflect its real social and environmental cost. For exam­
ple, pollution emitted from an industrial plant that affects residents of
 
the neighboring area is regarded as an externality. When the plant’s
 
operating decisions do not take these consequences into consideration
 
(i.e. do not compensate the population, do not alter the price of the
 
products, or the process through which they are manufactured), the
 
externality is not internalized.
 
“Failure to internalize,” means, essentially, the collective failure to pay
 
for the environmental costs associated with having commodities in the
 
marketplace. These costs are often not borne by the producers and are
 




Internalizing cross-border externalities entails finding ways to prevent
 
or repair damages that transcend borders or affect global systems like
 
the atmosphere or the oceans. In the case of the industrial plant, if the
 
people who suffer from air pollution could measure the harm done to
 
them and negotiate compensation from the polluters, the externality
 
would be internalized. Facilitating the negotiation of similar deals for
 
transboundary and global concerns would be one of the central tasks of
 
a World Environmental Organization.
 
current arrangements do not address 
internalization 
We see the present global environmental regime as deficient in attain­
ing the internalization goal we suggest. The principles embodied in 
the Rio Declaration and a series of approximately 200 largely issue-
specific environmental agreements (UNEP, 1996) have, in our view, 
relatively little to do with solving the problems caused by the environ­
mental consequences of market transactions that are not factored in 
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Even though a small number of recent treaty arrangements encour­
age bargaining deals between parties with different interests (for 
example, the Kyoto Protocol allows countries to buy or sell permits to 
emit CO2), we suggest that the patchwork quilt of issue-specific, sci­
ence-driven global and regional treaties have not achieved full inter­
nalization, as might be possible under a World Environmental 
Organization (WEO). These narrow topic and largely non-side pay­
ment negotiations have spawned shallow treaties under which oppor­
tunities for achieving more substantial joint gains are not discussed. 
Currently, few mechanisms guide and focus efforts to inter­
nalize externalities that cause global environmental failure. 
a dealmaking agency could address 
internalization 
We suggest that these failures of negotiation can best be corrected 
through a new agency that aims to account for as many of the social 
costs of market transactions as possible through innovative and 
aggressive environmental dealmaking. The World Environmental 
Organization we propose remedies what we regard as a relative lack of 
2Coasian deals to internalize externalities at the international level.
Such a WEO could be designed to cover all externalities, both within 
and across countries. Our main focus is on cross-border externalities, 
since within-country externalities can in principle be dealt with by 
solely domestic initiatives. 
2	 Coase (1960) suggested that those who cause and those who receive damage can (and often
do) bargain between themselves so as to internalize externalities. For this to occur, Coase
stressed that property rights assignments are needed to clarify who has rights to do what. In
the case of a factory that causes air pollution, for instance, a Coasian deal is possible if all par­
ties agree that the factory owners must compensate people who suffer from pollution, or that
those who suffer from air pollution should compensate the factory owners for using cleaner
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We see the central objective for a WEO as facilitating cross-
country deals on environmental issues with the aim of raising 
environmental quality. Those who have custody of assets in 
one country should, through bargained deals, be able to get 
those abroad who value these assets highly to pay for higher 
standards of environmental management for the wider 
benefit. 
The result would be improved environmental quality, as well as 
monetary transfers to custodians of assets, many of whom are in poor 
countries. We do not claim that such an innovation will fully and 
immediately achieve complete internalization, but we do think that 
significant improvement on the current situation is possible through 
such an approach. 
Entities such as a WEO also sometimes evolve out of small begin­
nings, and slowly grow into full form. Only time will tell whether the 
institutional structure we outline here emerges from the present glob­
al environmental regime, or whether radical response to future exter­
nal shocks will ultimately prove to be the main driving force. 
initiating cross-country internalization deals 
The central activity of a World Environmental Organization would 
consist of generating internalization deals between countries (and/or 
groups of agents within countries) on global environmental issues. 
Deals would involve verifiable environmental commitments 
exchanged across countries in return for various forms of compensa­
tion, including cash. The deals could be government-to-government 
deals of various kinds, or also involve private sector agents (compa­
nies, representatives of community groups) in various ways. 
The deals could have specific environmental goals. For species, for 
example, the target might be species population levels by a specified 
target year. For biodiversity, it might be access to undisturbed lands 
guaranteed over a period of time. For coral/oceans, it might be the 
portion of unimpaired coral in coastal waters. For carbon emissions, 
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it might be a maximum emission level from the country over a time 
period, or (as in the Kyoto Protocol) cutbacks from emission levels. 
With water, where there are international disputes over flow rates 
through territories and water quality indicators, these could also be 
bargained for in return for considerations, as above. Toxic waste com­
mitments could be bargained for in terms of annual levels of dis­
charges. All these deals would constitute implementable and verifiable 
environmental commitments, and could be bargained over in a WEO 
for considerations in cash or other compensation. 
While some of these commitments are currently covered by treaty 
arrangements in various forms, a WEO would allow deals to go con­
siderably further. As such, there seem to be no conflicts with existing 
treaties. If new WEO deals go beyond what is in treaties, the treaties 
simply become redundant. If WEO deals are not up to the terms of 
treaty arrangements, they will not be concluded. 
The effect of these deals would be for agents who were the 
source of global environmental damage to take into account 
the costs of that damage to others through their private 
decisions. 
Species and forests would be protected in the interests of foreign 
consumers, who in turn would pay for environmental quality 
improvements. Carbon emitters, for example, would take into account 
the costs that incremental climate change inflicted on others; defor­
esters would take into account the incremental loss to others in glob­
al amenity value and habitat loss. Custodians of assets would be com­
pensated in the case of forest stewardship, or emitters in the case of 
carbon if they agree to use more expensive but cleaner production 
technologies. Explicit bargained arrangements involving both govern­
ments and non-governmental groups would thus reflect negotiated 
deals in which property rights dictated the direction of payment for 
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weakening the impediments to internalization deals 
Ambiguous property rights, free riding, time inconsistency, and con­
tract enforcement are four central reasons why global externalities go 
un-internalized. The difficulty of assembling coalitions and the prob­
lem of side payments are other related concerns. A central aim of a 
WEO would thus be to weaken the impediments to internalization 
3deals that currently exist. 
Property Rights and Environmental Dealmaking 
A key impediment to global environmental dealmaking in a World 
Environmental Organization will clearly be the ambiguities of proper­
ty rights both across and within countries. 
Across countries, national governments often assert their implicit 
right to regulate and protect economic activity, involving different 
claims over environmental assets. OECD countries often argue, for 
instance, that forests are the lungs of the earth (globally communal 
property) and thus they have the right to, say, block imports of tropi­
cal lumber until improvements in environmental quality (forest cover 
targets) occur in exporting countries. Developing countries with for­
est cover argue that this is eco- (or green) imperialism, which forces 
them to slow their growth and development, and yields environmen­
tal benefits mainly to wealthy countries. They argue that they should 
instead be compensated for showing environmental restraint over the 
use of their own environmental assets. The issue is whether forests are 
a global or a national asset. 
Within countries, there are also substantial ambiguities as to 
property rights over environmental assets. Some countries have multi­
level government registration of ownership (national and provincial), 
which produces conflicting claims that courts often do not adequately 
resolve. Native peoples may have various rights to biological species, 
even if formal land rights are held elsewhere. Squatters in some 
countries exert de facto property rights over species, forests, and 
biodiversity. 
3	 Note that a WEO such as we propose is some distance from the current WTO. While the latter
is both a rule and a bargaining framework, it is restrictive, since no cash is allowed in bargain­
ing and the rules of the WTO Charter (via GATT 1994) also constrain allowable bargaining (such
as through the Most Favored Nation rule, which prevents pair-wise deals). The WTO Charter’s
initial focus was more on preventing a reversion to the global trade regime of the 1930s in the
postwar years, as well as further liberalizing through negotiated exchanges of concessions,
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examples of bargains 
A government in country X with no rainforests might strike a deal on 
behalf of its citizens with a government of country Y with rainforests. 
Its effect might be that a specified fraction of land in country Y would 
remain under forest cover for a specified time period (twenty or forty 
years, for example). In return for this commitment, the government 
of country X would pledge to transfer a sum of money to country Y at 
the end of the period. The commitment would need to be verified in 
some way and country Y would need to impose this undertaking 
upon its residents. This could be done through logging bans, export 
taxes on logs, logging licenses, or other internal arrangements. 
Alternatively, a group of concerned citizens in country X could 
negotiate independently of their national government with a com­
munity group that has custody of an environmental resource in coun­
try Y. They might again agree to a transfer of financial resources 
directly to the group at the end of a time period if a particular envi­
ronmental target is met (again, say, forest cover). Issues of verifica­
tion and compliance would arise in both cases. 
For a WEO, this raises difficult questions of who is to deal with whom 
to generate environmental quality-enhancing bargaining. Coase (1960) 
argued that clear assignment of property rights is needed before any 
environmental dealmaking occurs, and a central task for a WEO would 
be to help to clarify property rights to facilitate such deals. Property 
rights related problems partially explain why cross-country deals on 
environmental issues have been science-based and lowest common 
denominator in outcome, rather than Coasian in character, and why 
property rights issues would have to be a part of WEO activity. 
This will not be easy, although some aspects may be more 
straightforward than others. Where multiple land registration 
schemes operate, a WEO could help simplify and consolidate them. 
Where non-timber rights to forests arise, for example, a WEO might 
codify them and bring them in as part of the deal. Across countries, a 
WEO could accept that de facto rights devolve to the country with 
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Because coercion is not a viable solution, bargained compensation 
would seem to be the only practical way forward, although this 
involves effectively ceding currently contested property rights over 
environmental assets in developing countries. The operational princi­
ple, in the absence of international courts with clear authority to rule 
on such rights, would seem to be that custody of assets yields ability to 
bargain, and that bargaining becomes more satisfactory as an inter­
nalization device the more secure the custody is. 
Some environmental conflicts at the international level are them­
selves primarily about property rights. An example of this is water 
conflicts, where one country controls the headwaters that flow to 
other countries further down the river. Here, negotiated deals, say, to 
maintain water flow relative to target levels in return for other conces­
sions, could be brokered by a WEO. Documenting existing overlap­
ping and inconsistent property rights where they occur may help 
resolve the situation. Suggesting ways to proceed where property 
rights are contested might also help. 
We do not claim that a WEO could definitively resolve all interna­
tional property rights issues. Coase, in any case, suggested that they lie 
outside of formal economics and rest on arguments of natural justice. 
The aim would be both to contribute to the alleviation of some dis­
putes and to work with de facto rights on other cases through existing 
custody of assets. 
The Problem of Free Riding 
The problem of free riding can occur when the benefits of pollution 
control accrue to many different nations regardless of their behavior. 
By bargaining for environmental protection in another country, coun­
try A would assume all the costs of environmental protection, but 
environmental protection would benefit other countries as much as it 
would benefit country A. Nations would have an incentive not to enter 
into a deal, hoping that someone else would do it for them. For exam­
ple, if countries, or groups within countries, hold existence value over 
forests abroad, and if bargained environmental deals were bilateral, 
countries could free ride on each other’s deals, since the benefits from 
a deal committing a country to preserve its forests accrue to countries 
other than those that are party to it. Free riding greatly undermines 
the attractiveness of environmental deals at the global level, since the 
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Deals made only by subsets of affected parties would therefore be 
difficult to conclude and would likely span groups of countries with 
similar interests on both sides of the environmental resource. A 
strength of a WEO would be its potential ability to orchestrate simul­
taneous deals across groups of affected parties. This would further 
raise the degree of internalization of the global externality achieved in 
the deal through crossovers, and hence would reduce free riding. 
As another example, all OECD countries may benefit from a species 
population target negotiated, say, in Cameroon by Germany (or a 
German NGO). 
A WEO could help countries capture the benefits to others 
from free riding through multilateral rather than bilateral 
dealmaking, with packages of environmental deals put 
together in rounds of negotiation, much as the WTO utilizes 
crossovers of benefits in one area and costs in others in 
allowing countries to conclude mutually advantageous deals 
on trade barrier reduction. 
A WEO could even aggressively seek out dealmaking opportunities 
by proposing a package of deals to consortia of interested parties, and 
in this way reduce free riding benefits. 
The Problem of Time Consistency 
Time consistency is a problem because an arrangement entered into 
by one government might not be honored by a later government that 
is either unwilling or unable to fulfill the terms of the agreement made 
to another state. If Brazil, for example, were to promise to restrain 
deforestation over some number of years in return for financial 
inflows, then if the funds were paid immediately, Brazil could request 
more funds after initial receipt. But if funds were to be paid at the end 
of the period, Brazil would have no assurance that payment would be 
forthcoming. 
Some form of intermediary guarantor, therefore, seems needed by 
both sides to reduce the risks involved in bargained environmental 
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for deals agreed to and holding them in escrow, pending execution of 
the commitment. If the environmental target were deemed to be met, 
funds would then be released to the country or group making the 
commitment, and if not, returned to the country or group pledging 
the funds. 
Problems of Contract Enforcement 
Enforcing the environmental deals concluded within a World 
Environmental Organization would require robust procedural 
arrangements. Who ensures that a pledged environmental target has 
actually been met, and what are the remedies if this is not the case? 
Under a WEO, staff could monitor compliance on environmental 
commitments, and make determinations of whether or not 
commitments have been met. A set of agreed upon procedures for 
verification would be needed to this effect. These, in turn, would 
require undertakings from parties to deals monitored by the WEO to 
accept WEO determinations, and a system of dispute resolution and 
appeal. 
Difficulty of Assembling Coalitions 
There are difficulties in putting together coalitions for dealmaking 
aimed at reducing transaction costs. Often it is difficult to determine 
the benefits from deals, and hence who should be approached with 
dealmaking proposals. Preferences underlying deals need to be esti­
mated and represented, because revealed “willingness to pay” meas­
ures are hard to put together. Parties to deals typically have little infor­
mation on what deals may be worth to other parties, and hence how 
to negotiate. Who assesses and acts on behalf of the collective willing­
ness to pay in OECD countries for global environmental improve­
ments? If it is to be national governments, how are they to do this and 
with what effect? A WEO could play a role by undertaking studies, 
producing willingness to pay estimates for enhanced global environ­
mental quality, setting out scenarios for deals, and orchestrating and 
stimulating the process with information. 
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The Problem of Side Payments 
It is often said that side payments do not occur to any significant 
degree in existing inter-country environmental arrangements, and 
that financial resource transfers from countries that belong to the 
OECD where demand for global environmental quality is high, to 
lower income countries with significant endowments of environmen­
tal assets, are small and do not take place on a regular basis. If resource 
transfers do occur, it is usually as a result of a country’s being a signa­
tory to one of the global treaties, such as the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), rather than 
as a negotiated environmental deal focused on internalization. Under 
the current system, negotiations occur for specific Conventions or 
Protocols, each addressing a major global issue. By encouraging ongo­
ing negotiation and constant dealmaking between countries, a WEO 
would make side payments much more common. 
Overview of the Role of a World Environmental Organization 
We envision a World Environmental Organization that could under­
take activities underpinning environmental dealmaking on a global 
scale, aiming at accounting for as many social costs of market transac­
tions as possible. It would not have the power to conclude deals (these 
would be for national governments to decide on) but proposals for 
deals, mechanisms to support deals, arrangements to enforce deals – 
all would be the bailiwick of the WEO. 
A WEO could act as an intermediary on deals of the type sketched 
out in this chapter. It could receive and hold funds until determina­
tions were made as to compliance (with either transfers to the custo­
dian country, or return to the other country). A WEO could provide 
verification as to whether the terms of deals had been met, and act as 
a dispute settlement and arbitration vehicle. This would go much fur­
ther than the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol, 
which initiates and oversees North-South transactions on climate 
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A WEO could be proactive in identifying areas and countries 
between which deals would make sense, even to the point of 
initiating proposals. It could coordinate single country offers 
and explicitly seek to internalize free riding in the deals it bro­
kered. It could propose mechanisms to be used in countries to 
assess and reflect collective willingness to pay. 
In setting out our view of a WEO, we see a possible progressive 
graduation from weaker to stronger forms as the likely evolution. Such 
an entity in its strong form is unlikely to be implemented quickly, and 
the demand for it, as much as anything else, will reflect the level of 
concern for global environmental quality and the global costs stem­
4ming from lack of internalization.
developing environmental/non-environmental
policy linkage 
By bringing global environmental arrangements under a single bar­
gaining umbrella, a WEO should also make it easier for cross-country 
concessions to be exchanged between environmental and non-envi­
ronmental areas, potentially leading to both a stronger environmental 
regime and gains elsewhere. Thus, developing countries might make 
concessions on their internal environmental management in return 
not only for cash, but also for improved trade access. A problem in 
making such concessions is how to do it within the existing patchwork 
quilt of global environmental arrangements. By systematizing these 
arrangements, a WEO could better facilitate bargains of this kind. 
The WTO involves bargaining concessions on trade barrier reduc­
tions, but no cash is exchanged and only national governments may 
bargain. A WEO could go further. Cash for commitments could be 
allowed, and bargains would not be restricted to national govern­
ments. A WEO can be seen as a parallel and expanded bargaining 
framework for country and group concessions. Linkage to non-envi­
ronmental issues, while a second or third step, implies that bargaining 
In a parallel paper (Whalley and Zissimos, 2001), we set out three variants of a possible WEO
progressing from weaker to stronger forms, which we suggest could be implemented gradu­
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need not be restricted to cash compensation for environmental com­
mitments. A wider forum for global bargaining could evolve from the 
WEO, encompassing both the WTO and various issues on which 
groups want to exchange concessions. 
Developing countries have been cautious over such bargains, 
arguing that they should be compensated for undertaking environ­
mental restraint of the form sought by OECD countries. They are 
fearful that a willingness to bargain indicates both a relaxation of this 
position and, implicitly, a concession on property rights. But the 
opposite is true. 
A World Environmental Organization would give developing 
countries the opportunity to take advantage of their property 
rights and obtain resource transfers for environmental 
restraint. Thus, by providing institutional support for 
bargaining across issue areas, incentives to cooperate would 
be multiplied, and the basis for global environmental 
cooperation significantly broadened. 
Underpinning Domestic Environmental Policy 
An international environmental entity such as a WEO could also lend 
support to domestic groups (including NGOs) trying to raise levels of 
5compliance with domestic environmental laws. Governments in coun­
tries with such problems, in turn, might be able to use the WEO as a 
masthead to support domestic policy change in the environmental area. 
A WEO might also consolidate the information clearinghouse func­
tions of the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), and 
build a wider range of information sources, again underpinning 
domestic policy. It could also help build institutional capacity in less 
developed countries, based on the recognition that, in the past, com­
pliance has been hampered by administrative weakness and poor 
institutional infrastructure. 
5 If an NGO vehemently opposed a deal its national government entered into that was bro­
kered by a WEO, it remains to be worked out whether the NGO should be able to appeal the
case to the WEO. Our inclination would be to treat these as issues to be resolved within the 
domestic political process. 
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possible form of a world environmental organization 
Structure 
•	 Head Office 
•	 Governing Council 
•	 All WEO members would have a seat * 
•	 All sign protocol of accession to uphold all WEO decisions 
•	 Chief Officer 
Mandate 
•	 To improve global environmental quality through structured 
environmental deals 
Issues Covered 
•	 All issues on which agents wanted to strike deals 
•	 Primarily transboundary issues and global commons issues** 
Services Offered 
•	 Facilitation of deals 
•	 Verification of deals 
•	 Property rights verification 
•	 Intermediation of financial arrangements 
•	 Advancement of cross-country negotiations 
•	 Initiation of proposals 
Structure of Deals 
•	 No set format for negotiations 
•	 No principles or general rules 
•	 Country-to-country, including non-state parties 
•	 WEO notified once deals are completed 
Possible Additional Activities 
•	 Call for negotiating rounds on the environment 
•	 Initiation of negotiations to streamline, codify current treaties 
•	 Exploration of cross-linkage negotiations 
•	 Exploration of whether WEO commitments might underpin 
domestic environmental policy 
* 	 Whether non-governmental organizations as well as countries would be members
needs to be determined. 
** 	 Environmental issues within countries could also be dealt with but are more likely to
be resolved through a process outside a WEO, since the impediments to successful














    
 
 
    
potential benefits to developing countries 
While we see a WEO playing a central role in achieving improvements 
in the areas of global dealmaking, there could be additional potential 
benefits of the resulting environmental deals for developing countries. 
These benefits would be an important step in driving forward efforts 
at global environmental protection, considering that developing 
countries often see economic development and poverty alleviation as 
more urgent priorities and have traditionally been reluctant to 
embrace environmental treaties proposed by the developed world: 
• Low-income developing countries may be able to obtain valuable 
resources for development by making commitments to undertake 
environmental protection at home; 
• Negotiations could be about much more than the environment, 
since these countries will also be able to bargain collectively on 
both environmental and non-environmental dimensions of issues 
in a WEO, substantially enhancing their bargaining power; 
• Issue linkage in negotiation between environmental and non-
environmental areas would be made easier through a WEO, since 
these links require a level of coordination across sub-areas and 
regions in the environmental area that is currently difficult to 
imagine occurring without agency support; 
• Opportunities may exist for countries experiencing difficulties in 
implementing their own domestic environmental policies to use 
the political support of an international entity such as a WEO to 
achieve their objectives; 
• A WEO could act as a focal point for developing country coalition 
formation in negotiation. By formulating joint positions in WEO 
negotiations, developing countries with similar interests might be 
able to act together. Resource transfers to developing countries in 
return for strengthened environmental regimes might be more 
significant if developing countries were to bargain jointly through 
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possible reasons for caution on the part of
developing countries 
Developing countries may, however, be cautious about such proposals. 
Their concerns would likely be: 
• Whether advantages to them would be large enough to contribute 
significantly to development; 
• Whether any new flow of funds and technology would justify the 
raised expectations of improved environmental performance; 
• Whether an additional global “pressurizing agency” along the lines 
of the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
might result; 
• Whether growth and development might be slowed by taking on 
environmental commitments. The heterogeneity of both interest 
and circumstance across individual countries may further compli­
cate a developing country reaction to our WEO proposal. 
Caution toward a WEO may be a likely initial response, and one 
that has to be clearly acknowledged, but we would argue that potential 
gains remain. For now, the catalyst for a possible global environmen­
tal body is seen as the trade and environment conflict in the WTO, but  
we think this may change. If major additional global environmental 
damage occurs in the next few years and cooperation might have mit­
igated it, this could prove to be a more powerful catalyst. 
conclusion 
The central aim of the World Environmental Organization we pro­
pose, regardless of the speed at which it evolved, would be to redress 
international environmental negotiation failures in a way that would 
move the global economy closer to achieving fuller internalization of 
global environmental externalities. Its overarching purpose would be 
to improve environmental quality worldwide. It is our contention that 
such an organization would provide more concrete benefits to the 
environment than any arrangement or organization that currently 
exists, and for that reason, we urge serious consideration of its merits 
by the international community. 
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Revitalizing Global Environmental 
Governance: A Function-Driven 
Approach 
Daniel C. Esty and Maria H. Ivanova 
summary 
We advance the case for a Global Environmental Mechanism (GEM) on 
the basis of our analysis of four key questions: Do we need environmen­
tal efforts at the global scale? What functions are essential at the global 
level? Where has the existing system fallen short? What would an effec­
tive institutional mechanism for addressing global environmental prob­
lems look like? 
Our central argument is that there exists today a set of inescapably 
global environmental threats that require international “collective 
action.” They demand an institutional mechanism at the global level, we 
argue, but one quite different from traditional international bodies. We 
propose not a new international bureaucracy but rather the creation of a 
Global Environmental Mechanism that draws on Information Age tech­
nologies and networks to promote cooperation in a lighter, faster, more 
modern, and effective manner than traditional institutions. 
We see three core capacities as essential to a GEM: (1) provision of ade­
quate information and analysis to characterize problems, track trends, 
and identify interests; (2) creation of a policy “space” for environmental 
negotiation and bargaining; and (3) sustained build-up of capacity for 
addressing issues of agreed-upon concern and significance. We envision 
a GEM building on the expertise of existing institutions and creating new 
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a need for effective environmental institutions 
Ten years after the Rio Earth Summit, and thirty years after the 
Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, the world com­
munity lacks effective institutional and legal mechanisms to address 
global-scale environmental degradation. This deficiency weighs ever 
more heavily as nation-states come to recognize their inability to 
address critical problems on a national basis and to appreciate the 
depth and breadth of their interdependence. 
Devised during the infancy of environmental awareness, when 
problems were perceived as largely local, relatively distinct, and subject 
to technological fixes, the current international environmental regime 
is weak, fragmented, lacking in resources, and handicapped by a nar­
row mandate. There is motion, but there is little progress. More than 
500 multilateral environmental treaties are now in existence (UNEP, 
2001), more than a dozen international agencies share environmental 
responsibilities, and yet environmental conditions are not improving 
across a number of critical dimensions. Problems such as climate 
change, ocean pollution, fisheries depletion, deforestation, and deser­
tification persist – with trends that are often broadly negative. 
Moreover, advances in a range of ecological sciences continue to 
unveil new threats to the global commons – from airborne mercury 
to disrupted hydrological systems – as well as new interrelationships 
among issues. 
The environmental challenges we now face clearly illustrate the 
extent of interconnectedness of the earth’s ecological as well as eco­
nomic systems. These problems demand collective action on a global 
scale, yet there is no established and effective forum where parties can 
engage in a sustained and focused dialogue, identify priorities, and 
devise action plans for tackling environmental concerns with world­
wide implications. Absent a vibrant international environmental 
body, many decisions with serious environmental repercussions are 
taken within the economic, trade, and finance institutions, where 
short-term economic priorities often trump long-term sustainability. 
Some of the current failings can be attributed to a history of man­
agement shortcomings and bureaucratic entanglements, but other 
aspects of the problem are deeper and more structural. Governments 
have failed to create a functional institutional architecture for the 
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al challenges – international economic affairs, population control, and 
various world health problems (e.g., eradication of polio and small 
pox) – have been addressed more successfully is notable. 
The disconnect between environmental needs and environ­
mental performance in the current international system is 
striking. New institutional mechanisms for better global 
governance are urgently needed. 
The haphazard development of international environmental laws 
and agencies has left three important institutional gaps in the existing 
global environmental governance system: (1) a jurisdictional gap, (2) 
an information gap, and (3) an implementation gap. 
Jurisdictional Gap 
The discrepancy between a globalized world and a set of inescapable 
transboundary problems on the one hand, and a dominant structure 
of national policymaking units on the other, has led to a gap in issue 
coverage. National legislatures often do not see their role in addressing 
worldwide transboundary harms, while global bodies often do not 
have the capacity or the authority to address them. 
The United Nations lacks a coherent institutional mechanism for 
dealing effectively with global environmental concerns (Palmer, 1992; 
Esty, 1994). The UN Charter provides for no environmental body. 
Responsibilities are instead divided among a suite of agencies, includ­
ing the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Meteorological 
Organization, the International Maritime Organization, the Inter­
national Oceanographic Commission, the UN Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization, the Commission on Sustainable 
Development, the Global Environment Facility, and the UN 
Development Programme, with a coordinating and catalytic role 
assigned to the UN Environment Programme (UNEP). Adding to this 
fragmentation are the independent secretariats to the numerous 
treaties, all contending for limited governmental time, attention, and 
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gantuan task of coordinating all of these diffuse efforts and has proven 
incapable of carrying out its mission (Palmer, 1992). 
A mere program in the UN system, UNEP has accomplished more 
than its limited mandate might seem to make possible and its minute 
1budget might have been expected to allow. UNEP has supported the 
creation of a large body of international environmental law and has 
contributed to efforts to generate environmental data, assessments, 
and reporting. A number of UNEP executive directors have been force­
ful advocates for change and international environmental coopera­
tion. But UNEP has no executive authority. It has failed to coordinate 
the various global and regional environmental arrangements around 
the world and “lacks political clout to serve adequately as the lead 
international organization for the protection of the global environ­
ment” (Dunoff, 1995). 
The scattering of environmental activities across many 
international organizations has greatly compromised participation, 
especially that of developing countries. Negotiations on a variety of 
critical pollution control and natural resource management issues 
often occur simultaneously around the world. Moreover, the costs 
associated with attending intergovernmental sessions to negotiate 
international environmental agreements and treaties are high, both in 
terms of direct economic expenses and opportunity costs of days away 
2from the already understaffed environmental ministries. Countries 
with limited diplomatic and financial resources have thus been forced 
to choose which conferences to attend, or whether to attend them at 
all (Kelly, 1997). 
UNEP was created following the Stockholm Conference in 1972 with the mandate “to provide
leadership and encourage partnership in caring for the environment by inspiring, informing and
enabling nations and peoples to improve their quality of life without compromising that of
future generations” (UNEP, 2001): http://www.unep.org/about.asp Its annual budget of $100
million is comparable to that of many environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
such as the U.S. National Wildlife Federation (Kelly, 1997). 
Edith Brown Weiss (1995) points out that “A normal negotiation may require four or five
intergovernmental negotiating sessions of one to two weeks each during a period of eighteen
months to two years. The Climate Convention negotiations required six sessions of two weeks
each in less than sixteen months. Despite this very full and expensive schedule of negotiations,
the Climate Convention negotiations were only one of more than a half dozen global or regional
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Without an effective forum with an action orientation, rule-
making and norm development have been inadequate and 
left to a chosen few, leading to prolonged discussions, lowest­
common-denominator outcomes, and poor results. 
There is, moreover, no structured system of dispute settlement. 
Most environmental agreements have no procedures for resolving dis­
putes among parties. A few agreements, notably the UN Convention 
on the Law of the Sea and the Montreal Protocol, have dispute settle­
ment mechanisms, but these provisions have gone unused. Other 
treaties, like the Biodiversity Convention and the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, expressly defer disputes to the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ). And while the ICJ has set up an 
“environmental chamber,” it has never heard a case. As a result of the 
weakness of the environmental institutions, the disputes they might 
have addressed end up being taken to other fora, such as the World 
Trade Organization. This pattern leaves those with international envi­
ronmental claims with no institutional mechanism for redress (Kalas, 
2001). This lack of institutional capacity has broad implications: 
• Individuals harmed by transboundary effects of state or corporate 
activities have nowhere to turn; 
The existing bodies have jurisdiction only over states. Private  actors  • 
can neither be brought before the court nor do they have standing 
to request adjudication; 
• Jurisdiction is largely “by consent” and remedies are not 
enforceable. 
Information Gap 
As the long-standing literature on international cooperation makes 
clear, the availability of reliable information is critical to policy 
formation (Hassan and Hutchinson, 1992; Martin, 1999; Esty, 2001, 
2002). In the environmental field, where problems are dispersed across 
space and time, sound decisionmaking hinges on the availability of 
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relationships, and (2) policy options, results, and compliance with 
commitments. Data collection, “indicator” development, monitoring 
and verification, and scientific assessment and analysis thus emerge as 
central to sound decisionmaking. 
High quality data with cross-country comparability is necessary to 
support an effective approach to problem definition and assessment 
(Esty, 2002). A suite of international organizations, scientific research 
centers, national governments, and environmental convention 
secretariats are responsible for data collection and scientific assess­
ment. UNEP has established an Environment and Natural Resources 
Information Network to help collate, store, manage, and disseminate 
environmental information and data in developing countries and to 
assess environment and development issues for decisionmaking, 
policy setting, and planning. UNDP has launched a similar initiative 
with its Capacity 21 program. Numerous other international organi­
zations, NGOs, universities, and think tanks have information 
initiatives underway. However, significant data gaps remain. There is 
little coordination among data collection efforts, and comparability 
across jurisdictions is poor (WEF, 2002). 
Compliance monitoring and reporting are even more unsystematic, 
scattered, and informal. International environmental agreements have, 
until recently, contained few substantive mechanisms for monitoring 
and evaluation. Although environmental agreements usually require 
parties to report their compliance to the respective treaty secretariat, 
few guidelines exist as to the scope or methodology of the reports. 
Moreover, the convention secretariats often lack the authority and 
resources to monitor agreements through verification of reported 
information or through independent assessments. The analysis and 
publication of collected data is also severely limited. With the 
proliferation of agreements, countries have found it increasingly 
difficult to meet their reporting obligations under the various 
conventions, and nations’ self-reported data are often incomplete, 
unreliable, and inconsistent (GAO, 1999). UNEP has, in fact, begun to 
















    
Implementation Gap 
The biggest single obstacle to environmental progress at the global 
scale is the lack of an action orientation. This might be attributable to 
an implementation gap. Treaty congestion has led to overload at the 
national level, where the political, administrative, and economic 
capacity to implement agreements resides. Many international 
environmental institutions, including the numerous secretariats of 
international environmental conventions, have some claim on the 
administrative capacity of national states. Even industrialized states 
with well-developed regulatory mechanisms and bureaucracies have 
become overwhelmed (Brown Weiss, 1995; UNEP, 2001). 
For developing countries, financial and technology transfer 
mechanisms are critical. But the efforts to date in these 
regards are modest and noticeably inadequate. 
The existing financial mechanisms are scattered across the Global 
Environment Facility, UNEP, the World Bank, and separate treaty-
based funds such as the Montreal Protocol Finance Mechanism. This 
dispersion and lack of integration reinforces the perception of a lack 
of seriousness in the North about the plight of the South. The institu­
tional mechanisms for technology transfer have also been less than 
effective. Tying technology transfer to official aid and export promo­
tion policies has resulted in the imposition of inappropriate 
technologies on countries with little capacity to choose, assess, 
operate, and maintain them. 
Moreover, few international environmental agreements contain 
serious enforcement provisions. In most cases, the only incentive for 
compliance with treaty obligations comes from peer pressure or the 
threat of public exposure. However, when performance data are 
scarce, the “name and shame” strategy provides little traction. Even 
when agreements do include enforcement provisions, resource or 
other constraints limit their effectiveness. For example, the Northwest 
Atlantic Fisheries Convention has the authority to establish and allo­
cate fishing quotas, but allows for the exemption of any member from 
any enforcement proposal through the lodging of an objection. It also 
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permits members to choose not to be bound by rules already in force. 
Finally, although members are allowed to board and inspect the ves­
sels of other member nations, only the nation under whose flag the 
vessel is operating can prosecute and sanction a vessel’s owner for vio­
lations. Nations are often reluctant to penalize their own fleets. In 
1993, for example, out of forty-nine vessels charged with offenses, only 
six were prosecuted (GAO, 1999). 
A multi-pronged agenda of refinements to the existing structure 
and reforms of UNEP and the other elements of the current interna­
tional environmental system should be developed to address these 
glaring gaps in global environmental governance. 
The list of problems is so long and the baggage associated 
with the current regime so heavy that at some point a funda­
mental restructuring rather than incremental tinkering 
becomes a better path forward. 
In the face of so many difficulties and the existing regime’s poor 
track record, any presumption in favor of working with the status quo 
cannot be sustained. Moreover, as the analysis above suggests, the nub 
of the issue is structural. This fact makes a different starting point and 
a new institutional design desirable if not essential. 
rationale for global action 
The need for international cooperation to address environmental 
problems with transboundary or global implications is clear both in 
theory and in practice. Some environmental problems (local air 
pollution and waste disposal, for example) are of limited geographic 
scope and can be handled at the national or local scale. An increasingly 
large set of issues, however, from persistent organic pollutants to 
fisheries depletion to climate change, demand an effective response 
among several jurisdictions and, sometimes, coordinated action 
across the globe. Governments around the world are beginning to 
recognize the limits of their ability to tackle transboundary 
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Global Public Goods 
To understand the need for a new institutional design, it is helpful to 
understand that the underlying conceptual framework of the environ­
mental problem set central to this framework is the notion of a “pub­
3lic good.” Clean air and an intact ozone layer are classic examples of 
public goods. While markets are the primary producers of private 
goods, which are delivered to individual buyers, public goods confer 
benefits that cannot be confined to a single individual or group. Once 
provided, they can be enjoyed for free. 
The challenge public goods pose is that, unless carefully managed, 
they trigger behavior that is individually rational but collectively sub­
optimal or even disastrous. Since the very nature of public goods is 
that individual users cannot be excluded, some individuals may 
choose to “free ride” on the efforts of others rather than contribute 
resources to the provision of the good in question. It is rational for a 
fisherman, for example, to try to maximize his personal gain by catch­
ing as many fish as possible as quickly as possible. Collectively, how­
ever, such a strategy leads to overexploitation of the resource and can 
result in a “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin, 1968). The fish stock 
will be depleted, leaving the entire fishing community worse off than 
it would have been had it found a cooperative arrangement for con­
4trolling the rate at which the resources were extracted.
Similarly, in a world of multiple governing authorities and jurisdic­
tions, optimal pollution reduction is unlikely to occur without some 
structure to promote collaboration. Fundamentally, public goods – 
including global public goods – will be underproduced without 
mechanisms to promote cooperation (Kaul, Grunberg, and Stern, 
1999). The problem that public goods (especially global public goods) 
pose, therefore, is one of organizing cooperation to overcome the ten­
dency toward what is called in game theory a “lose-lose” equilibri­
um.The situation must be converted from one in which decisions are 
made independently based on narrow self-interest to one in which 
actors overcome the “collective action” problem and adopt cooperative 
solutions (Ostrom, 1990). 
3	 Kaul, Grunberg, and Stern (1999) define global public goods as “goods whose benefits reach
across borders, generations, and population groups.” Among these are equity and justice, mar­
ket efficiency, environment and cultural heritage, health, knowledge and information, and peace
and security. 
4	 As Hardin put it in his seminal piece in 1968,“Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush,
each pursuing his own best interest in a society which believes in the freedom of the commons.
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Super Externalities 
In the environmental arena, the problem of collective action is espe­
cially acute where shared resources or pollution harms spill across 
national boundaries, creating “super externalities” (Dua and Esty, 
1997). At the national level, a regulatory agency is usually given author­
ity to direct (and coerce if need be) the behavior of private actors so as 
to ensure cooperation. In the absence of an overarching sovereign at 
the global level, the incentives to free ride are even stronger (Young, 
1999). 
Take the example of the fishing community again. Even if local fish­
ermen could reach an agreement to regulate catch, the tragedy of the 
commons will persevere unless there is oversight and control over for­
eign commercial fleets. Crucial fisheries have indeed collapsed world­
wide as heavily subsidized fleets sweep across thousands of kilometers 
scooping up fish. In the face of such competition, local fishermen 
behave “rationally” by rushing to catch more fish more quickly. But in 
doing so, they generate a “lose-lose” outcome in which everyone is 
worse off than they might have been had they cooperated. In the 
words of a Mexican fisherman, “The philosophy is: get it now, grab it 
– if I don't, the next guy will” (Weiner, 2002). 
Global collective action is further hampered by the fact that 
impacts of “externalities” are often hard to grasp. They are often 
spread out, both spatially and temporally. In the case of climate 
change, for example, the abatement and adaptation costs can be 
transferred not only across space – to other countries – but also over 
time – to future generations. Cooperation is also difficult to obtain 
when the impact is unidirectional, i.e., when activities in one country 
cause damage only in another jurisdiction. Upstream users of a shared 
river, for instance, have little incentive to limit their extraction of water 
or curb pollution, as the costs they impose will largely be borne by 
others downstream. As Whalley and Zissimos demonstrate in this 
volume, internalization of global environmental externalities through 
bargains involving financial resources or policy changes will be critical 
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Global Environmental Governance Functions 
The nature of current and future environmental problems – spanning 
jurisdictions and generations – requires new governance mechanisms 
that alter incentives in favor of environmentally sound choices. We see 
three major sets of functions as critical to addressing the global 
collective action problem: (1) provision of adequate information on 
the problems at hand and on whose behavior is contributing to the 
problem; (2) creation of a forum for sustained interaction, bargaining, 
and rulemaking; and (3) establishment of concrete mechanisms for 
implementation of the deals and rules upon which agreement has 
5been reached. A series of functions falls within each of these 
categories (Figure 1). 
Data collection, indicator development, monitoring and verifica­
tion, and scientific assessment and analysis emerge as central func­
tions in the information domain. A policy space for continued inter­
action instills a sense of reciprocity, facilitates adoption of common 
rules and norms, and assists the “internalization of externalities,” tack­
ling potentially contagious phenomena at the source, before they spill 
across borders. Within the forum function, we thus place issue linkage 
and bargaining, a mechanism for rulemaking, environmental advoca­
cy within the global regime, a mechanism for inclusive participation, 
and a dispute settlement framework. Sound and reliable financing 
mechanisms coupled with appropriate technology transfer would 
ensure that targets are met. A database of best practices and imple­
mentation strategies would further facilitate the implementation of 
commitments. 
a global environmental mechanism 
In our view, a Global Environmental Mechanism (GEM) could effec­
tively respond to both the common elements of national problems 
and the special demands of transboundary issues and global public 
goods. Conceptually, a GEM fills the need for a mechanism to promote 
environmental collective action at the international scale. Practically, 
it offers the chance to build a coherent and integrated environmental 
See also Haas, Keohane, and Levy (1993) for a similar analysis and an assessment of the causes
of institutional effectiveness – what they term “the three Cs” – concern, contractual environ­
ment, and capacity. 
5 
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policymaking and management framework that addresses the chal­
lenges of a shared global ecosystem. 
We see three core capacities as essential to a Global Environmental 
Mechanism: 
• Provision of adequate information and analysis to characterize 
problems, track trends, and identify interests; 
• Creation of a policy “space” for environmental negotiation and 
bargaining; 
• Expansion of capacities – both global and national – for address­
ing issues of concern and significance. 
We envision a “network-based” GEM that builds on the functioning 
elements of existing institutions and creates new structures where 
gaps exist in the current regime. We see a GEM growing organically as 
consensus develops around issues and needs. A GEM might contain 
the following elements: 
A Data Collection Mechanism, ensuring the availability of reliable • 
data of high quality and comparability, developing indicators and 
benchmarks, and publishing State of the Global Environment reports; 
A Compliance Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism, providing a • 
repository for information on compliance with agreements and 
established norms, and a continuous and transparent reporting effort; 
A Scientific Assessment and Knowledge Networking Mechanism,• 
drawing on basic research on environmental processes and trends, 
long-term forecasting, and early warnings of environmental risks; 
A Bargaining and Trade-offs Mechanism, facilitating the internal­• 
ization of externalities through exchanges of commitments on 
various environmental issues (forest cover, biodiversity protec­
tion, species management, etc.) in return for cash or policy change 
(market access); 
A Rulemaking Mechanism for the global commons, establishing • 
policy guidelines and international norms on protection of shared 
natural resources such the atmosphere and oceans; 
A Civil Society Participation Mechanism, providing a business • 
and NGO forum for direct participation in problem identification 
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A Financing Mechanism, for global-scale issues mobilizing both • 
public and private resources to provide structured financial assis­
tance to developing countries and transition economies; 
A Technology Transfer Mechanism, promoting the adoption of • 
best options suited to national conditions and encouraging inno­
vative local solutions; 
A Dispute Settlement Mechanism, with agreed procedures and• 
rules to promote conflict resolution between environmental 
agreements and vis-à-vis other global governance regimes in an 
equitable manner; 
An Implementation Strategies Mechanism, ensuring coordination • 
with institutions with primary implementation responsibility 
(such as national governments, UNDP, World Bank, business, civil 
society organizations) and providing a database of best practices. 
Through these capacities, the GEM would contribute to the closing 
of the three institutional gaps we describe – the jurisdictional gap, the 
information gap, and the implementation gap. For real progress to be 
achieved, an extraordinary mix of political idealism and pragmatism 
will be required. If global politics require, the GEM could start mod­
estly and grow over time, progressively gaining new responsibilities 
and enlarging its mandate as its value is demonstrated. 
Because scientific activities represent the dimension of the policy 
realm where economies of scale and other efficiency gains can most 
quickly be realized from increased cooperation, a Global Information 
Clearinghouse could become the first concrete step toward the estab­
lishment of a GEM. The coordination of existing institutional mecha­
nisms for data collection, scientific assessment, and analysis might 
attract broad-based support. A Global Technology Clearinghouse 
focusing on information sharing and best practices dissemination 
might also be launched as an early GEM element. With its competence 
established in these areas, the GEM mandate might then be expanded 
to include monitoring, rulemaking, and the development of a Global 
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Global Environmental Information Clearinghouse 
An institutional mechanism is needed to channel relevant scientific 
and technical expertise to the appropriate policy arena. Better envi­
ronmental data and information make it easier to identify issues, spot 
trends, evaluate risks, set priorities, establish policy options, test 
solutions, and target technology development (Esty, 2002). A global 
information clearinghouse for relevant, valid, and reliable data on 
environmental issues and trends could shift assumptions, preferences, 
and policies. In the case of acid rain in Europe, for example, 
knowledge of domestic acidification damage triggered emission 
reductions in several countries (Levy, 1993). Simply put, data can make 
the invisible visible, the intangible tangible, and the complex 
manageable. 
The availability of information on how others are doing in reduc­
ing pollution and improving resource productivity tends to stimulate 
competition and innovation. Comparative performance analysis across 
6countries – similar to the national PROPER scheme in Indonesia – 
could provide much greater transparency, reward leaders, and expose 
laggards (Afsah, Blackman, and Ratunanda, 2000). Just as knowledge 
that a competitor in the marketplace has higher profits drives execu­
tives to redouble their efforts, evidence that others are outperforming 
one’s country on environmental criteria can sharpen the focus on 
opportunities for improved performance. The attention that the 
World Economic Forum’s Environmental Sustainability Index has 
generated demonstrates this potential (Seelye, 2002; Yeager, 2002). 
While data gathering should primarily be the function of local or 
national organizations, a central repository for such information and 
a mechanism for making the information publicly available would 
represent a significant discipline on slack performance (Chayes and 
Chayes, 1995). An information clearinghouse will, in reality, not cen­
tralize science policy functions but create a “centralized source for 
coordinating information flow between the institutions responsible 
for performing the different science policy functions” (UN University, 
2002). 
6	 PROPER (Program for Pollution Control, Evaluation, and Rating) is Indonesia’s innovative pro­
gram for reducing pollution by rating and publicly disclosing the environmental performance of
industrial facilities. 
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Global Environmental Technology Clearinghouse 
Most multilateral environmental agreements contain provisions related 
to technology transfer as part of the incentive packages for developing 
countries to meet their obligations under the conventions. The Basel 
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of 
Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, the Montreal Protocol on the 
Ozone Layer, the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change and its related Kyoto 
Protocol all cite technology transfer as a critical method for achieving 
concrete environmental improvements. Agenda 21 also underscores 
7the importance of technology transfer to sustainable development.
However, the process of selecting and operating environmentally 
sound technologies is not as simple and straightforward a process as is 
sometimes believed. Selecting a technology that is suitable for local 
needs, adapting it to local conditions, and maintaining it require sub­
stantial skills and information. Yet, the recipients of technology trans­
fers have limited access to information and limited technical capacity, 
underscoring the need for an information clearinghouse on various 
abatement technologies (Worrell et al., 2001). 
An environmental technology clearinghouse could serve as the 
repository and disseminator of information on available technologies, 
their sources, their environmental risks, and the broad terms under 
which they may be acquired. It could also encompass information on 
best practices around the world, promoting continuous learning. The 
clearinghouse would thus be critical to the expansion of technological 
and innovation capabilities in recipient countries. It could address the 
need “to work out a collaborative model between the North and the 
South that can cater to both the soft and the hard aspects of 
technology transfer, be driven by local needs, adapted to the 
developing country operational environment and sustained through 
facilitated private sector participation” (Aslam, 2001). In order to be 
effective, the clearinghouse would also need to provide referrals to 
other services, including sources of advice, training, and technology 
8assessment.
7 See Agenda 21, Chapter 34, “Transfer of Environmentally-Sound Technology, Cooperation, and
Capacity-Building,” available at http://www.igc.org/habitat/agenda21/a21-34.htm 
8 For a proposal for the creation of international information networks and technology clearing­
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Global Bargaining Forum 
A global bargaining forum could act as a catalyst between countries or 
private entities to negotiate the transfer of resources in exchange for 
commitments to agreed-upon policies and behavior. Thus, a govern­
ment in one country might negotiate a deal to preserve a particular 
natural resource – part of a rainforest, a set of species, etc. – in another 
country in return for a sum of money or other policy benefits, as 
Whalley and Zissimos explain in this volume. 
Market access, for example, is an issue of paramount economic 
importance for developing countries, and has been used as a condition 
for many concessions on issues of interest to the North. Brazil has 
made a market access agreement in agriculture a precondition for its 
involvement in a new trade negotiations round. India has made 
commitments on intellectual property rights in exchange for 
expanded market access in agriculture and textiles (Runge, 2001). A 
global bargaining forum would allow such deals to be negotiated, and 
ensure that incentives are altered in ways that include commitments to 
higher environmental quality. Such a forum would also help to 
stimulate a flow of new resources to developing countries, which often 
bear the costs of producing many global public goods. The forum 
would also need to comprise a set of mechanisms for verification, 
financial transfers, and contract enforcement. 
A permanent negotiation forum, moreover, would substantially 
reduce the costs of diplomatic activity around global issues. Rather 
than holding a series of international meetings at different locations 
around the world, a “campus” for international environmental activi­
ty could be devised where relevant scientific information is presented 
and negotiations conducted (Spencer, 2001). This process of continu­
ous interaction, mutual education, and creative trade-offs would 
encourage increased coherence of rules, revelation of preferences and 
assumptions, and innovative solutions to cross-cutting issues. 
Networked Governance 
In proposing a loosely structured GEM, we emphasize the need for 
form to follow function. We envision a light institutional 
superstructure, which would provide coordination through a staff 
comparable in size and expertise to the WTO Secretariat in Geneva 
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help to promote cooperation and achieve synergies across the 
disparate multilateral environmental agreements and other inter­
national institutions with environmental roles. It would also act as a 
mediator and buffer between the environment and the Bretton Woods 
institutions with their economic focus. 
The Global Environmental Mechanism would thus not add a 
new layer of international bureaucracy nor create a world 
government. Quite to the contrary, movement toward a GEM 
should entail consolidation of the existing panoply of inter­
national environmental institutions and a shift toward a 
more modern, “virtual” organizational structure. 
At the center of our proposal for a GEM lies a global public policy 
network that draws in issue-specific expertise from around the world. 
Global networks represent an innovative organizational mechanism 
for responding to an ever more complex international policy environ­
ment, taking advantage of Information Age communications and 
technologies to build new opportunities for cooperation (see Streck, 
this volume). Engaging an established set of private and public organ­
izations with environmental expertise, these networks operate as a 
flexible system for advancing international environmental agenda-set­
ting, analysis, negotiation, policy formulation, implementation, and 
institutional learning. 
Two benefits from networked governance are most notable – min­
imized complexity and hierarchy, and fast boot-up and delivery times 
(Rischard, 2001). While capitalizing on existing institutions and har­
nessing the power of governments and civil society alike, networks 
offer a faster, agile, problem-tailored process, inclusiveness on a merit 
basis, access to state of the art knowledge, and simultaneous proximi­
ty to both the local and the global scale. 
conclusion 
Global environmental policymaking in the last decade has focused 
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alter incentives and produce change. The global environmental man­
agement system is clearly falling short of the world community’s needs 
and expectations. It is time to re-engineer the regime, aiming for a 
new, forward-looking, sleeker, and more efficient architecture that will 
better promote the environment while also serving governmental, 
public, and business needs. 
The logic of a Global Environmental Mechanism is straightfor­
ward: a globalizing world requires better and more modern ways to 
manage ecological interdependence. A vibrant and focused Global 
Environmental Mechanism would contribute to improved collective 
action in response to global-scale challenges by: 
• Closing the jurisdictional gap through the provision of an author­
itative environmental voice in the international arena and a recog­
nized forum where national officials and other stakeholders can 
work cooperatively to address global issues; 
• Closing the information gap by bringing relevant data and analy­
sis to the appropriate policy arena, elucidating problems, and 
framing solutions; 
• Closing the implementation gap by matching interests and com­
mitments in a global bargaining forum and providing functional, 
coordinated financing and technology mechanisms. With a global 
public network at its core, a GEM would contribute to improved 
legitimacy through greater participation, representation, and fair­
ness in the policy process. 
The 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development presents an 
opportunity to make real progress. 
We suggest launching a Global Information Clearinghouse 
and a Global Technology Clearinghouse as immediate con­
crete steps forward and initiating a Commission of eminent 













    
More broadly, a commitment to revitalize the international envi­
ronmental regime should be cast as part of a wider “global bargain.” 
Specifically, the launch of a GEM needs to be paired with a major new 
poverty alleviation initiative, perhaps driven by a rechartered World 
Bank and UNDP. 
In conclusion, we turn to the words of former New Zealand Prime 
Minister Geoffrey Palmer, who, before the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, 
observed: 
[T]he methods and techniques now available to fashion new 
instruments of international law to cope with global environ­
mental problems cannot meet the challenge. The emerging 
issues are so big and so all-embracing that current ways of 
doing things will not solve these problems. The institutional 
mechanisms within the United Nations system are not capable 
of handling the issues. The time has come for ‘something more 
innovative, for a conceptual leap forward in institutional 
terms.’ (Palmer, 1992) 
These words continue to ring true today and underscore the 
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Climate Change: 
National Interests 
Or a Global Regime? 
Christiana Figueres and Maria H. Ivanova 
summary 
This chapter addresses the ultimate global environmental governance 
challenge: climate change. It explores four key questions: 1) Who is 
responsible for climate change? 2) Who is affected by its consequences? 
3) Who should act in response? and 4) What is to be done? 
Climate change is profoundly different from most other environmen­
tal problems humanity has faced. The atmosphere’s planetary scale and 
scope make it a “global public good,” prone to overexploitation and 
underregulation. The multiplicity of causes of climate change, the uncer­
tainty of timing and effects, and substantial economic costs make global 
agreement difficult to attain and maintain. Along with a challenge to 
material wellbeing, however, the climate change problem poses an ethi­
cal dilemma stemming from the large physical, social, and even temporal 
distances between emitters and victims of climate change. 
Climate change requires a global response, encompassing the North 
and the South, local and global communities, and the public and private 
sectors. Ranging from global negotiations to individual choices, a diver­
sity of actors with different resource endowments, and diverging values 
and aspirations, need to be involved. 
Success will depend on the substance and equity of national commit­
ments and on the process developed for promoting global-scale cooper­
ation. Four conditions need to be emphasized in building a global climate 
regime: 1) adequate information, 2) issue linkage and bargaining, 3) tech­
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climate change and global governance 
All social structures humanity has ever built have required some form 
of management. As societies evolved from tribes to kingdoms and 
from kingdoms to nation-states, they were governed both at an 
increasingly larger scale, and with increasing levels of complexity. 
Tribes were managed as relatively simple top-down structures, where 
the center of influence was the tribe itself, and the circumference of 
interdependence was the geographically surrounding tribes. Nation-
states developed more complex systems of governance, and pushed 
the circumference of interdependence beyond neighboring states. In 
the era of globalization, however, governance issues have moved to a 
global level in response to a growing recognition of planetary interde­
pendence. 
Climate change is one of the first truly global environmental chal­
lenges. Several key features distinguish it from other environmental 
problems: 
• The atmosphere is a classic example of a global public good – 
greenhouse gas emissions in one country affect the entire planet; 
conversely, emission controls in any country benefit all, encourag­
ing “free riding” on the efforts of others; 
• The impact of climate change is not likely to be evenly distributed 
among regions and countries. Developing countries tend to be 
more vulnerable and, at the same time, less able to respond and to 
adapt; 
• A multitude of human activities result in greenhouse gas 
emissions, so that efforts at reducing emissions are needed at 
many levels – from global to national to local to individual; 
• Uncertainties as to the timing, scope, and impacts of climate 
change reinforce reluctance to alter economic behavior. 
The scale of climate change requires global collective action, yet the 
costs and complexity make many countries hesitant to participate. A 
functioning climate change regime has thus been difficult to con­
struct. This chapter examines the tension between national interests 
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• Who is responsible? 
• Who is affected? 
• Who should act? 
• What is to be done? 
Were the answers to the first three questions one and the same, 
devising solutions to the problem of climate change would be a rela­
tively simple task – the countries responsible for climate change 
would tackle the issue themselves, because it would be in their own 
interest to do so. The fact that the answers vary takes us into a per­
plexing ethical arena where many of the countries most affected are 
least able to act, and many of those most able to act are least willing. 
We will emerge from this quandary to the degree that countries are 
able to shift from narrowly defined national interests to an internal­
ized notion of global interdependence. Such a shift will need to 
encompass both a technological revolution and an ethical evolution 
supported by a new approach to problem solving at the global scale. 
Who Is Responsible? 
Major components of our biosphere (including the air, the oceans, the 
range of animal and plant species, and the climate system itself) have 
been altered by the intensity of human exploitation of the earth’s 
1resources in the twentieth century. Responsibility is lodged in the 
North as well as in the South and must be understood in terms of two 
major global trends that lead to increased greenhouse gas emissions 
and reduced “sinks” for carbon dioxide – population growth and 
increasing consumption (especially of fossil fuels). Population growth 
is a problem mainly in developing countries while increasing con­
sumption is a problem mostly in the industrialized world. 
Global population has doubled since 1960, reaching 6.1 billion by 
2001 (UNFPA, 2001). Increasing population entails increasing pressure 
on the land. Arable land per capita has been rapidly dwindling since 
the 1950s. The average then was 1.2 acres per capita. The average today 
is less than half that. In developing countries, pressure on the land has 
been “eased” by clearing forests and converting them to (poorly 
For information and data on changes in climate and other consequences of global warming,
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performing) agricultural land. Deforestation, however, contributes 
significantly to carbon dioxide emissions (UNEP, 2002). 
Twenty-three percent of global greenhouse gas emissions are 
due to deforestation, and most of this comes from developing 
countries. In Latin America alone, well over two thirds of total 
emissions are due to deforestation. There is clear climate 
change responsibility here. 
The second macro trend is increasing consumption. The rate of 
environmental degradation is affected not simply by population 
growth but by the pressure people exert on natural systems through 
consumption, especially of non-renewable resources, most notably 
coal, oil, and natural gas. While world population has doubled over 
the past fifty years, total energy consumption has increased fivefold in 
the same period of time (Energy Information Administration, 2002). 
We have relied mainly on fossil fuels for that energy generation, and 
the growth in consumption has brought on parallel increases in green­
house gas emissions. Carbon dioxide (CO2) concentrations in the 
atmosphere have increased from 280 parts per million (ppm), before 
the industrial revolution to 370 ppm today, reaching a level that has 
not been exceeded during the past 420,000 years, and in all likelihood, 
not during the past twenty million years (IPCC, 2001a). 
The United States alone accounts for as much as twenty-one per­
cent of total world emissions while being home to only four percent of 
the world’s population. In contrast, 136 developing countries are col­
lectively responsible for twenty-four percent of global emissions 
(Marland, Boden, and Andres, 2000). This situation, however, will 
shift in or about the year 2020, when population growth and increased 
energy consumption in developing countries will contribute half the 
total world emissions. It is therefore imperative that both developed 
and developing countries make a substantial commitment to action 
and that the requisite governance structures are created to facilitate 
agreement, to allow bargaining and trade-offs, and to assist in the 
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Who Is Affected? 
It has been universally accepted that countries have “common but 
2differentiated responsibilities” with regard to environmental degrad­
ation. Sophisticated climate models and scenarios point out that 
countries have also common but differentiated vulnerabilities. The 
comparative susceptibility to adverse climate impacts lies also along a 
North-South axis, but in an inverse relation to historical 
responsibility. Recent studies of the likely impact of climate change on 
regional agricultural production predict positive impacts for the 
United States, Japan, and parts of Europe (Mendelsohn and Nordhaus, 
31996; Mendelsohn, 2001; Reuters, 2002) and considerable negative 
consequences to sub-Saharan Africa and the Indian subcontinent 
4(IPCC, 2001b; Fischer et al., 2001). Some of the most significant 
potential effects for the developing world include: 
• Exacerbated desertification in Africa due to reductions in average 
rainfall, runoff, and soil moisture; 
• Significant increases in the geographic incidence of insect-borne 
diseases, such as malaria and dengue, particularly in the tropics 
and subtropics, due to rising temperatures; 
• Increased risk of hunger and famine for many of the world’s poor­
est people as a result of a change in the volume and distribution of 
water; 
2	 Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration adopted at the 1992 Earth Summit states that “In view of
the different contributions to global environmental degradation, States have common but
differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that
they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development in view of the pressures
their societies place on the global environment and of the technologies and financial 
resources they command.” The full text of the Rio Declaration is available at: 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm 
3	 Even within the United States, where some studies forecast positive impacts, there is likely to
be significant regional differentiation. Southern states are likely to experience substantial
negative consequences from higher temperatures, including decreased agricultural produc­
tivity, increased unemployment, and increased energy use for cooling that would far outstrip
the savings from heating (Mendelsohn, 2001). 
4	 A warmer climate is also likely to adversely affect far Northern latitudes where permafrost
would melt, leading to the collapse of the topsoil and the loss of large forested areas. This
would be particularly devastating for Russia, where large parts of the country (rich in natural
resources) are covered in permafrost. The global impacts would also be significant as Siberian
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Undermined food security, human health, and infrastructure, and • 
constrained development due to increases in droughts, floods, and 
other extreme events; 
Food production losses of as much as twenty-five percent in forty • 
of the world’s poorest nations, including India, Bangladesh, Brazil, 
and many countries in sub-Saharan Africa. These countries have a 
current combined population of about 2 billion, of which some 
450 million are already undernourished; 
Displacement of tens of millions of people in the low-lying coastal • 
areas of Asia due to rising sea levels and increasingly intense trop­
ical cyclones. 
These adverse impacts will be most severely felt in the poorest coun­
tries where vulnerability is greater due to geographic and climatic con­
ditions, and where the ability to respond is very limited. Successful 
adaptation depends on technological advances, institutional capacity, 
knowledge and education, and availability of financing. 
Overall, developing countries have less favorable economic 
circumstances, weaker institutions, more limited access to 
capital, and more restricted information exchange. The 
nations most vulnerable to global change are often the ones 
least prepared to respond or to adapt to it. 
Who Should Act? 
The divergence between the countries most responsible for, and the 
countries most affected by, climate change creates a profound ethical 
dilemma. Developed countries have the capacity to act, yet some of 
them (notably the United States) are unwilling to do so without the 
assurance of substantial emission reductions on the part of develop­
ing nations. Facing pressing domestic concerns, however, countries in 
the South resent the imposition of economic costs for the ameliora­
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Currently, the United States emits twenty metric tons of CO2 per 
capita annually, while per capita CO2 emissions in India are 1.05 met­
ric tons. (World Bank, 2002). One is reminded of the famous cartoon 
of the tall white man who drives up in his gas-guzzling SUV and asks 
the bushman to put out his campfire in order to reduce global emis­
sions. It is not surprising that Indian negotiators contend that their 
people should not be limited to a few “survival emissions” while 
industrial countries are not even willing to accept modest cutbacks in 
their “luxury emissions.” 
Finger pointing about past responsibility for or future contribu­
tions to the problem will not help countries reach a solution. 
Constructing a global climate regime without the United States may 
be possible, but it is certainly not optimal. The Kyoto Protocol target 
of a 5.2 percent reduction in CO2 emissions from 1990 levels by indus­
trialized countries cannot be met without the United States. But even 
if it could be reached, the estimated sixty to seventy percent decrease 
required to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere 
(Mapes, 2001; Gelbspan, 2001) demands the participation of all. 
One-sided measures will not be sufficient. Industrialized 
countries cannot, by themselves, reduce global carbon 
emissions to levels likely to fall within relatively harmless 
concentrations; indeed, even a total ban of fossil fuels by all 
industrialized nations would not be sufficient if developing 
countries continue to increase their emissions (Jacoby, Prinn, 
and Schmalensee, 1998). 
Many developing countries have shown a willingness and 
capability to voluntarily participate in global climate protection. The 
most recent ratification of the Kyoto Protocol comes from Brazil, 
which – with a unanimous vote from its Senate on June 18, 2002 – 
joined seventy-five other countries in committing to a global climate 
5regime. Several developing countries are making significant efforts 
5	 Developing countries, however, are not required to reduce greenhouse gas emissions under
the Kyoto Protocol. They can participate in the flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto agreement,
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to reduce emissions, primarily for economic reasons. China, Brazil, 
India, and Mexico have cut fossil fuel subsidies, reducing 
6consumption by twenty-five million tons of carbon. South Korea, 
China, Mexico, and Thailand have adopted efficiency standards as well 
as tax incentives for energy efficiency. China’s efforts at restricting 
carbon emissions are especially impressive. It has reduced carbon 
emissions substantially, even while its economy has grown steadily, 
7with the help of subsidy phase-outs for coal, market pricing for fuel, 
and energy conservation initiatives. The World Bank estimates that 
the un framework convention on climate change 
and the kyoto protocol 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), which was opened for signature during the 1992 United 
Nations Conference on the Environment and Development in Rio, 
was designed as a first attempt to deal with the threat of global 
climate change. The main objective of the Convention is to stabilize 
atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations at levels that would 
prevent dangerous consequences for the climate system (UNFCCC, 
1992: Note 1, Article 2). Although the existence of the Convention 
attests to an international consensus that serious steps must be 
taken to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the Convention does not 
set any specific targets, leaving that step to subsequent protocols. 
The Kyoto Protocol differentiates Annex B countries, mainly 
industrialized countries and countries with economies in transition, 
from non-Annex B countries, the developing nations. The Kyoto 
agreement provides legally binding emissions targets for Annex B 
countries, which will be required, by 2012, to reduce their combined 
emissions of greenhouse gases to below the levels measured in 1990. 
Different countries have different targets, which range from an eight 
percent decrease from the base level for the European Union to a ten 
percent increase for Iceland (UNFCCC, 1992: Annex B). 
6	 Between 1990-91 and 1995-96, total fossil fuel subsidies in fourteen developing countries that
account for twenty-five percent of global carbon emissions from industrial sources declined
forty-five percent, from $60 billion to about $33 billion. Reduced subsidies are desirable
because they lead to higher fuel prices and reduced taxes of growth in carbon emissions (Reid
and Goldemberg, 1997). 
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further efficiency gains in China have the potential of yielding savings 
of 1,000 to 1,700 million tons of coal equivalents per year by 2020 – an 
amount greater than China's total energy consumption in 1990 
(Johnson et al., 1996). 
So far, developed countries have done little to reduce their emis­
sions. The commitment of the 1992 United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change has gone largely unfulfilled. Inaction 
8is justified by the presumption of prohibitive economic costs.
However, a growing body of data and results from progressive corpo­
rate and local government practices tell a different, more encouraging 
story (Hawken, Lovins, and Lovins, 1999). While national govern­
ments have been reluctant to respond to the challenge, innovative 
solutions have sprung up at the company and local levels across the 
world. 
Aware that – with or without the Kyoto Protocol – the future trend 
is toward less carbon intensive economies, multinational corporations 
are putting in place efficient energy systems to reduce emissions. BP, 
for example, has established a voluntary plan with the target of reduc­
ing emissions of greenhouse gases by ten percent from a 1990 baseline 
by the year 2010 (Browne, 2002). A consortium of corporations led by 
Shell Hydrogen and DaimlerChrysler reached an agreement in 1999 
with the government of Iceland to make that country the world’s first 
hydrogen-powered economy. Shell expects to develop its hydrogen 
capacity and DaimlerChrysler expects to have the first fuel cell-pow­
ered automobile on the market. Shell plans to open its first chain of 
hydrogen stations in Iceland (Brown, 2001). 
In developing countries, where access to a central power utility and 
an electricity grid is limited, local entrepreneurs are investing in solar 
cell generating facilities and selling power to village households. By the 
end of 2000, one million households were receiving their electricity 
from solar cells. About 700,000 of those households were in villages in 
developing countries. 
Similarly, local governments have responded to new information 
about environmental realities. In the United States, many state gov­
ernments and local communities have embarked on new energy ini­
8	 An intensive advertising campaign in the United States by a coal-led industrial lobby with the
environmentally friendly name of “Global Climate Coalition” has contributed significantly to
the perception by the press and politicians that any climate-related mitigation measures
would be prohibitively costly. The United States has large sources of cheap coal and a transi­
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tiatives encompassing energy efficiency and emission reductions pro­
grams as well as a shift toward new generation capacities. Advances in 
wind turbine technology have lowered the cost of wind power dra­
matically and wind farms have sprung up in Colorado, Iowa, 
Minnesota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wyoming. Lester Brown 
calls the U.S. Great Plains “the Saudi Arabia of wind power” as the 
steady breezes in this region have the potential to generate enough 
electricity to meet a significant portion of U.S. needs. In Europe, wind 
power covers fifteen percent of the electricity demand of Denmark, 
nineteen percent of Schleswig-Holstein, the northernmost state of 
Germany, and twenty-two percent of Spain’s industrial state of 
Navarra. China could double its current generation capacity by wind 
alone (Brown, 2001). 
Corporate and governmental action will be fundamental to ensur­
ing greenhouse reduction. However, unlike other environmental 
problems where blame is easily assigned to industrial pollution or gov­
ernmental failure, individual decisions are a critical factor in global 
climate change. In Bangkok, Thailand, the city government decided 
that at 9:00 pm on a given weekday evening, all major television sta­
tions would show a big dial with the city’s use of electricity at the time. 
Once the dial appeared on the screen, viewers were requested to turn 
off unnecessary lights and appliances. As people watched, the dial 
showed a reduction of 735 megawatts, enough to close two coal-fired 
power plants (Brown, 2001). This experiment served as a reminder of 
the power of individual decisions to make a collective difference. 
At the individual level, seemingly insignificant investment 
decisions of shareholders could also exercise enormous pressure. The 
9Dow Jones Sustainability Index tracks the performance of leading 
companies worldwide and addresses increasing investor interest in 
companies committed to innovative technology, industrial leadership, 
and social wellbeing. There is mounting evidence that the manage­
ment of these particular factors is directly related to superior financial 
performance (EPA, 2000). 
Global climate change requires a response encompassing the North 
and the South, local communities, and the global community of 
nations. Ranging from global negotiations to individual choices, a 
diverse set of actors with different resource endowments and diverg­
ing values and aspirations would need to be involved. Concerns for 
9 For information on the Dow Jones Sustainability Index, see http://www.sustainability-index.com 
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equity and justice, however, are central to effective responses to glob­
al climate change (Paterson, 2001; Wiegandt, 2001). Differences in the 
perceptions of developed and developing countries as to what is fair 
and equitable have presented enormous difficulties in constructing 
governance mechanisms for addressing climate change. Developing 
countries emphasize the need for a historical view of responsibility as 
well as present-day distributive justice. An historical perspective 
entails not only the widely accepted “polluter pays” principle but also 
the principle of “common but differentiated responsibility.” However, 
absent a supranational body vested with the requisite judicial author­
ity, the application of these concepts is, at best, difficult. Distributive 
justice entails a fair distribution of costs or benefits. Some commen­
tators argue that this translates into equal per capita emissions 
(Grubb, 1990; Agarwal and Narain, 1990; Bertram, 1992). Given the 
political infeasibility of this approach, its defenders have emphasized 
the critical importance of financial resources and technology transfers 
to assist developing countries in minimizing their impact while allow­
10ing economic growth.
Developed countries have formally acknowledged the need for 
fairness, but they have shown little interest in operationalizing this 
commitment to equity on a basis that satisfies the South. The absence 
of governance structures that allow for matching interests, facilitating 
bargains, and overseeing the completion of contracts hampers effec­
tive responses to many global issues. In the case of climate change, an 
equitable agreement could come about if the genuine interests of all 
parties involved are duly considered and accounted for. This would 
entail the creation of a more agile and multi-layered institutional 
structure. 
What Is To Be Done? 
Climate is an extraordinarily complex system with many delicately 
interrelated components. We lack knowledge about thresholds that 
might trigger climatic changes for which we are unprepared. 
Estimates of global carrying capacity for CO2 emissions range from 
500 billion tons to two trillion tons (Schelling, 2002). Climate change 
modeling continually grows more sophisticated, but the complexity of 
10 Grubb (1990: 287) estimates that necessary North-South transfers would amount to $100 bil­
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the systems modeled and current limitations in technology leave pre­
dictions of future changes in the realm of the hypothetical. And yet, in 
the face of uncertainty that is likely to continue into the future, policy 
decisions must be made regarding possible ways to advance human 
development while diminishing its impact on nature. As illustrated by 
the analysis thus far, action is necessary at the local and the global lev­
els, by private and public actors, in the North and in the South. To this 
end, an interest-based approach is critical. Interests are shaped by 
changes in information on vulnerability or abatement costs. Drawing 
on the analysis of Esty and Ivanova in this volume, we see functioning 
governance mechanisms for information and technology as critical 
and a forum for issue linkage and bargaining as imperative for a suc­
cessful climate change regime that incorporates yet transcends nation­
al interests. 
Information Provision 
Given the distance, scope, and relatively hard-to-see nature of the 
problem, and the scientific ambiguity and magnitude of the costs 
involved, climate change decisions are predicated upon a complex 
array of data on emissions, likely impacts of human activities on the 
environment, and costs and benefits of abatement strategies. 
Measurement and indicators can make obscure phenomena such as 
greenhouse gas emissions seem more tangible. The “electricity meter 
on TV” in Bangkok provides a vivid example of this effect. 
Data and information can expose uncertainties, reveal risks, and 
demonstrate alternatives (Esty, 2002). As new information emerges, 
the utility calculus of countries can shift, leading to an altered percep­
tion of interests and more optimal strategies. For example, if countries 
receive new evidence that their ecological vulnerability is higher or 
that abatement costs are lower than previously estimated, their 
propensity to support stronger international commitments may 
increase (Sprinz and Weiß, 2001). 
The climate regime has developed considerable data and informa­
tion capacity, drawing on research institutes around the world. It has 
built a sophisticated network of experts through the assessment 
process of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 
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11a variety of disciplines. The climate data and information initiative is 
an important building block for a more comprehensive environmen­
tal information initiative at the global level. 
Comparative cross-country data and benchmarking on energy 
efficiency indicators could be developed to reveal true eco­
nomic potential, identify best practices, and increase aware­
ness and peer pressure. Greater information availability could 
also promote a more effective issue linkage and bargaining 
strategy and more efficient and equitable technology transfer. 
Issue Linkage and Bargaining 
Recognizing the importance of institutional incentives and flexible 
arrangements, the Kyoto Protocol features new mechanisms that seek 
to facilitate greater participation and alter incentives, including Joint 
Implementation, emissions trading, and the Clean Development 
Mechanism. These mechanisms provide flexibility in achieving emis­
sion reduction targets through the potential for contracts between 
countries with high and low abatement costs. As Whalley and 
Zissimos emphasize in this volume, a bargaining forum that allows 
linkage among various issues could further develop these mechanisms 
and provide for matching of interests and “give and take” on a series 
of issues of global impact and significance. 
One way to breach the North-South gap might be to establish a 
place where environmental bargains could be struck. Many developing 
countries, for example, still manufacture and use chemicals known as 
persistent organic pollutants. These substances include pesticides such 
as DDT, deldrin, and endrin, industrial chemicals such as PCBs, and 
unintentional byproducts of industrial and combustion processes 
such as dioxins and furans. Persistent organic pollutants pose a serious 
threat to human and ecosystem health and their effects may span the 
globe, since they travel great distances, persist in the environment, and 
bioaccumulate through the food chain. A global forum for negotiation 
and bargaining across issues might provide a breakthrough in global 
11	 The IPCC was established by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the United
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in 1988 to assess scientific, technical, and socioeco­
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governance. The United States, for example, could agree to reduce 
CO2 emissions in exchange for a phase-out of persistent organic pol­
lutants, more stringent controls for preventing influx of non-native 
species, forest preservation, or other issues of concern to the United 
States and its citizens. Developing countries would hold powerful bar­
gaining chips in the form of natural resources of global significance. 
Biodiversity, tropical forests, coral reefs, and pristine ecosystems could 
be preserved in exchange for market access, debt relief, or immediate 
12financial transfers.
An issue linkage strategy might provide for a more egalitari­
an approach than current governance structures. 
Emission reductions could be linked with minimizing the costs to 
the North of meeting reduction targets, and would also facilitate North-
South financial and technological transfers based on genuine interest-
based contracts rather than altruistic promises. Moreover, a bargaining 
approach, with a light institutional structure to oversee contract com­
pletion, could ensure efficiency in implementing obligations. 
Technological Potential for a New Growth Imperative 
The economic paradigm of the last hundred years of rapid growth was 
based on the presumption that the environment should be under­
stood as a subset of the economy rather than the economy being a 
subset of the ecosystem on which it depends. Further, the supply of 
natural resources was assumed to be infinite and the capacity to 
absorb waste unlimited. Environmental services such as the ability of 
plants to convert carbon dioxide to oxygen, of wetlands to cleanse 
water, or of forests to stabilize aquifers are not assigned any economic 
13value despite their importance to continued economic growth. It was 
not until it became obvious that economic development and popula­
12 For a full analysis of the rationale for and the functioning of a global bargaining body, see
Whalley and Zissimos, this volume. 
13 Many of the ecosystem services that life on Earth depends upon have no substitute at any
price. This was demonstrated memorably in 1991-93 when the scientists operating the $200
million Biosphere 2 experiment in Arizona discovered that it was unable to maintain life-sup­
porting oxygen levels for the eight people living inside. The Earth performs this task daily at
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tion growth were affecting the carrying capacities of natural systems 
that an alternative was put forward – the vision of sustainable devel­
opment. 
A shift from the traditional fossil fuel-based economy to carbon-
free energy systems would be the cornerstone of an environmentally 
sustainable economy. Indeed, as Seth Dunn of Worldwatch Institute 
points out, an information-age economy cannot conceivably be pow­
ered by a primitive, industrial-age energy system (cited in Brown, 
2001). Technological breakthroughs can already be identified. 
Advanced new technologies such as hydrogen fuel cells, film-thin solar 
cells applicable to facades and windows, and wind turbines with long­
term energy storage capacity are being developed and could dramati­
cally alter energy needs. The transition from fossil fuels to an energy 
economy based on wind, solar, and hydrogen power is taking hold (see 
Table 1). Moreover, energy restructuring is not only feasible, it could 
14be economically profitable.
Table 1 Trends in Energy Use, by Source, 1990-2000 
Energy Source Annual Growth Rate (percent) 
1990–2000 2000 
Wind power 25 32 
Solar cells 20 43 
Geothermal power 4 N/A 
Hydroelectric power 2 N/A 
Natural gas 2 2 
Oil 1 1 
Nuclear power 0.8 0.8 
Coal -1 -4 
Source: Brown, Lester. 2001. Eco-Economy: Building an Economy for the Earth. New  
York: W. W. Norton, available from http://www.earth-policy.org/Books/Eco_ 
contents.htm 
14 The United States, for example, could cut its annual energy bills by $300 billion by using exist­
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Technological progress is likely to play a key role in a transition 
toward sustainability. Technological innovation represents a double 
opportunity, offering prospects for improvement in both developed 
and developing countries. In the North, new technologies could be 
gradually introduced as capital stocks turn over. In the South, new, 
more energy efficient technologies would allow countries to bypass 
the carbon intensive growth typical of the North, and advance direct­
ly into cleaner energy matrices. However, new technologies often rep­
resent incremental costs and take time to develop and disseminate. 
Financing mechanisms for technology transfer from the North to the 
South would therefore be critical to meeting the rapidly growing ener­
gy needs of developing countries, while also facilitating their partici­
pation in global efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
New Ethical Imperative 
The pace of progress will be determined by the most important shift 
that the international community still needs to make – a shift in val­
ues. As Speth argues in the opening chapter of this volume, we now 
find ourselves in a radically different ethical position, one that 
demands “active management of the planet.” We need to extend our 
value system over space, relinquish our self-centered attitudes, and 
think beyond the confines of our immediate surroundings. We need 
to give up our village behavior as we realize that our wellbeing has 
become intricately tied to the wellbeing of others. We need to also 
extend our value system over time and overcome our propensity for 
short-term thinking. Global environmental challenges require long­
term commitment and investment. The effects of today’s environ­
mental degradation are likely to be experienced most intensely by 
future generations. At the end of our lives, we must return to our chil­
dren the planet we have ultimately borrowed from them. 
conclusion 
Climate change presents the ultimate challenge to global environmen­
tal governance. The inherently global nature of the problem mandates 
a truly global response. The atmosphere is indivisible and greenhouse 
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causes, uncertainty of timing and effects, and significant economic 
costs are strong deterrents of collective action. Moreover, vulnerabili­
ty to climate change varies across regions, with the greatest negative 
impacts likely to be concentrated in the tropics and sub-tropics. While 
historical responsibility for climate change is undoubtedly lodged 
with the North, development trajectories are shifting this burden to 
the South. Climate change thus brings forth deep-seated North-South 
divisions that demand resolution. Historical fairness would have the 
North pay a large share of the initial climate change bill, but the exist­
ing international institutional arrangements have no authority to 
impose such a tab. Distributive justice entails an ability to pay 
approach, but even this version of fairness seems politically infeasible. 
An innovative governance architecture is necessary to facilitate a 
leap from narrowly defined national interests to a global regime. 
Accurate, comprehensive, and reliable information can reveal prefer­
ences, confer negotiating power, and alter interests. Bargaining across 
issues holds the promise of reaching otherwise impossible agreements 
and directly addressing preferences for resource transfer or policy 
changes. A system of international mechanisms to promote changes in 
behavior across sectors and jurisdictions in an efficient and equitable 
manner will be critical to the success of a climate change regime. 
Despite all the debate, the confrontations, and the frustration, we 
have begun to move in the right direction. The issue now is the pace at 
which we are moving. The longer we wait before taking serious action, 
the more difficult and costly it will be to mitigate global warming. 
Global governance, whether for climate change or for any of the myri­
ad issues affecting the world as a whole, can only be built on the recog­
nition of planetary interdependence. Anything short of that will keep 
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The Road Ahead:
 
Conclusions and Action Agenda
 
Daniel C. Esty and Maria H. Ivanova 
We live in a time of contrasts. Ours is an era of fast-paced change and 
yet persistent problems. More people are wealthier than ever before in 
history – and yet billions remain desperately poor. News travels in an 
instant across the planet – and yet old beliefs, values, and prejudices 
only slowly change. New actors from multinational corporations to 
non-governmental organizations are playing an increasingly central 
role on the global stage – and yet, nation-states continue to be the 
dominant mode of political organization. Transformative technolo­
gies, such as the internet, bind us together ever more tightly – and yet 
old divides remain deep, and new ones seem to be emerging. On one 
level, the lines between “us” and “them” appear to be more sharply 
etched than ever. But on other levels, past distinctions have blurred. 
What is clear is that success in achieving old goals – such as providing 
opportunities for lives of peace and prosperity, liberty and happiness 
– will require fresh thinking, refined strategies, and new mechanisms 
for cooperation. 
Recent events have clearly revealed the interdependence of the 
nations and peoples of the world. Security issues have been in focus 
but interdependence extends beyond these concerns. Economic inte­
gration has demonstrated that some global-scale forces are beyond the 
capacity of national governments to regulate and control. Simul­
taneously, we are becoming ever more aware of our ecological inter­
dependence. From shared natural resources such as fisheries and bio­
logical diversity to the potential for transboundary pollution 
spillovers across the land, over water, and through the air, we now 
understand that the traditional notion of national territorial sover­
eignty cannot protect us from global-scale environmental threats. 
This volume seeks to address the environmental dimension of 
interdependence. It highlights a set of issues that make the present dif­
ferent from the past and promise to make the future dramatically 
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sustainability we now face are not all new, but the scope and scale of 
the threat they pose are unprecedented. 
The need to coordinate pollution control and natural resource 
management policies – across the diversity of countries and peoples, 
political perspectives and traditions, levels of wealth and develop­
ment, beliefs and priorities – may seem awkward. But, however 
uncomfortable, there really is no choice. Ecological interdependence is 
now an inescapable fact. Moreover, the rapid pace of economic inte­
gration has led to interlinked world markets and economies, demand­
ing synchronization of national policies on a number of issues. One 
dimension of this coordination concerns the environment. 
Given the global-scale issues and linkages highlighted in this vol­
ume, it is imperative that we manage our ecological interdependence 
and related economic relationships thoughtfully, explicitly, and effec­
tively. Four basic “governance” options can be distinguished: 
• Do nothing; 
• Refine the status quo governance structure; 
• Launch a new Global Environmental Organization; 
• Develop a new governance approach: a Global Environmental 
Mechanism. 
Do Nothing 
If the harms that a global environmental regime would address were 
not serious, there would be a logic to a “do nothing” approach. As 
economists (Demsetz, 1967; Libecap, 1989), lawyers (Krier, 1974; Rose, 
1991), political scientists (Haas, Keohane, and Levy, 1993) and environ­
mental analysts (Esty and Mendelsohn, 1998) have demonstrated, 
unless the benefits of action justify the costs, the investment in coor­
dination and governance cannot be justified. Organizing a response to 
a problem demands resources. “Collective action” at the global scale is 
especially complicated and expensive. Thus, simply put, if the costs of 
organizing for action are greater than the benefits anticipated, doing 
nothing makes sense. 
Cost-benefit calculations represent an essential starting point in 
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of governance structure to create. But undergirding this analysis must 
be good data on the environmental problem set and the costs and ben­
efits of taking action. All too often, however, economic costs have been 
easier to measure and benefits difficult to quantify, leading to “justi­
fied” inaction. We thus need refined economic models that more fully 
account for the ecological services on which the economy – and 
humanity’s existence – depend (see Hales and Prescott-Allen, and 
Figueres and Ivanova, this volume, calling for a more rigorous 
approach to environmental valuation). Carefully gathered, rigorously 
scrutinized, and thoroughly peer-reviewed information on the types 
of threats to which we are exposed, the risks they pose, the degree of 
harm threatened, and the value of the damage that might be inflicted 
must therefore underpin any governance debate. 
As demonstrated by Speth and others throughout this volume, and 
elsewhere in the literature (Haas, Keohane, and Levy, 1993; Hempel, 
1996; Vogler, 2000; Vig and Kraft, 2000), the evidence suggests both 
that investment in global scale environmental protection makes sense 
and that the current approach is not delivering good results. The ques­
tion is not whether to design a structure of global environmental gov­
ernance, but how. Therefore, we turn to a set of reform options. 
Refine the Status Quo 
A number of commentators (Juma, 2000; von Moltke, 2001a; Najam, 
2002, forthcoming) believe that the most feasible way to improve 
global environmental results is to revitalize the existing regime cen­
tered on the UN Environment Programme (UNEP). They argue that 
what is missing is political will and claim that we have never tried to 
make the current system work. Thus, their reform package focuses on 
giving UNEP a sharper mandate, bolstering its funding, and develop­
ing better coordination across UN bodies. 
On a practical level, those who favor a refined status quo generally 
fear that any broader gauge reform effort will fall flat politically. They 
emphasize the difficulty of carrying out fundamental changes within 
the UN system and point to the likely bureaucratic obstruction and 
fierce turf battles that would be triggered by any program of wholesale 
restructuring. Others say that energies put into revolutionizing the 
global environmental regime are misplaced. The priority, they suggest, 
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Some proponents of a refine-the-status-quo strategy also argue 
that proposals to consolidate global-scale environmental responsibili­
ties might diminish the effectiveness of the system. They note that the 
range of problems that must be addressed is diverse, making a decen­
tralized structure of multiple international organizations and individ­
ual treaty secretariats a virtue. Other reformers have argued for a 
“clustering” of the various pieces of the existing environmental regime 
so as to improve policy coherence, tighten potential cross-issue link­
ages, and avoid the duplication of effort that comes from full decen­
tralization (von Moltke, 2001b; UNEP, 2001a, 2001b). 
Launch a Global Environmental Organization 
Proposals for major structural reform derive from the conclusion that 
the existing global-scale environmental architecture is deeply dysfunc­
tional and structurally flawed, making a fresh start easier than reform 
along the margins. A number of leading politicians (Ruggiero, 1998; 
Chirac, 2001; Gorbachev, 2001; Panitchpakdi, 2001), academics 
(Runge, 1994, 2001; Esty, 1994a, 1994b; Biermann, 2000; Schellnhuber 
et al., 2000; Whalley and Zissimos, 2001) and others (Charnovitz, 
2002; Zedillo Commission, 2001) have come to this conclusion. 
Beyond the difficulties of trying to fix a failed structure, those arguing 
for a new approach often note that the existing regime was designed 
for a pre-globalization era, before the full spectrum of worldwide 
environmental problems was understood and the depth of current 
economic integration was achieved. 
The substantive case for a major overhaul of the environmental 
regime builds on a number of arguments: (1) the “public goods” logic, 
which suggests that collective action must be organized at the scale of 
the problem to be addressed (Olson, 1971), combined with the 
recognition that some problems arise at a worldwide scale, making 
national level responses inadequate; (2) the potential to overcome the 
fragmentation of the current structure, to obtain synergies in 
addressing problems, and to take advantage of opportunities for better 
issue prioritization, budget rationalization, and bureaucratic 
coordination; (3) the benefit of having a body that could serve as a 
counterpoint and a counterweight to the World Trade Organization, 
the World Bank, and the other international economic institutions, 
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into the international economic regime; and (4) the practical value of 
having an authoritative international body with a first-rate staff, a 
reputation for analytic rigor, and the capacity to take on tasks such as 
dispute resolution. 
Develop a New Governance Approach: A Global Environmental
Mechanism 
Another option for strengthening global environmental governance 
focuses on creating a structure that can deliver the functions needed at 
the global level. Such an approach acknowledges the diversity and 
dynamism of environmental problems and recognizes the need for 
specialized responses. Proponents of a Global Environmental 
Mechanism (GEM) argue that no bureaucratic structure can build an 
internal organization with the requisite knowledge and expertise to 
address the wide-ranging, dynamic, and interconnected problems we 
now face (GEM PAG, 2002; Esty and Ivanova, this volume). The issues 
demanding immediate attention arise on various geographic scales, 
requiring a multi-tier response structure (Esty, 1999). They demand 
capacities in multiple areas, including ecological sciences, public 
health, risk assessment, cost-benefit analysis, performance measure­
ment, and policy evaluation. What is necessary is not only a multi-tier 
but also a multi-dimensional governance structure (Esty, 2003, forth­
coming). Today’s global environmental governance challenge thus 
requires a more virtual structure with a multi-institutional founda­
tion capable of drawing in a wide array of underlying disciplines 
through governments, the private sector, NGOs, and global public pol­
icy networks. 
As we argue in this volume, a Global Environmental Mechanism 
could emerge in various ways, driven by functional needs. Its core 
capacities might include: (1) provision of adequate information and 
analysis to characterize problems, track trends, and identify interests; 
(2) creation of a “policy space” for environmental negotiation and bar­
gaining; and (3) sustained build up of capacity for addressing issues of 
agreed-upon concern and significance. A Global Environmental 
Mechanism could build upon the expertise of existing institutions and 
create new mechanisms where key functions were deemed to be non­
existent or inadequate. Initial elements might comprise a global infor­
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ment, monitoring, and analysis; a global technology clearinghouse 
with mechanisms for technology transfer and identification and dis­
semination of best practices; and a bargaining forum, along the lines 
proposed by Whalley and Zissimos in this volume, to facilitate deals 
that improve environmental quality and reconcile the interests of dif­
ferent parties. 
While it would take time to weave the dense fabric of relationships 
across actors and institutions that is required for successful global 
environmental governance, the concept of a Global Environmental 
Mechanism would allow for the progressive growth of the regime. It 
could begin with “the art of the possible” and gradually assemble the 
elements of an effective institutional structure as issues and mecha­
nisms are identified and developed, building on a core set of functions 
such as information provision and a mechanism for dissemination of 
policy and technology strategies. A Global Environmental Mechanism 
could expand into more ambitious domains such as bargaining, trade-
offs, norm development, and dispute settlement as (and only if) the 
value of those activities is demonstrated. A Global Environmental 
Mechanism offers a new model of governance that is light, more vir­
tual and networked, and potentially more entrepreneurial and effi­
cient. 
toward effective action 
In deciding what route to take, careful thinking is needed about what 
is required from the international environmental regime. The chapters 
in this volume identify a number of critical roles and functions in a 
global environmental governance system: 
Problem identification and definition; • 
Analysis and option evaluation; • 
Policy discussion and coordination; • 
Financing and support for action; • 





















    
Problem Identification and Definition 
Understanding the range of pollution control and natural resource 
management issues the world community faces requires good data 
and information. As Hales and Prescott-Allen demonstrate in their 
chapter, the foundations for effective decisionmaking in the interna­
tional environmental and sustainable development realm do not exist. 
With a better picture of the problem set and issue trends, the logic of 
collective action at the global scale would be clearer and the specific 
institutional needs might come into sharper focus. Such clarity would 
help to define the challenge, furnish us with a compass and a 
roadmap, and make it easier to identify the best path forward. 
Analysis and Option Evaluation 
Progress depends on more than data. Once a problem is identified, it 
must be studied so that the risks it poses are understood and the costs 
and benefits of action or inaction can be calculated. Given the range 
of issues that must be addressed and the variety of circumstances 
under which these issues arise, those responding to international envi­
ronmental challenges need access to significant analytic capacity. 
Without a global-scale policymaking apparatus, however, critical 
transboundary issues will likely be neglected (Dua and Esty, 1997). 
And as Karlsson argues in this volume, the high degree of uncertain­
ty that exists in the environmental domain and the diversity of under­
lying values and assumptions means that the analytic process needs to 
draw on a wide range of perspectives. 
Managing interdependence in the context of great diversity seems 
to call for an “open architecture” of decisionmaking that encourages 
data, information, risk assessments, cost-benefit analysis, policy 
options, and evaluations to be brought forward not just by govern­
ments, but by the business community, environmental groups, and 
others in civil society who can enrich the foundation on which deci­
sions are made. In their chapter, Gemmill and Bamidele-Izu highlight 
some of the benefits of a more open and inclusive governance process. 
Streck’s analysis in this volume explains, moreover, how global public 
policy networks can forge effective working arrangements across sec­
tors and could be part of the answer to the complexity of internation­
al environmental problems and the diversity of perspectives that need 
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Policy Discussion and Coordination 
Successful intervention to address environmental challenges requires 
more than analysis; a course of policy action must be agreed upon and 
executed. Getting all of the relevant parties on board an action plan is 
never easy. Coordinating effective policies in the international sphere 
is especially difficult. There is, of course, no global legislature. Thus, 
one of the critical functions that a global environmental regime must 
serve is as a forum for dialogue. As Koh and Robinson stress in their 
analysis in this volume, the current consensus-driven approach to 
internalize problem solving has resulted in multiple political agree­
ments, but has failed in implementation. What is needed is a mecha­
nism for generating on-the-ground progress. Whalley and Zissimos, 
in their chapter, suggest a novel option: a “policy space” for sustained 
environmental interaction, negotiation, and bargaining. Such a forum 
might engage not only governments in trying to forge multi-country 
“deals” to address particular issues, but could also draw in the business 
community and other potential parties. 
Financing and Support for Action 
Real progress cannot be achieved without resources – and to date the 
commitments made in this regard have generally been regarded as 
inadequate. Another aspect of the global environmental regime that 
therefore demands attention is funding. The financial support 
required for action could come from a variety of sources: (1) increased 
government funding and development assistance; (2) a redirection of 
existing funding, perhaps through a “rechartering” of the World Bank 
and the UN Development Programme (UNDP); (3) increased eco­
nomic growth and better channeling of private capital flows (includ­
ing foreign direct investment (FDI) and national private sector invest­
ments); and (4) new commitments of resources from foundations, 
enlightened citizens, and social entrepreneurs. Given the magnitude of 
the challenge it seems likely that all of these strategies will need to be 
pursued. In this volume, Koch-Weser offers an innovative strategy for 
jump-starting this process through a Johannesburg Commission on 
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Outreach and Legitimacy 
A further challenge in the global governance arena emerges from the 
need for legitimacy. At the national level, governments are usually 
elected and thus derive authority and legitimacy from their “popular 
sovereignty.” International decisionmaking inevitably involves offi­
cials whose claim to power does not derive directly from having won 
elections. Because they are somewhat removed from the majority­
vote-based popular sovereignty, international organizations must 
make special efforts to ensure their legitimacy (Esty, 2002). They must 
build bridges to publics around the world, and explain their decision 
processes, drawing in views and guidance from the citizens of the 
world community on whose behalf they are meant to act. NGOs can 
play a useful role in this give-and-take. As Gemmill and Bamidele-Izu 
explain in their chapter, international organizations must also 
demonstrate their effectiveness and thus the value of their role as 
coordinators of worldwide action. 
International bodies in general, and any global environmental 
regime in particular, must also be perceived as fair and equitable. 
Fairness encompasses both procedural and substantive elements. 
Procedural fairness requires access to decisionmaking on an equitable 
basis, with both a horizontal dimension – across governments and 
bridging the North-South divide – and a vertical dimension – pro­
viding individuals and groups as well as governments a chance to be 
heard. As Figueres and Ivanova suggest in this volume, substantive 
fairness demands that the polluter pays principle be enforced and the 
“ability to pay” be recognized in setting the course of international 
action and in deciding how the costs of intervention will be borne. 
the johannesburg opportunity 
As we hope this volume has demonstrated, there are many paths to 
progress in global environmental governance. The creation of a func­
tioning and effective environmental regime will require years of work 
and refinement. But windows of opportunity to define the agenda and 
take major steps do not come around all that often. One exists in 2002: 
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We urge the countries participating in the Johannesburg process to 
seize the opportunity and demonstrate a commitment to action with 
four concrete initiatives, addressing: 
• Global environmental data and information; 
• Financing for sustainable development; 
• Technology promotion; 
• Exploration of options for strengthening global environmental 
governance. 
Global Environmental Data and Information 
The weak foundations for global-scale environmental decisionmaking 
could be shored up with a modest commitment of resources to a new 
coordinated program of global environmental data gathering and 
information sharing. Building on existing efforts, such an initiative 
might focus on ensuring that a core set of baseline environmental 
indicators (covering air, water, and land) were tracked in every coun­
try in the world on a methodologically consistent and rigorous basis 
that would permit cross-country comparisons. Furthermore, individ­
ual countries or regional groupings might supplement the global data 
set with additional metrics addressing local priorities. 
Information systems could reveal new policy options and lead to 
better decisionmaking, improved performance, and greater efficiency 
through reduced uncertainty, enhanced comparative analysis, and 
greater ability to define points of policy leverage. Data that are com­
parable across countries also facilitate benchmarking and the identifi­
cation of best practices, creating both a spur to lagging jurisdictions 
and a guide for all. A more “measured” approach to environmental 
problem solving would not only enhance analysis and decisionmak­
ing, it would make it easier to evaluate policy and program perform­
ance, track on-the-ground progress in addressing pollution control 
and natural resource management challenges, and identify successful 
(and unsuccessful) efforts and approaches. 
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Financing for Sustainable Development 
Any commitment to enhanced global environmental efforts must 
come in the context of a “global bargain” that commits the world 
community to a more aggressive program of poverty alleviation. The 
Johannesburg process creates an opportunity for such a dual commit­
ment with a major initiative to promote economic progress across the 
developing world. Such an initiative might include several elements: 
(1) an expanded emphasis on phasing out trade barriers and broader 
commitments toward progress in the Doha Development Round; (2) 
a rechartering of the World Bank and UNDP to redouble their efforts 
to promote development in the poorest countries and to finance glob­
al public goods, including environmental programs; and (3) a new 
mechanism (or, at least, the launching of a process to create a new 
mechanism) to promote financing for sustainable development har­
nessing government, business, foundation, and individual resources. 
Technology Promotion 
“Technology transfer” has become a buzzword. But too little has been 
done to translate the concept into action. A step forward could be 
taken by launching a technology initiative that would seek to make use 
of Information Age breakthroughs to resolve international environ­
mental challenges. Beginning perhaps as a technology clearinghouse, 
such a facility might ultimately provide a mechanism for North-South 
cooperation and for creating incentives for the private sector to devel­
op technologies in response to needs in both developing and devel­
oped countries. Engaging leading information technology companies 
in this initiative would be useful – and could be seen as part of a strat­
egy to bridge the “digital divide.” 
Exploration of Options for Strengthening Global Environmental
Governance 
To give momentum to the process of exploring options for 
strengthened global environmental governance within the context of 
the Johannesburg process, a Commission could be launched to 
identify and evaluate the world community’s needs in the 
international environmental realm and various ways of addressing 
these needs. Comprised of eminent persons from the North and the 
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South, including a number of environmental ministers as well as 
distinguished business leaders, academics, and non-governmental 
organization officials, the Commission could be given a mandate to 
report back within eighteen months with an evaluation of the options 
and a recommended blueprint for action. 
the road ahead 
We have entered a new era of public policy, defined by a growing num­
ber of concerns that straddle national borders and transcend national 
interests. Global environmental challenges represent an issue set on 
which collective action is critical and through which experience could 
be gained on how best to build broader mechanisms for international 
cooperation. Narrow, unstructured government-to-government 
approaches are no longer sufficient. The global problems we current­
ly face will yield only to a carefully targeted, sustained, and coordinat­
ed effort involving novel coalitions of actors and innovative institu­
tional arrangements. 
As Speth emphasizes in the opening chapter of this volume, the 
goals and principles of global environmental governance have been 
elaborated over the past two decades, and “it is clearly time to launch 
a second phase moving us from talk to action.” With this volume, we 
hope to contribute to the unfolding debate on concrete options and 
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